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 Using secondary data from Pew’s Early January 2004 Political Communications Study 
this thesis explains political identification, the range of media sources that a person uses, 
perceptions of political party bias and political participation using information about media use 
and perceptions of the media.  The survey, which was conducted during the winter of 2003/2004, 
includes responses from 1506 individuals.  Analytic techniques include means breakdowns, 
crosstabulations, correlations and multiple regression.  Many associations are identified; 
however, in general, the media related variables were weakly related to dependent variables.  
The thesis speculates that the weak relationships can be attributed to a homogeneous range of 
available media content.  Connections between the recent growth in the number of media sources 
and diversity in media content are discussed.   
The analysis finds that listening to talk radio, religious radio and watching the Fox News 
Channel were weakly associated with conservatism while use of non-profit media, including use 
of National Public Radio (NPR), the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) and the 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) were weakly associated with liberalism.  The thesis questions 
if the use of “sound bites” used on talk radio programs and some 24-hour television news 
channels is related to the conservatism of these audiences.  A positive relationship between the 
amount of bias that a person sees in the news media and the range of news sources that a person 
uses was found.  Sources include Internet, television and print media.  The implications of these 
findings in the context of the agenda-setting framework and a homogenous media are discussed.   
Use of the Fox News Channel and talk radio were associated with perceptions of a 
Democratic Party bias in the news media.  Ideas from Bourdieu and Passeron are used to 
understand how communication styles are related to the perception of talk radio as an alternative 
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to the “liberal media”.  The implications of the prevalence of the perception of a “liberal media” 
are discussed and related to theoretical work from Gramsci and Abercrombie.  Media that 
attempt to add diversity through new operational models are described.  Associations between 
political participation and several types of media use were found.  The finding that use of 
comedy television is related to some indicators of political participation is seen as demonstrating 
the difficulty in distinguishing information from entertainment-oriented programming.  The 
analysis questions assumptions about the relationships between media use, electoral cynicism 
and political participation.  The thesis argues that better tools from examining media use in 
general and in the Canadian context are needed.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction & Review of Literature 




1.0 Introduction & Review of Literature: 
 
1.1 Thesis Introduction and Outline: 
 
 This research aims to understand the link between media use and political views and 
behaviours.  The project seeks to identify associations, not causal relationships.  By examining 
patterns in media use we gain a better sense of the concerns that people have about the media and 
the measures that they use to address these perceived deficiencies.   
Very few people have decisive power over media content or the range of media options 
available.  As North Americans, we have the ability to choose from the content that is available 
to us.  We have some ability to choose how much and which media we want to use.  The link 
between media consumption and political views is complex.  Feelings about political issues can 
stem from the information that persons accesses from the media.  However, political views can 
also influence media selection.  While this knowledge can come from sources other than the 
media, attention to media use is a way of examining decisions that are tied to a person’s place in 
democracy.  Because individuals have limited power, it is important to examine areas where 
individuals can make decisions. Media use patterns help to reveal the concerns that people have 
about the media and the measures that they use to address these perceived deficiencies.  The 
identification of sources associated with audiences with perceptions of high bias in the media 
suggests how people attempt to overcome the biases that they see. The present analysis seeks to 
identify such associations in attempt to trigger future research that will explore the causality of 
such relationships.   
There has been major growth in the range of media options made available in recent 
years.  Media choices are becoming increasingly niche oriented; giving media consumers the 
sense that they have countless unique media sources to choose from.  Attention to the strength of 
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the relationships between media use and the political variables examined in the present analysis 
will offer a sense of how patterned media habits are.  Stronger relationships between media use 
variables and political variables would suggest that media content is distinct enough to draw 
clearly defined audiences.  In contrast, weak relationships would suggest that despite the 
exponential growth in media options; content is homogeneous.  By considering the powerfulness 
of media use variables in the present analysis, this thesis will help to evaluate the level of media 
diversity.  
 The data analysis portions of the project use the Early January 2004 Political 
Communications Study conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People and The Press.  A 
range of literature including theoretical work by Abercrombie informs the analysis and Gramsci 
as well as media policy oriented materials from Herman and Chomsky and McChesney.  These 
works, as well as a wide variety of empirical works are discussed in this chapter.  Much of the 
empirically focused research uses quantitative methodology to find associations that media use 
habits have with political and demographic variables.  Studies using the agenda-setting 
framework are described.  Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the methodological approach and 
limitations of the project and outlines the hypotheses tested in subsequent chapters. Chapters 3 to 
6 describe the findings from data analysis.  In all cases, bivariate and multivariate findings are 
described.  Techniques include means breakdowns, correlations, crosstabulations and multiple 
regression.  Chapter 3 presents associations between media use and political identification as 
measured through political ideology, voting behaviour and partisanship.  Chapter 4 analyzes the 
range of television broadcasters, media and media sources that a person uses by identifying 
relationships that these variables have with demographic variables and perceptions of the news 
media.  The analysis in Chapter 5 treats political party bias as a dependent variable.  The chapter 
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identifies relationships between media use and perceptions of political party bias in the news 
media.  In Chapter 6, associations between media use and political participation are identified.  
In the final chapter, findings are summarized and implications are discussed.  The chapter relates 
the findings to the expanding range of media options.  
  
1.2 Literature Review Outline: 
 
This discussion of existing work on topics related to the present analysis will draw on 
theoretical and empirical materials.  The literature review will begin with an exploration of ideas 
raised by Adorno, Mills, Abercrombie and Gramsci. These thinkers offer observations about 
power and how the media fits into social structure.  Work from media critics Chomsky, Herman 
and McChesney will then be presented to examine how media content is related to these themes.  
These works are discussed also discussed in Chapter 7 in order to help identify implications of 
the findings presented in Chapters 3 through 6.  
 The remaining sections of the chapter focus on mostly quantitative empirical work.  To 
begin, a number of studies by Holbert and his colleagues will be discussed to reveal demographic 
patterns related to television exposure.  Next, attention will be paid to research on political 
knowledge as well as each of the dependent variables that will be explored in subsequent 
chapters: political participation and identification and perceptions of the news media.  These 
sections will discuss work that deals with these issues in general as well as how they are related 
to media use.  The discussion of work on civic participation will highlight Putnam’s 
contributions to the area and discuss studies and criticisms sparked by his observations.  Because 
of the wealth of work on political talk radio, a section focusing specifically on the medium will 
address talk radio exposure and associations between talk radio listening and political 
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identification and participation.  The last section dealing with empirical findings will introduce 
the agenda-setting framework and discuss the contributions of the area to our understanding of 
role of the mass media.  The final section of the chapter will place the present thesis in the 
context of existing work by explaining how the thesis will address gaps in the substantive area. 
 
1.3 Discussion of Theoretical Work: 
 
Adorno’s work is useful because it questions the way that people see their leisure time.  
Adorno (1998) saw popular music as a paradox because it is does not always appear highly 
standardized despite standardization being central to its structure.  Adorno observes that popular 
music seeks to stimulate the listener’s attention by relying on familiarity.  He writes that:  
Popular music must simultaneously meet two demands.  One is for stimuli that 
provoke the listener’s attention.  The other is for the material to fall within the 
category of what the musically untrained listener would call ‘natural’ music: that 
is, the sum total of all the conventions and material formulas in music to which he 
is accustomed and which he regards as the inherent simple language of music 
itself, no matter how late the development might be which produced this natural 
language [sic.] (Adorno 1998: 202). 
 
Adorno links the idea of popular music seeming natural to its listeners with his discussion of 
leisure time and work.  He sees the desire for workers to be distracted as being “bound to the 
present mode of production, to the rationalized and mechanized process of labour” (1998: 205). 
Adorno sees labour as being associated with anxiety because of fears of unemployment.  This 
concern, according to Adorno, causes people to seek relaxation, specifically, a form of relaxation 
that requires minimal concentration.  Workers are in an irresolvable situation because they want 
“relief from boredom and effort simultaneously” (1998: 205, emphasis added).  Adorno sees 
popular music as reproducing workers’ working capacity through its standardized nature (1998: 
205).  In other words, both work and popular music are based on repetition.  He explains that, 
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“To escape boredom and avoid effort are incompatible-hence the reproduction of the very 
attitude from which escape is sought” (1998: 206).   
 Media consumption, in general, is seen as a leisure activity.  Putnam’s (2000: 241) 
work, as discussed below, demonstrates that Americans spend a large proportion of their 
“leisure” time watching television yet they do not find the activity much more enjoyable than 
doing household chores.  Television and radio, including news content are activities that are 
done during a person’s “spare time”. Adorno’s argument about the structure of popular music 
raises the possibility that news users are also seeking an activity that attempts to reconcile their 
desire for effortless stimulation.  This suggests that the producers of news content must 
negotiate between competing goals.  They make decisions about the balance between 
entertainment and informative aspects of their programs.  Applying Adorno’s ideas to 
television news suggests that news content producers have some incentive to air content that 
stimulates the viewer in ways without demanding much intellectual work.  Recent 
programming trends demonstrate that “news” is a flexible category. 
 Tabloid news is an example of a style that reflects this aspect of news.   Knight (1989: 
94) describes some of the techniques that characterize tabloid news programs.  He explains that 
tabloid, denoted by topic, accent, emphasis and style, is used in varying degrees.  In tabloid 
television, “the goal is to tell the story as much as possible through actuality pictures and 
sound.  The disembodied voice-over, which splits the visuals from the audio source, is played 
down as artificial and staged.  In this respect, tabloid capitalizes on the perceptual effect of 
rawness, immediacy, and liveness, of the direct, unmediated presence, that video has over 
film” (Knight 1989: 101).  Turning footage into a series of clips that are only seconds long 
helps to create a sense of “hyperactivity” (Knight 1989: 103).  These measures represent 
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attempts by programmers to entice viewers with program design.  These techniques appeal to 
viewers’ desire to be stimulated by pace and rhetoric, not their want for depth, detail or 
complex arguments.  This approach is consistent with Adorno’s observations about people’s 
attempts to escape boredom without strain.  The paradox about the amount of time that 
Americans spend in front of their televisions and their lack of satisfaction with this time 
suggests that Adorno’s observations about the irreconcilable goals that popular music listeners 
also have application with television news audiences.  Putnam’s observations about the link 
between television and civic engagement are addressed in detail below.   
 Abercrombie (1990: 201) is critical of Adorno’s ideas about popular music.  He argues 
that: 
This kind of account of the relationship of popular culture to ideology, reproduced 
in several theoretical schemes (e.g. Fargier, 1980), incorporates rather crude, 
unidimensional views of the producers, the audience and the text itself.  The 
production system is seen as coherently and smoothly generating the text, which 
is itself relatively homogeneous and invariant.  Most important of all, the 
audience is presented as relatively uncreative in its responses to an ideological 
text. 
 
Instead, Abercrombie (1990: 201) describes the advantages that Gramsci’s ideas have over 
Adorno’s observations.  He explains that Gramsci sees hegemony as process involving 
“struggle” and “negotiation” (Abercrombie 1990: 201).  In his work with Hill and Turner, 
Abercrombie proposes the “dominant ideology thesis” which is summarized as the argument 
that: 
In all societies based on class divisions there is a dominant class which enjoys 
control of both the means of material production and the means of mental 
production.  Through its control of ideological production, the dominant class is 
able to supervise the construction of a set of coherent beliefs.  These dominant 
beliefs of the dominant class are more powerful, dense and coherent than those of 
subordinate classes.  The dominant ideology penetrates and infects the 
consciousness of the working class, because the working class comes to see and to 
experience reality through the conceptual categories of the dominant class.  The 
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dominant ideology functions to incorporate the working class within a system 
which is, in fact, operating against the material interests of labour.  This 
incorporation in turn explains the coherence and integration of capitalist society. 
(Abercrombie, et al. 1980: 1-2). 
 
The use of the word “supervise” in the above excerpt is instructive.  The concept of supervision 
involves leadership and management without assuming complete control.  Abercrombie, et al. 
(1980: 151) sees the mass media, along with education, as a way to “transmit dominant values on 
a universal scale”.  The authors argue that, in the later stages of capitalism, dominant ideology is 
difficult to specify.  They question the assumption that sees the mass media as spreading a 
coherent set of values held by the dominant class (Abercrombie, et al. 1980: 130).   
In his book focusing on television, Abercrombie (1996: 3) describes television as an 
activity that the British population can share without being divided by gender, ethnicity or class.  
He explains that television is a “shared experience” that often results in interpersonal dialogue 
about television programming (Abercrombie 1996: 3).  This prevalence raises the importance of 
understanding the mass media.  Abercrombie, et al. (1980: 151) see the question of the extent of 
the media’s influence as being important but relying on inconclusive information for answers.  
The authors speculate that an individual’s beliefs are more likely to be influenced by the mass 
media in situations where they have no other tool to base their views (Abercrombie, et al. 1980 
152). 
Abercrombie’s work differs from Adorno’s ideas about popular music in that it sees the 
connection between dominant and subordinate as less direct and explicit.  Gramsci’s ideas also 
represent a view where dominant groups do not have open-ended power over others.  Gramsci’s 
conception of hegemony sees one class striving for consent from another class.  This is in 
contrast with using force (Femia 1981: 24).  For instance, Gransci sees trade unions as an 
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example of such consent.  According to Gramsci, trade unions accept and work within the 
“categories of bourgeoisie democracy” thereby accepting capitalism and positioning workers as 
wage earners rather than producers (Femia 1981: 35, 259).  Gramsci and Abercrombie describe 
possible behavioural scenarios from non-dominant groups.  Adorno’s observations characterize 
the masses as having more prescribed responses. 
Mills’ work also deals with power.  He refers to the powerful class as the power elite and 
describes how the mass media relates to the maintenance of power relations.  Mills (1959) 
defines the power elite as those “men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary 
environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major 
consequences.  Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that 
they occupy such pivotal positions…” (1959: 3-4).  Mills’ definition emphasizes power rather 
than income or wealth.  He sees the economy, the political and the military as the institutions 
with the greatest power in modern America (1959: 6).  The power elite are the people with the 
greatest power in each of these institutions.  While Mills’ work discusses mass society and the 
media, it does not specifically identify the media as one of the “big three” institutions.  However, 
he is critical of the media because he sees it as doing little to promote public debate.  By not 
fostering a critical forum for the American population, the media are presented as a force that 
protects existing power relations.   
 Mills points out that the “big three” institutions are not three separate institutions.  He 
sees them as unified and as shifting leadership roles depending on “the ‘tasks of the period’ as 
they, the elite define them” (1959: 277).  During the time of writing The Power Elite, Mills  
(1959: 276-7) saw the military as central: 
In so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the economic order, 
that clue is in fact that the economy is at once a permanent-war economy and a 
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private-corporation economy.  American capitalism is now in considerable part a 
military capitalism, and the most important relation of the big corporation to the 
state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporation needs, 
as defined by warlords and corporate rich.  Within the elite as a whole, this 
coincidence of interest between the high military and the corporate chieftains 
strengthens both of them and further subordinates the role of the merely political 
men.  Not politicians, but corporate executives, sit with the military and plan the 
organization of war effort.   
 
 Mills makes the distinction between a “public” and a “mass” society. The concepts are 
presented as characteristics that describe a spectrum.  A public is a situation where the number of 
people who express opinion is equal to the number of people who hear them.  A public facilitates 
forums for debate so that debate is always possible.  The mass society differs from the public by 
allowing institutions to have immense influence, leaving the population without agency.  Unlike 
in a public, those in a mass society struggle to make their voices heard.  Instead, the population is 
at the discretion of those who manage the forums for dialogue.  Mills identifies Nazi Germany 
and Communist Russia as extreme examples of mass societies because of their totalitarianism 
(1959: 303-4).  Because the mass media is linked to the concept of the mass society and elite 
culture, they have a role in protecting the structure that allows the elite institutions to dominate.  
Mills (1959: 311) explains that:  
No one really knows all the functions of the mass media, for in their entirety these 
functions are probably so pervasive and so subtle that they cannot be caught by 
the means of social research now available.  But we do now have reason to 
believe that these media have helped less to enlarge and animate the discussions 
of primary publics than to transform them into a set of media markets in mass-like 
society. 
 
Mills (1959: 311) is most critical of the “psychological illiteracy that is facilitated by the media”.  
This term refers to a number of different implications that result from exposure to the mass 
media.  For instance, Mills observes that the media makes events seem legitimate.  The media 
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are said to guide experiences to the extent that personal experiences are thought of in terms or 
stereotypes perpetuated by the media (1959: 312).  He also explains that most people do not 
compare media content.  This is because people are drawn to media that confirms their existing 
beliefs and because there is a narrow range of content to choose from.  “The media display an 
apparent variety and competition, but on closer view they seem to compete more in terms of 
variations on a few standardized themes than of clashing issues” (1959: 313).  Mills sees the 
media as dictating people’s identities and prescribing their goals for them (1959: 314).  He 
explains that, “the gaps between the identity and aspiration lead to technique and/or to escape.  
This is probably the basic psychological formula of the mass media today” (1959: 314).  Mills 
sees the media as distracting people from important issues by feeding them with “artificial 
frenzies that are resolved within the program framework, usually by violent action or by what is 
called humor” (1959: 315).   
Manipulation, unlike authority, conceals the goals that surround it.  In contrast, authority, 
according to Mills, is explicit in the sense that those who are influenced by it are aware that it 
exists (1959: 316).  He argues that manipulation is not a problem in classic democratic societies 
because the “formal authority resides in the public itself” (1959: 317).  Manipulation is 
problematic when those with power do not have authority.  In these situations, the powerful do 
not want others to know about their power.  Implicit in Mills’ argument is the idea that these 
elites are not powerful to the extent that they have no stake in the public’s opinion.  He explains 
that, “Authority formally resides ‘in the people,’ but the power of initiation is in fact held by 
small circles of men.  That is why the standard strategy of manipulation is to make it appear that 
the people, or at least a large group of them, ‘really made the decision’” (1959: 317, emphasis in 
original).    
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1.4 Discussion of Work By Media Critics: 
 
Herman and Chomsky (1998) and McChesney (2004) describe how the range of content 
in current media facilitates the interests of the most powerful and demonstrate that media content 
can be used for purposes captured by Mill’s concept of manipulation.  
Herman and Chomsky’s (1998) model proposes that five “filters” restrict the potential of 
the private media.  First, according to Herman and Chomsky (1998), the financial barriers 
associated with entry into industries such as television and print restrict the range of voices that 
can exercise ownership control.  This reduces the range of potential media owners and explains 
why organizations in the media are foremost profit motivated and are governed by a homogenous 
group with distinct political goals.  Second, the media’s dependence on revenue from advertising 
discourages content which conflict with client interests.  It also encourages companies to target 
their content at audiences with more disposable income.  Those that design media content have 
less value for those with less money (Herman and Chomsky 1998: 16). These practises affect the 
content of the media.  Herman and Chomsky (1998: 17) observe that public affairs oriented 
content is less encouraged because it is seen as spoiling the consumer mood.  Third, because the 
companies in the media aim to keep their costs low, they prefer to use sources that already have 
credibility with their audience because of their status and prestige.  Herman and Chomsky’s 
(1998: 19) examples of such sources include representatives from The White House or the police 
department.  This restricts the range of commentary to those who already are relatively powerful.  
According to Herman and Chomsky (1998: 24), conservative agenda think tanks are said to fund 
experts (also referred to as “talking heads”) that push the agendas of the elite.  He contrasts these 
measures with the costly and provocative genre of investigative journalism, which has the 
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potential to bring attention to other voices.  Fourth, Herman and Chomsky explain that those who 
produce media strive to reduce “flack.” Flack are “negative responses to a media statement or 
program” (Herman and Chomsky 1998 26).  They provide examples of ways that those with 
power put pressure on the media in an attempt to avoid the production of media content that may 
be counter to their goals.  Finally, the authors explain that the idea of communism is presented as 
an “ultimate evil” in the media (1998: 29).  As a result, social democrats are seen as too soft on 
communism and American patriotism is seen as a legitimate news practise.  Issues are framed in 
the context of a narrow dichotomy that labels things as either “communist” or “anti-communist.”  
This approach promotes free-market based ideas. More recent news coverage suggests that the 
new “ultimate evils” have emerged since Herman and Chomsky first published Manufacturing 
Consent.  Enemies for the “war on terror” include those who question United States foreign 
policy or “homeland security” measures. 
McChesney’s (2004) work closely resembles Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model 
by indirectly addressing the five “filters” that Herman and Chomsky identify as restricting 
American media content.  However, McChesney’s (2004) work is much more than a 
regurgitation of the model.  Because of its emphasis on policy, McChesney (2004) focuses on 
recent industry trends.   
McChesney’s (2004) policy recommendations are consistent with the view that market 
forces limit the mass media.  He suggests an alternative to the current structure of the media.  He 
writes: 
The logic of my argument is that a democratic media system-or a democratic 
solution to the problem of the media, as I put it-would necessitate a large, well 
funded, structurally pluralistic, and diverse nonprofit and non-commercial media 
sector, as well as a more competitive and decentralized commercial sector.  
Where economics preclude competitive commercial markets, there must be 
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transparent regulation in the public interest.  The reforms I envision should be 
content neutral and viewpoint neutral (2004: 11). 
 
These recommendations are based on McChesney’s (2004) observations about the weaknesses of 
private media ownership.   
McChesney (2004) enhances Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) work by offering detail and 
elaboration on the weaknesses of private profit oriented media. He observes that the private 
media are committed to promoting an ethic of consumption and argues that we are living in an 
age of “hyper-commercialism.”  McChesney points to the increase in product placement in 
current media.  He notes that, “Coca-Cola paid $25 million to AOL Time Warner so that, among 
other things, characters in the WB Network’s Young American series would ‘down Cokes in 
each episode’” (McChesney 2004: 149).  He points out that part of the attraction of reality 
television to broadcasters is its conduciveness for product placements (McChesney 2004: 149).  
Product placement is especially attractive to advertisers because of concerns that audiences have 
become trained to avoid commercials.  Product placements allow advertising messages to reach 
even the viewers who refuse to stay tuned during commercial breaks.  It also further blurs 
programming with advertising making it more difficult viewers, particularly children, to identify 
advertising content.   
McChesney is very critical of current journalism.  He calls election coverage 
“journalism’s litmus test” because of its importance to the democratic process (McChesney 
2004: 123).  He explains that current election “press coverage strongly emphasizes the ‘spin’ 
politicians deploy, endless analyses of polls, and predictions of winners rather than issues.  This 
inexpensive journalism is easy to fashion into both serious and entertaining reports” (McChesney 
2004: 123).  He notes that, “journalism simply devotes far fewer resources to campaigns and 
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elections than it has historically” (McChesney 2004: 126).  He continues by describing that, “It is 
in this context that paid TV political advertising has become the lingua franca of the electoral 
culture, and a massive industry in its own right…Adjusting for inflation, the amount spent on TV 
political spots increased 600 percent from 1972 to 2000” (McChesney 2004: 127).  McChesney 
(2004: 128) identifies the implications that this trend has on democracy:  
The juggernaut of TV political advertising has significantly molded U.S. electoral 
politics.  For starters, political advertising has replaced coverage as the main 
vehicle by which candidates are exposed to citizenry.  In 2002, for example, a 
viewer was four times more likely to see a political ad during a TV newscast than 
to see an election-related story. 
 
McChesney explains that the emphasis on TV advertising in American elections ensures that 
those running for office are multimillionaires (McChesney 2004: 131).   “The average cost of a 
successful campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives increased from $87, 000 in 1976 to 
$840,000 in 2000, a dramatic increase even after accounting for inflation” (McChesney 2004: 
130).  McChesney explains that in 2000, the better-funded candidate won the House race 95 
percent of the time (McChesney 2004: 130).  These observations illustrate how the media’s 
attempts to maximize revenues results in a system that protects existing power relations while 
encouraging voters to believe that they chose their political leaders. 
 McChesney (2004) points out that in economic theory, competitive markets are markets 
where customers have control over the range of products.  Because of the restrictions on private 
media, our current system does not produce as much “outstanding content” as it could 
(McChesney 2004: 199).  He refutes the idea that private ownership is superior to public media 
ownership because it strives to meet audience tastes by understanding market forces.  Instead, he 
argues that the private sector produces a narrow range of content that is limited by the issues 
discussed above and presents these choices as exhaustive.  He argues that, “People are exposed 
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to the media fare that the giants can profit from, they develop a taste for it, they consume it, and 
then the media giants claim they must make more of it to satisfy demand.  What is demanded 
depends to a very large extent on what is produced rather than the other way around, what John 
Kenneth Galbraith (1958) called the ‘dependence effect’” (McChesney 2004: 200-1).   
McChesney (2004) is very critical of media regulation in the United States.   
 The ideas discussed above describe power relations in capitalistic societies.  They 
emphasize ways that those with power maintain their status.  The hypotheses tested in this thesis 
focus on individual level behaviour to reveal how media users navigate their media use.  
Understanding patterns that relate media use habits to political variables helps to reveal how 
people manage their place in the context of power relations.  Subsequent sections of this chapter 
will deal with political behaviour, identification and views as well as media use and content.  The 
work described below focuses on individual level behaviours to further our understanding of 
these issues.   
 
1.5 Predicting Media Exposure:  
 
Research shows that media use habits can be predicted through demographic variables.  
Holbert and his colleagues have played a major role in demonstrating that television use patterns 
can be predicted through demographic and other background variables.   
Many relationships were explored in the study (Holbert, et al. 2004: 351) on the 
connection between media use and attitudes on law and order issues.  Their analysis examined 
predictors of television news, police reality programs and crime drama viewing.  It was found 
that age has some explanatory power for use of all three program categories.  Unlike police 
reality programming, the other two categories have positive relationships with age.  Being male 
Chapter 1: Introduction & Review of Literature 
 16  
 
 
was found to be associated with watching police reality programs.  Gender was not significantly 
related to television news or crime drama viewing.  Income and education were negatively 
associated with police reality viewing and were not significantly related to the other types of 
television.  Caucasians watched less of all three types of viewing.  Religiosity was positively 
associated with watching television news but was not related to the other types of programming.  
Liberalism was an inconsistent predictor of crime drama viewing.   
Holbert, et al. used information about media use to predict concerns about the 
environment (Holbert, et al. 2003a) and feminist issues (Holbert, et al. 2003b).  Their analyses 
include examinations of associations with various types of entertainment and factual-based 
television.  While the environmental study examined various types of entertainment and factual-
based television, the feminist study focused only on the associations of entertainment 
programming. The former analysis uses data from the 1999 and 2000 advertising firm DDB’s 
Life Style Study while the feminist study draws on the 1997, 1998 and 1999 editions of the same 
survey.  The authors distinguish between traditional and progressive dramas.  While the 
environmental issues study lacks a detailed discussion of the differences between the dramatic 
programming categories, the feminist issues study explains that progressive dramas include 
female characters in positions of authority while traditional dramas limit female characters to 
domestic roles (Holbert, et al. 2003b: 48-9).  Examples of progressive dramas named by the 
authors include NYPD Blue, ER, Law & Order.  In contrast, Chicago Hope. Touched By An 
Angel, Promised Land and Walker: Texas Ranger were considered traditional dramas (Holbert, 
et al. 2003a: 184).   
In the case of dramatic entertainment programming, age did not emerge as a consistent 
predictor of progressive drama viewing but was found to have a significant positive relationship 
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with the viewing of traditional drama (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 187; 2003b: 54).  A negative 
relationship between age and the viewing of situation comedies was found in both studies 
(Holbert, et al. 2003a: 187; 2003b: 54).  Age was found to be positively associated with the 
viewing of public affairs and nature documentaries (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 186).  Being female 
was associated with watching both types of drama (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 187 and Holbert, et al. 
2003b: 54) as well as nature documentaries (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 186).  Gender was a predictor 
of public affairs viewing in 1999 but not in 2000, as being female was positively associated with 
public affairs viewing in 1999 (Holbert, et al. 2003: 186).  Neither education nor income was 
consistently related to watching either of the factual-based programming categories (public 
affairs or nature documentaries), situation comedies or progressive dramas (Holbert, et al. 2003a 
186-7).  However, income was associated with situation comedy viewing in the case of the 
feminist issues study (Holbert, et al. 2003b: 54).  These socio-economic measures were 
negatively associated with watching traditional dramas in both studies (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 
187; 2003b: 54).  Liberalism is positively related to situation comedy viewing and negatively 
associated with traditional dramas (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 186-7; 2003b: 54).   Liberalism was not 
a consistent predictor of progressive drama viewing in the environmental study but was found to 
be positively associated with the category in the feminist issues study (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 187; 
2003b: 54). 
These differences can be attributed to a number of issues.  Because the variables 
described above are generally weak predictors of media use, their predictive power may not 
persist from year to year.  Age is a relatively powerful predictor of media use, particularly for 
news and public affairs programs with standardized beta weights ranging from 0.36 to 0.40 for 
such categories.  Similarly, Young (2004) found age to be negatively associated with late night 
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comedy exposure.  Most other variables, in the context of Holbert’s work, had standardized beta 
weights between –0.1 and 0.1.  An exception was education in the context of the police reality 
television model where standardized beta weights of –0.19 and –0.17 were found for the years 
1999 and 2000 respectively (Holbert, et al. 2004: 351).  While the variables included in Holbert’s 
models differ from study to study, most variables were used in all models and variables unique to 
particular studies are associated with weak effects.  When comparing the relative powerfulness 
of models, Holbert and his colleagues were best able to predict the viewing of news and public 
affairs programming.  The R squared values associated with these models range from 13.8% for 
public affairs television viewing in 1999 (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 186) to 15.9% for television 
news viewing in 2000 (Holbert, et al. 2004: 351).  In contrast, the R squared values for models 
predicting the viewing of nature documentaries and crime dramas do not exceed 1.9% (Holbert, 
et al. 2003a: 186; 2004:351).  The models better predict situation comedy and traditional drama 
viewing with R squared values peaking at 7.1% and 13.6% respectively (Holbert, et al. 2003a: 
187; 2003b: 54).  
The above discussion focuses on television exposure.  Attention to exposure of other 
mediums tends to be less explicit.  Associations related to the newspaper audience will be 
addressed through a discussion of media preference in the section pertaining to feelings about 
media credibility below.  The section focusing on talk radio will address the heterogeneous 
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1.6 Discussion of Work on Political Variables:  
 
1.6.1 Political Knowledge: 
 There is a body of research examining the link between media use and political 
knowledge.  Researchers have identified a number of background variables related to political 
knowledge.  Education and income are positively related to political knowledge (Evelend Jr. and 
Scheufele 2000; Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001).  Being male, older, “right-wing” and interested 
in politics were weakly and positively related to political knowledge (Holtz-Bacha and Norris 
2001). Moy, et al. (2004: 540) found length of residence to be positively related political 
knowledge. 
Moy, et al. (2004) and McLeod, et al. (1996) found that the use of local media was 
positively related to political knowledge.  Work from Moy, et al. (2004: 539) finds that local 
newspaper and television were equally related to political knowledge.  McLeod and his 
colleagues (1996: 197) found that local hard television and newspaper use were positively 
related to community knowledge with newspaper use associated with a slightly higher 
standardized beta coefficient.  Local media explains 15.33% of the variance in political 
knowledge after background variables including “race”, ideology and length of residence were 
entered into the model developed by Moy and her colleagues (2004: 540).   
Eveland Jr. and Scheufele (2000) also examined the relationship between television and 
newspaper use and political knowledge.  However, the indicators that they employed do not 
isolate local and national coverage.  The authors found television news, using an index that 
combines exposure and attention, to be unrelated to forms of political knowledge (Eveland Jr. 
and Scheufele 2000).  A slight positive relationship was found between television news use and 
knowledge about candidate positions during the 1996 United States Presidential campaign.  
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Relationships between television news use and other forms of political knowledge were not 
significant (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000: 224).  Newspaper use, as measured by a similar 
index, was positively related to knowledge about candidate and party stances and overall 
political knowledge (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000: 224).  Television use was found to interact 
with education in predicting political knowledge such that the relationship between education 
and knowledge was weaker for heavy television news viewers (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000: 
223).  Heavy and low newspaper users had similar correlations between education and political 
knowledge (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000: 224).  Medium newspaper users had the highest 
correlation between the variables (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000: 224).   
 Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) compared the political knowledge of public and private 
television viewers in European Union (EU) countries.  Denmark and Ireland were the countries 
with the greatest proportion of the population preferring public television to commercial 
television.  The vast majority of the population in these countries prefer public television.   The 
opposite pattern characterizes Greece and Portugal, the countries at the other end of the spectrum 
(Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001: 131). Those who prefer to tune to either news or entertainment 
programming on public television scored higher on the political knowledge scale in comparison 
with those who preferred commercial television for either news or entertainment (Holtz-Bacha 
and Norris 2001: 135).  The authors used the same multivariate regression model to predict 
political knowledge for the population of each nation separately.  Considering the EU as a whole, 
preference for public television was associated with a standardized beta weight of 0.09.  The 
standardized beta weight associated with preference for public television was statistically 
significant and positive in ten of the fourteen countries.  Three of these countries (Netherlands, 
Belgium and Finland) were associated with beta coefficients of 0.17 or higher.  Of the countries 
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with significant beta coefficients, Italy had the lowest at 0.06 (Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001: 
134).  No country had a coefficient that was negative and significant.  Northern Ireland was the 
only country with a negative standardized beta weight (Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001: 134).  The 
relationships between public media use and political identification, perceptions of political party 
bias and political participation are examined in the present analysis. 
 Kull, et al. (2003-4) also offer an analysis that is useful in understanding the relationship 
between public television viewing and political knowledge using an American sample.  The 
authors approach the issue of political knowledge by comparing the level of misperception 
associated with various television news source audiences.  They tested the accuracy of their 
sample’s perceptions about key issues surrounding America’s policy with Iraq.  Specifically, 
they asked respondents what their perceptions were about: 1.) Whether or not “weapons of mass 
destruction” had been found in Iraq; 2.) The relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda; 
and 3.) How the international community feels about the United States “having gone to war with 
Iraq”.  Kull, et al. (2003-4: 575) found that 60% of the sample held one or more misperception.  
The authors (Kull, et al. 2003-4: 589) found that The Fox News Channel (FNC) audience had the 
greatest percentage of viewers with one or more misperceptions and was twice as likely to 
believe that close links between Hussein and al-Qaeda had been found.  In contrast, Kull, et al. 
(2003-4: 582) found that the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) had the smallest percentage of 
viewers with one or more misperceptions.  However, the authors only briefly discuss their use of 
binary logistic regression.  Kull, et al. (2003-4: 580) describe that their analysis shows that the 
presence of one or more misperceptions was the most powerful predictor of support for the war 
even when demographic variables, ideology, political participation and media consumption 
variables were included in the analysis.  This analysis would be stronger if it shifted its emphasis 
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from percentage data to multiple regression/correlation (MRC) techniques. While the authors 
used regression analysis to offer context to the role played by a person’s primary news source, 
this discussion lacks detail.  The analysis would be strengthened if it quantified the relative 
impact played by primary news source in order to give a stronger sense of the relative 
powerfulness of the broadcast source as Holtz-Batcha and Norris (2001) did. The present 
analysis offers analysis of the FNC audience using MRC.  The relationship between Fox News 
use and political identification, perceptions of political party bias and political participation are 
examined in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
1.6.2 Political and Civic Participation: 
 
 A number of background variables have been identified as being associated with political 
participation.  Milbrath and Goel (1977) observe that those who are closer to the “centre” of a 
society are more likely to be involved in politics.  The authors explain that this concept is vague.  
But, the idea is that those who are closer to power and social networks are more likely to have 
high levels of political participation.  In contrast, those who are more isolated and less connected 
to decision-making are expected to participate less in politics.   
Milbrath and Goel’s perspective is supported by recent research.  For instance, education 
and income are positively associated with political participation (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 
2000; Moy, et al. 2004; Milbrath and Goel 1977).  Shah, et al. (2001b: 485) found education to 
be positively related to civic participation (involvement with community activities) and income 
to be weakly and positively associated with civic participation when only demographic and 
social situation variables were included in the model.  Income was not significant after social 
orientation and media use variables were introduced to the model.  These findings support 
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Milbrath and Goel’s observation that those closer to decision-making will participate more.  
Similarly, age is positively associated with political participation (Shah, et al. 2001b; Moy, et al. 
2004; Milbrath and Goel 1977).  Shah, et al. (2001b: 493) observe that younger people have 
lower levels of interpersonal trust and political participation.  These authors also found that 
interpersonal trust and political participation are more closely related for younger people (Shah, 
et al. 2001: 492).  Church attendance is positively associated with political participation (Mastin 
2000; Shah, et al. 2001).  Some studies have not found gender to relate to political participation 
in a statistically significant way (Moy, et al. 2004; Mastin 2000; Eveland Jr.; Scheufele 2000).  
However, Milbrath and Goel (1977: 116-7) cite a body of work suggesting that males are more 
likely to be involved with politics.   
Blacks are less politically active (Milbrath and Goel 1977).  However, Milbrath and Goel 
(1977: 120) observe that those Blacks who participate in politics are as likely as Whites to 
participate in politics at higher levels of office and that Blacks are not less likely than Whites of 
the same class position to participate.  
 Shah, et al. (2001b) tested the relationship between a number of social orientation 
variables and civic participation.  Sociability and institutional trust were found to be weakly and 
positively related to civic participation in a statistically significant way while life satisfaction and 
residential stability did not have significant relationships with civic participation after media use 
variables were entered into the model (Shah, et al. 2001b: 485). 
 Uhlaner (1982) used data from the 1974 Canadian National Election Study to determine 
if people participate consistently across levels of government.  Respondents were asked about 
their political involvement at the local, provincial and federal levels.  The activities addressed by 
the survey include voting, discussing politics and attending rallies.  Uhlaner (1982: 304) found 
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that people participated in the same activities across government levels.  For instance, those who 
put up campaign signs during provincial elections were likely to do the same for federal 
elections.  However, involvement in a political activity at one level was not associated with other 
activities at that same level.  For instance, a person who puts a campaign sticker on his or her car 
during a federal election campaign is not more likely than a random respondent to participate in 
other forms of political participation at the federal level.  Uhlaner (1982: 307) found a closer 
association between participating in a specific activity at both the federal and provincial levels 
for independents and those who identified strongly with the same party at both levels of 
government.  Those who identified with a party at only one level of government had weaker 
associations.   
 Chui, et al. (1991) used data from the 1984 Canadian Election Study to understand the 
power of information about immigrant background in predicting political participation.  The 
authors controlled for the respondent’s gender, age and province of residence, educational level 
and occupational status as well as the education levels of the respondent’s parents because these 
variables have been shown to have relationships with immigrant background and political 
participation.  Chui, et al. (1991: 387) did not find political activity to increase linearly with the 
number of generations in the country.  It was found that political involvement peaked among 
those in the second-generation category.  The authors found that respondents with origins in 
Southern Europe and Asia were less likely to vote and get involved with the election.  Those who 
spoke English at home were more politically involved than those who spoke other languages 
(including French) in their homes (1991: 389).  Chui, et al. (1991: 391) did not find major 
differences in political participation between foreign and native-born respondents before the use 
of control variables. 
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 Work from Brunsting and Postmes (2002) examines issues related to online collective 
action.  They describe how the Internet is paradoxical in that it can be used as a forum that 
facilitates collective action despite its isolating qualities.  The authors web-surveyed members of 
Milieudefensie, the Dutch division of Friends of the Earth International.  The group uses 
lobbying and negotiation to create environmental change.  The group also organizes sit-ins and 
demonstrations on occasion (Brunsting and Postmes, 2002: 536).  The organization is composed 
of three general subcategories: the hardcore activist groups, pressure groups and sympathizers.  
The authors’ analysis makes use of these categories and a control group consisting of people who 
registered with Milieudefensie for reasons other than supporting it.  It was found that the 
hardcore activist group and the pressure group identified more strongly with the environmental 
movement (Brunsting and Postmes 2002: 539).  Brunsting and Postmes (2002: 542) found the 
hardcore activist group, in comparison with the pressure group, had a more positive expectation 
of the amount of participation that other members would offer to aims of the organization.  The 
hardcore group saw offline and online activism as more effective than the other groups.  
However, this was only significant with the pressure and control group for offline actions and the 
pressure group for online actions (Brunsting and Postmes, 2002: 541).  The authors explain that 
both activists and non-activists see the Internet as a way to facilitate collective action.  People 
who engaged in online activities intended to get involved with activism again in the future 
(Brunsting and Postmes, 2002: 547).  Tolbert and McNeal (2003) also examined the link 
between political participation and Internet use.  They found through multivariate analysis that 
those with Internet access were more likely to vote in the 1996 and 2000 United States 
Presidential elections.   
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 Researchers have tested the relationships between use of offline media and political 
participation.  Earlier work suggests that television news viewing is not related to political 
participation (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000; Shah, et al. 2001b; Scheufele 2002).  In contrast, 
numerous studies suggest that newspaper reading is related to political participation (Eveland Jr. 
and Scheufele 2000; Shah, et al. 2001b; Scheufele 2002).  However, when examining local news 
specifically, McLeod, et al. (1996) found that hard and soft television and newspaper news use 
are positively related to local participation and political interest.  Eveland Jr. and Scheuffele 
(2000: 227) found political participation to be higher among more educated newspaper readers.  
Shah, et al. (2001b: 485) found print magazine reading, television social drama viewing and 
using the Internet for information exchange purposes to be weakly and positively related to civic 
participation.  Watching situation comedies and reality programs were found to have weak 
negative relationships with civic participation (Shah, et al. 2001b: 485).  Models predicting 
political participation that include media use variables are presented in Chapter 6.  The analysis 
expects that more information-based sources will draw audiences that are associated with higher 
levels of political participation whereas more entertainment-oriented content is anticipated to 
draw less active audiences.  These expectations are described in more detail in Chapter 2 and are 
tested in the analysis in Chapter 6. 
 Scheufele (2002) adds nuance to the area of political participation by examining the role 
that interpersonal discussion has on political activity levels.  Her work finds that those who 
watch hard television news and discuss politics with others frequently have higher levels of 
political participation and political knowledge than those who tended not to discuss politics with 
others.  The same pattern was found for the political participation among newspaper hard news 
use.  However, television viewers who discussed politics with others were not more 
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knowledgeable than viewers who did not (Scheufele 2002: 56).  As explained above, Scheufele 
(2002) did not find television news to be associated with political participation without the 
interaction effect.  In contrast, newspaper reading is associated with political participation with 
and without the interaction effect.  Scheufele’s findings suggest that there may be differences 
between what draws people to newspapers over television as well as the way that information is 
presented in each medium.    
 Mastin (2000) observes that the Black community in the United States has a unique 
relationship with local news.  Her Black sample did not seem to use local news in ways that were 
consistent with expectations suggested by work on the link between local news consumption and 
civic participation.  Mastin notes that her findings do match work from other scholars that studies 
Americans in general and finds local news significant in predicting civic participation.  Mastin 
(2000: 124) speculates that Black Americans use the national media “to gain an overall 
environmental worldview” and interpersonal networks such as church and neighbourhood 
organizations to learn about local issues.  The relationship that Blacks have with local news use 
is explored in Chapter 6. 
 Putnam (2000) has identified a decline in civic participation in the United States.  
Putnam’s (1995) work sees civic participation as a component of the broader concept of “social 
capital” which captures “citizen engagement in community affairs”. Social capital can include 
involvement with organizations, interpersonal trust and socializing with other people.  While 
social capital is related to political participation, Putnam (1995: 665) explains that the concepts 
are not interchangeable.  Political participation refers to connections that individuals have with 
institutions whereas social capital refers to relationships between people (Putnam 1995: 665).  
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Putnam uses the concept of “civic participation” to describe people’s connections with their 
communities in general.  This includes political participation.   
Putnam (2000: 35) observes that the American population is increasingly educated, yet 
civic knowledge has not been increasing.  Election campaign following has been stable since the 
1970s while volunteering for political parties has declined over the past thirty years (Putnam 
2000: 37).  Putnam (2000: 40) observes that Americans are shifting away from volunteering their 
labour to making financial donations to political parties.  Other examples that demonstrate a drop 
in civic participation include decreases in attendance at public meetings and rallies (Putnam 
2000: 40).  While Putman (2000: 46) explains that, “The last several decades have witnessed a 
serious deterioration of community involvement among Americans from all walks of life”, he 
points out that in “absolute terms”, the declines among the more educated have had the greatest 
impact.  This is attributed the higher rates of participation associated with the more educated.   
 Putnam’s work explores a range of explanations for these trends.  He examined the issue 
of time pressure.  Putnam (2000: 191) observes that higher time pressure is not associated with 
reduced civic involvement even when controlling for education and income.  He describes that 
those with the busiest schedules are more likely than others to be involved with community 
projects, attend church and club meetings, follow politics, spend time visiting friends and 
entertain at home.  Putnam (2000: 213) explains that time spent commuting is negatively 
associated with community involvement.  Further, those who reside in communities with higher 
rates of commuting are less involved in their communities even if they do not commute (Putnam 
2000: 213).  This suggests that suburban culture in general discourages civic involvement.  This 
finding informs the control variables used in the models predicting the range of media sources 
used in Chapter 4. 
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 Putnam also examines the link between trends in media use and patterns in civic 
involvement.  In contrast with aspects of the studies described above, Putnam (2000: 220) 
observes that television news viewing is associated with civic engagement and political 
knowledge.  This is in contrast with newspaper reading, which is associated with high social 
capital (Putnam 1995: 678).  Putnam (2000: 220) explains that those who rely on television for 
their news are less involved than those who use newspapers but participate more than most 
Americans.  Those who primarily used the Internet as their information source demonstrated low 
levels of civic involvement (Putnam 2000: 221). 
 Putnam’s observations about the links between television use and financial anxiety help 
to offer a context for the role that television fills in American culture.  He explains that financial 
anxiety is associated with reduced socializing with friends and other forms of community 
involvement such as church attendance, volunteering and interest in politics.  Putnam (2000: 
193) points out that even activities that do not require any or little spending are reduced when 
financial stress increases.  According to Putnam (2000: 193), television use is the only leisure 
activity positively associated with financial anxiety.  Further, Putnam explains that social 
participation is positively associated with most other types of media use when controlling for 
demographics.  In contrast, television is “the only leisure activity that seems to inhibit 
participation in other leisure activities” (Putnam 2000: 237).  Putnam names religious 
participation, social visiting, shopping, parties, sports and participation in organizations as 
examples of activities that that are reduced when time spent watching television increases (2000: 
237).  Sleeping, resting, eating, housework, radio listening and hobbies were the only activities 
associated with heavy television viewing (Putnam 2000: 237).   
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These findings may suggest that those who spend a lot of time watching find television 
highly entertaining.  However, Putnam explains that the situation is generally the opposite.  He 
writes that, “for the average viewer television is about as enjoyable as housework and cooking, 
ranking well below all other leisure activities and indeed below work itself.  TV’s dominance in 
our lives reflects not its sublime pleasures, but its minimal costs” (Putnam 2000: 241).  From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that younger people who are heavy television users are more 
likely to have low levels of civic knowledge, feel cynical, have lower levels of academic 
achievement, participate less in politics and earn less money when they are older (Putnam 2000: 
237).  Further, malaise, measured by frequency of headaches, stomachaches and insomnia, is 
positively related to dependence on television for entertainment.  Moreover, television use is 
among the top predictors of malaise (Putnam 2000: 240).  Putnam describes work by Kubey and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) that suggests that viewers feel passive and less alert when watching 
television.  These researchers also found television use to be more prevalent among those who 
feel lonely, have more free time and “emotional difficulties” (Putnam 2000: 239).  While cross-
tabular data does not demonstrate causality, these characteristics do not encourage civic 
engagement.   
 Putnam claims that television provides “a kind of pseudopersonal connection to others.  
Anyone who has encountered a television personality face-to-face knows the powerful feeling 
that you already know this person” (2000: 242).  He describes Hart’s (1994) argument that 
television promotes, “‘remote-control politics,’ in which we as viewers feel engaged with our 
community without the effort of actually being engaged.  Like junk food, TV, especially TV 
entertainment, satisfies cravings without real nourishment” (Putnam 2000: 242).  This 
perspective suggests that people substitute interpersonal relationships with on-screen 
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relationships.  Putnam hypothesizes that this façade offers Americans a false sense of satisfaction 
reducing their incentive to form and foster relationships with people who they can interact with.   
 According to Putnam, by highlighting “every social and personal problem imaginable 
television also makes us less likely to do anything about” these problems (2000: 242).  He 
describes work that suggests that by saturating viewers with problems; viewers do not find other 
peoples’ problems as urgent as their own and are more likely to see individual rather than 
collective weaknesses (2000: 242).  This research has prompted Putnam to speculate about the 
psychological issues associated with television that discourage civic engagement.   
 Putnam (2000: 228) explains that each additional hour of television watched per day is 
associated with a ten percent less civic activism.  He notes that between 1965 and 1995, 
Americans on average saw a six-hour per week increase in their leisure time and that most of this 
time was spent watching television (2000: 222-3).  Putnam points to time use data that suggests 
that, in 1995, American’s spent about forty percent of their free time in front of the television 
(2000: 222).  He explains that television reduces both individual and collective forms of civic 
engagement.  However, it impacts the latter with far greater magnitude even after controlling for 
demographic variables (2000: 229).  Putnam argues that, “just as television privatizes our leisure 
time, it also privatizes our civic activity, dampening our interactions with one another even more 
than it dampens individual political activities” (2000: 229).  He points to the increase in the 
number of television sets per household as a sign of more privatized viewing (2000: 223).  
Putman reinforces his argument that Americans are becoming increasingly private by citing data 
from the DDB Needham Life Style Surveys which points to a major increase in the number of 
Americans reporting their preference for “spending a quiet night at home” (2000: 223).   
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 The above observations about the link between television and civic participation suggest 
that television explains some of the decrease in civic engagement in the United States. Putnam 
describes a few reasons why this pattern will not reverse in the short term.  These reasons are 
based on generational differences.  First, he observes that younger Americans are less selective 
of television content than others (2000: 226).  Second, Putman observes that younger people are 
more habitual users of television and that this type of viewing is associated with lower levels of 
civic involvement (2000: 235).  For instance, younger people are more likely to use television in 
the background while they are doing other things (2000: 226).  Finally, he notes that the more an 
age cohort was exposed to television during their formative years, the lower its relative level of 
civic engagement during adulthood (2000: 272).   
 Putnam’s work has prompted studies examining the associations between interpersonal 
trust and media use.  As described above, Putnam sees interpersonal trust as a key aspect of civic 
life.  He explains that there is large body of literature suggesting that those who watch higher 
amounts of television are more sceptical of others (1995: 679).  This observation fits with the 
above discussion of Putnam’s observations about how television encourages people to see 
individual instead of social problems.   
 Consistent with Putnam’s work, Shah, et al. (2001b: 483) found newspaper reading to be 
positively associated with interpersonal trust.  These authors also tested the relationships 
between tuning to a number of television genres and interpersonal trust.  Situation comedy 
watching was positively related to interpersonal trust.  This was the only programming category 
that had a significant relationship with interpersonal trust.  This relationship was positive. (Shah, 
et al. 2001b: 483).  While the authors describe these finding as consistent with earlier research, 
Putnam sees television in general as discouraging interpersonal trust.  Consumption of hard 
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news, social dramas and reality programs did not yield significant coefficients (Shah, et al. 
2001b: 483).   
 Lee, et al. (2003: 432) interpret their findings to demonstrate that the effects of television 
on interpersonal trust should be considered on a content-by-content basis.  The researchers found 
that watching Friends was associated with higher levels of interpersonal trust while sports and 
Hard Copy have an inverse relationship with interpersonal trust (Lee, et al. 2003: 432).  Lee, et 
al. (2003)’s findings on the link between newspaper consumption and interpersonal trust echoed 
Shah, et al.’s (2001b) finding described above.  Listening to conservative and liberal political 
talk radio was marginally positively associated with trust after control variables were included in 
the analysis (Lee, et al. 2003: 427).   
Education and age are useful predictors of interpersonal trust.  Lee, et al. (2003: 430) found 
education to be positively related to a number of trust indicators.  Shah, et al. (2001b) found 
education to be weakly related to trust through most of the blocks of their hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis.  Education was positively related to interpersonal trust when demographics, 
social situation, social orientation, print media and broadcast media variables were included in 
the model.  However, education was not statistically significant after Internet variables were 
included in the model (Shah, et al. 2001b: 483).  Putnam (1995: 667) found that education has 
powerful effects on trust and associational membership.  Lee, et al. (2001: 430) speculate if 
education is related to parenting styles.  The authors cite Bernstein (1974) who explains that less 
educated parents may warn their children with less specific warnings than more educated parents 
and this may encourage blanked mistrust.  Since parental education is a strong predictor of 
children’s education, this may explain why lower levels of education are associated with lower 
levels of interpersonal trust (Lee, et al. 2003: 730). 
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Lee, et al. (2003) and Shah, et al. (2001b) address Putnam’s work by testing the empirical 
grounding of his arguments.  Norris (2002) is concerned by the approach employed by these 
researchers.  She is critical of approaches that seek “evidence for a societal-level phenomena 
through individual-level survey data”.  Norris (2002: 4) explains that social capital norms are 
contextually unique and argues for cross-national work that deals with differences in political 
and economic contexts.   
Norris questions Putnam’s reasoning using data from the World Values Surveys from 
1995 to 1997.  She points out that countries with high social capital are the same countries with 
more accessible mass media.  Per capita newspaper circulation, the percentage of the country’s 
population with televisions and the percentage of the population on-line were found to have 
statistically significant positive relationships with social trust and social capital (Norris 2002: 4).  
Norris (2002: 7) explains that Putnam saw television as having the opposite relationship with 
social capital.   Norris (2002: 5) found a positive relationship between the percentage of the 
population on-line and associational membership.  Of the named independent variables, this was 
the only one that showed a significant relationship with associational membership.  In short, 
Norris (2002) finds the opposite of Putnam’s observations when using aggregate societal level 
data to examine the link between television penetration and social trust, social capital and 
associational membership. Norris (2002: 479) points out that television sources differ from one 
another and suggests that distinctions in the type of television that people use is important when 
examining civic engagement.   
 Milner (2002) employs cross-national data as encouraged by Norris (2002).  Like 
Putnam, Milner (2002) is critical of the implications of television on civic life.  He approaches 
the issue by comparing patterns associated with television and newspapers.  Milner (2002: 92) 
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observes that people retain more information from print than they do from television.  Further, he 
cites work from Norris (1996: 478) that finds that time spent watching television is negatively 
associated with political knowledge (Milner 2002: 94).  Milner (2002) has introduced the 
concept of the “television dependency scale” to compare the media use characteristics of 
different countries.  The index is based “equally on the countries’ relative ratings on commercial 
television consumption and newspaper reading” (Milner 2002: 99).  The average weekly time 
spent watching television for the country as well as per capita spending on television advertising 
were incorporated into the scale (Milner 2002: 101).  The United States, Italy and Canada (in 
order of decreasing dependency) were found to be most dependent on television while the 
Scandinavian countries dominated the low end of the scale (Milner 2002: 101).  Milner (2002: 
101) observes that countries tend to be high in either television or their newspaper consumption, 
but not both.  Milner (2002: 101) found a strong inverse relationship between a country’s level of 
television dependence and their scores on the International Adult Literacy Survey and as well as 
their knowledge of the United Nations.  Countries with high television dependency had lower 
levels of participation in local elections (Milner 2002: 103).   
 Milner’s discussion of media policy is helpful when considering how these issues are 
related.  Milner (2002: 111) explains that Scandinavian newspapers, generally speaking, identify 
with political parties and that newspaper subsidies were started to promote a diversity of news 
content and to allow political parties to communicate their views.  Milner argues that television 
is a more problematic medium than newspapers for communicating partisan information because 
of television’s “greater potential for distortion” and the financial barriers that facilitate unequal 
access.  Scandinavian countries, according to Milner (2002: 111), have made the biggest 
attempts to promote equal access to television.  Sweden and Norway have almost eliminated 
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political party advertising on television. “The exception is the United States, where money-and 
only money-gets a party or candidate TV time” (Milner 2002: 111).  Milner (2002: 113) 
describes the United States as the least competitive democracy as demonstrated by its high re-
election rate in the House of Representatives.  Milner cites data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics that explains that United States Presidential candidates raised $350 million for the 2000 
race.  Milner observes that total spending by candidates for national office was about $3 billion.  
He explains that, “In the United States, the dependence on private funding, the importance of 
television advertising, and the incentives for exaggeration and negative campaigning built into 
winner-take-all electoral institutions go hand in hand” (Milner 2002: 113).  From this 
perspective, American media policies favour those with power while Scandinavian media polices 
attempt to foster debate by providing media access to those with less capital.  Sweden’s policy of 
free library delivery to shut-ins, hospitals and homes for the elderly is consistent with this 
inclusive approach (Milner 2002: 109).    
 Instead of relying on television, Nordic politics rely on the distribution of printed 
information.  In Sweden, parties communicate information to electors using “wooden huts 
reminiscent of the summer cottage”  (Milner 2002: 112).  Arguably, the subsidy system for 
supporting political parties in Sweden also encourages debate in Nordic countries (Milner 2002: 
112).  However, Milner (2002: 112) refutes that the subsidy system is flawed because the 
subsidy monies end up with party bureaucrats by arguing that this weakness is a worthwhile cost 
to encouraging electors to get their information directly from the candidates instead of from the 
mass media.  Milner (2002: 112) observes that such measures encourage party identification and 
that high levels of party identification are associated with civic literacy.  He describes findings 
from Jenssen and Listhaug (1999) that suggest that voters with stronger party identification who 
Chapter 1: Introduction & Review of Literature 
 37  
 
 
agreed with their party’s position on European Union membership demonstrated the strongest 
factual and conceptual knowledge of the European Union (Milner 2002: 112).  Milner (2002: 
112) describes how the countries that Krouwel (1999) identified as having relatively “open 
systems” have high levels of voter turnout and organizational participation.   
 
1.6.3 Media Credibility: 
 
 The issue of media credibility is much debated in academic and popular circles.  Much 
scholarly empirical work approaches the subject by examining media content.  For instance, bell 
hooks (2004) is critical of representations of Blackness and gender in the media.  Much of Noam 
Chomsky’s work examines news reports of human rights violations.  However, work that uses 
audience as a unit of analysis is limited.  There are a number of studies that use cross-tabular 
data in the attempt to identify associations between an individual’s political attitudes on specific 
issues and their media use habits (for example, Sotirovic 2001; Chory-Assad and Tamborini 
2003; Kull 2003-4; Holbert, et al. 2003a; 2003b; Holbert, et al. 2004; Kim and Ward 2004; 
Young 2004; Smith 2000; Hofstetter and Moore 1979; Hofstetter and Strand 1983).  While such 
an approach can be used to support arguments about the link between media content and public 
opinion, they do not demonstrate causality and they do not explicitly address feelings about 
media credibility.  Few studies use individual perceptions of the media as dependent or 
independent variables.  We know little about how those who trust the media differ in their media 
use from those who claim not to trust the media.  For instance, it would worthwhile to know if 
those who perceive high levels of bias in the media make attempts to balance their consumption 
by making use of a greater range of sources or mediums.  The relationship between the amount 
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of bias in the news media that is perceived and the range of media sources used is examined in 
Chapter 4 of the present analysis. 
Tsafti and Capella (2003) suggest perceptions of the news media are related to sources 
that users choose.  Their work finds that those who are more sceptical of the media are drawn to 
“non-mainstream” sources.  The authors considered political talk radio and the World Wide Web 
to be non-mainstream.  While media sceptics did not differ from non-sceptics in their overall 
amount of news exposure, their “media diets contain on average significantly larger shares of 
nonmainstream sources” (Tsafti and Capella 2003: 518).  Exposure to sources categorized as 
mainstream including national television news, daily newspapers were negatively associated 
with media scepticism.   
 Reports from The Pew Research Center suggest that some broadcasters and television 
programs have audiences with feelings about the credibility of the news media that do not 
represent the American population as a whole (Pew 2004a; 2005b).  For instance, there are 
differences between the most trusted news sources among Republicans, Democrats and 
Independents (Pew 2005b: 43; 2004a).  To illustrate, the Fox News Channel was the most trusted 
source among Republicans but was not in the list of the five most trusted sources among 
Democrats or Independents (Pew: 2005: 43).  Further, Pew (2004: 13) notes that the audience for 
The Fox News Channel is becoming increasingly conservative.  Other research on the Fox News 
Channel is described below.  Pew (2005: 43) also found Democrats to be more trusting of 
National Public Radio (NPR) than Republicans or Independents.  Forty-five percent of 
Democrats see the Cable News Network (CNN) as all or mostly believable in contrast with only 
26 percent of Republicans and 28 percent of Independents (Pew 2005b: 43).  These findings 
suggest that political identification is related to the level of trust that individuals associate with 
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different news sources.  However, Pew’s analysis does not use MRC techniques.  Chapter 5 of 
the present analysis identifies relationships between media use and perceptions of political party 
bias in the news media using MRC.   
 There has been little research that predicts a person’s level of trust in the news media.  A 
study by Westley and Severin (1964) finds those with high socio-economic status to be more 
likely to give higher credibility to newspapers versus television.  “Blue collar” respondents saw 
television to be more credible than “white collar” respondents (1964: 327).  Education is 
positively related to newspaper credibility and negatively to television credibility (1964: 327).  
Those who identify as “middle class” prefer newspapers while those who identify as “working 
class” saw television as more credible (1964: 328).  Men were more likely to give greater trust to 
newspapers than to television.  The opposite was found for women (1964: 330).  Television was 
trusted more than newspapers in each age category (1964: 330).  Rural and small town 
residences are associated with preference for television over newspapers (1964: 330).  The 
authors did not find a relationship between partisanship and medium credibility rankings.  Unlike 
Democrats and Republicans, Independents assign higher credibility to newspapers (1964: 330).  
Voters were more likely to rank newspapers ahead of television (1964: 330).  Low associational 
membership was associated with higher ranking for television (1964: 332).  These findings 
represent some of the early work done on predicting feelings about media credibility.  They must 
be generalized with caution, as they do not make use of MRC and because the media landscape 
has changed dramatically since the early 1960s.  
More recent work by Jones (2004) offers a multivariate analysis that finds media trust to 
be negatively related to conservatism, talk radio listening and political Internet use and positively 
related to government trust.  Conservative talk radio listeners demonstrated especially low levels 
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of trust in the media.  Further, Bennett (2002: 13) finds that talk radio listeners in general are 
more likely to have lower levels of trust in the media.  However, Jones’ (2004) model does not 
include demographic control variables.  Jones’s finding that trust in the media and government 
are positively related is consistent with work from Lipset and Schneider (1983: 98) that 
demonstrates that confidence in one institution is positively related to confidence in other 
institutions. Using data from 1973-7, Lipset and Schneider (1983: 123) found that, at the 
bivariate level, confidence in “the people running television” and “the people running the press” 
are negatively associated with education, age, Republicanism and Conservatism.  Confidence in 
television is associated with being Black while confidence in the press in general is associated 
with being white.  Robinson and Kohut (1988: 181) found that network television news 
believability is negatively associated with age, being male, education, Republicanism, military 
service and knowledge about the press.  These associations are modest and should be interpreted 
keeping in mind that network news believability is more demographically patterned (Robinson 
and Kohut 1988: 181).  The authors clarify that “there is no believability crisis for the press” and 
that feelings about the believability of the press do not vary greatly from one social or political 
group to another Robinson and Kohut (1988: 188). 
Gunther (1988) found a curvilinear relationship between trust in the media and 
extremeness of attitude on specific issues.  Media trust ratings increased as attitude extremeness 
shifted from low to moderate and decreased as attitude extremeness increased from moderate to 
high (Gunther 1988: 283).  Gunther’s work (1988: 284) examining the link between ideology 
and media trust reveals that political neutrals are most trusting of the newspapers compared with 
partisans who have lower trust in newspapers.  No such pattern was found for trust in television 
(Gunther 1988: 284).   
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 Domke, et al. (1999) and Watts, et al. (1999) offer analyses that scrutinize claims of a 
liberal bias in the media in the United States.  Domke, et al. (1999: 45) found that 95% of claims 
by political elites of media bias during the 1988, 1992 and 1996 elections argued that the press 
showed a liberal bias.  When examining the media’s discussion of its ability to cover the news 
(self-coverage), 79%, 72% and 91% of such claims identified a liberal bias in the years 1988, 
1992 and 1996 respectively (Watts, et al. 1999: 159).  Watts, et al. (1999) used content analysis 
of news coverage to examine the accuracy of these claims.  The Republican and Democratic 
candidates were found to have roughly equal amounts of favourable coverage in 1988 and 1996.  
The sample of news used to represent coverage of the 1992 campaign showed a slight favouring 
of the Democrat candidate.  Specifically, of the paragraphs examined, 54% were categorized as 
being more favourable to the Democrats (Watts, et al. 1999: 157).  While this analysis of news 
content does not measure bias related to the media’s agenda, it signals that the extent of 
criticisms of the “liberal media” are not proportionate to the balance of candidate coverage in 
newspapers.  The balance of positive and negative news content about each of the Presidential 
candidates was not related to public opinion polls about media bias (Watts, et al. 1999: 166).  
However, using time series data, Domke, et al. (1999: 54) found a positive relationship between 
the election poll support for the Republican presidential candidate and claims of liberal media 
bias in 1988.  The opposite pattern was found for 1992 and 1996.  Watts, et al. (1999: 167) 
question if “citizens have begun to view elites as ‘surrogates’ for the public in keeping watch 
over the media, which would be an ironic reversal of the democratic ideal of citizens relying on 
news media to monitor elites.”   
 There has been research comparing the credibility attributed to newspapers and 
television.  Claussen (2004) describes findings from the 1982 and 1985 Newspaper Readership 
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Projects that suggest that Americans rely more extensively on television than newspapers to get 
their news.  The data also suggests that television is seen as a more credible medium than 
newspapers for local, state, national and international news (Claussen 2004: 214).  Television 
news anchors and reporters were seen as more “honest and ethical” in comparison with 
newspaper news teams (Claussen 2004: 214).  Claussen’s (2004) discussion of findings from the 
mid-1990s reflects the lack of clarity on the issue.  Specifically, he describes a 1997 study for the 
Newspaper Association of America that shows newspapers scoring higher on believability 
(Claussen 2004: 214). Robinson and Kohut (1988: 187) found that television is seen as being 
better at getting “the facts straight” despite that local television is seen as being less factually 
oriented in its content.  The authors found that television’s credibility is reduced when 
respondents are asked about the credibility of specific news organizations despite that the “big 
three” networks scored roughly the same on believability (Robinson and Kohut 1988: 188).  
However, many television personalities, particularly news anchors rank high on believability 
measures in comparison with programs, publications and mediums which tended to rank lower 
(Robinson and Kohut 1988: 188).  These observations are consistent with Claussen’s (2004) 
discussion of the role of personal exposure in explaining why television is comparatively more 
credible than newspapers.  Claussen (2004: 215) cites work from Newhagen and Nass (1989) 
that argues that impersonal messages are perceived as less sincere, responsible, accurate and 
impartial than personal messages.  “Viewers can see and hear television news figures but not 
newspaper reporters or editors” (Claussen 2004: 215).   
The inconsistency between the 1997 Newspaper of America Association study described 
above with the other works may be related to changes in media that have taken place between the 
1980s and 1997.  This time period saw an exponential rise in Internet access and content and 
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increased amounts of infotainment on television.  These changes alter the reference points that 
media consumers use to make their judgments.  A study by Kiousis (2001) partly supports the 
argument that this discrepancy in findings can be attributed to temporal factors.  His analysis, 
which used a random sample of Austin, Texas residents contacted in 1998 found that newspapers 
were seen as more credible than television and online news (Kiousis 2001: 393).  However, 
findings from Moy, et al. (2004) cloud the issue.  They found that attention to television was 
positively associated with favourable evaluations about the local news media as a whole.  No 
significant relationship was found for the relationship between attention to newspapers and most 
indicators of perceived local media credibility (Moy, et al. 2004: 539).  It is important to 
consider that the survey items used by Moy, et al. (2004) did not ask respondents to compare the 
credibility of media.  According to Kiousis (2001: 394) all mediums scored credibility means in 
the “moderate” range.  His study also found that perceptions of news credibility were positively 
correlated across newspaper, online and television news (Kiousis 2001: 394).  Newspaper 
exposure was associated with positive feelings about the credibility of newspapers.  The same 
association was found with online news.  However, supporting Putnam’s observations that see 
television as a time filler, television credibility was not associated with either local or network 
television news exposure (Kiousis 2001: 394).  Perceptions of high credibility in television news 
were negatively associated with interpersonal discussion about news after the inclusion of 
demographic control variables.  In contrast, the credibility of online news is positively associated 
with interpersonal discussion about news.  No significant relationship was found for newspaper 
credibility (Kiousis 2001: 395).  However, paying attention to newspapers as well as paying 
attention to television is associated with feeling that newspaper organizations play an important 
role in democracy (Moy, et al. 2004: 539).  Further, favourable evaluations of the news media 
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are positively associated with political participation, but do not have a significant relationship 
with political knowledge (Moy, et al. 2004: 540-1).  The former supports Putnam’s (2000) 
argument that more trusting worldviews are associated with higher levels of participation in civic 
life.   
 
1.6.3.1 Media Credibility and The Fox News Channel: 
 
 As described above, watching the Fox News Channel is associated with support for the 
Bush administration’s policy with Iraq (Kull et al.  2003-4) and credibility among Republicans 
(Pew: 2005: 43).  The broadcaster’s ratings success and its approach to media credibility have 
received much attention from the popular and industry presses in the United States and Canada 
(For example, Franken 2003; Gitlin 2003; Meroney 1997; The Economist 2002; Auletta 2003; 
Unger 2001; Gillis 2004; Durbin 2004; Anderson 2003 and Stephen 2002).  The broadcaster 
began airing in October of 1996 and currently leads the cable news audience ratings (Morris 
2005; Auletta 2003; New Statesman 2002; The Economist 2002; Anderson 2003; Durbin 2004 
and Franken 2003).  Production techniques including graphics and sound effects have helped the 
broadcaster to create a signature fast paced style.  
 While the broadcaster uses the slogans, “We Report.  You Decide.” And “Fair and 
Balanced.”, it has been called “rude and rabidly pro-Bush” (Gillis 2004: 23).  In his book Lies 
(And the Lying Liars Who Tell Them): A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right, Franken (2003), 
former Saturday Night Live cast member and radio host, mocks Fox’s self-declared objectivity.  
He dismisses the reasoning that Fox News is “fair and balanced, but only looks right wing 
because the rest of the media is so far to the left”.  He explains that, “This argument would be a 
plausible argument…if the rest of the media actually had a liberal bias.  Or if Fox wasn’t so 
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obviously slanted to the right.”  (2003: 62).  His book includes a chapter entitled, “Bill O’Reilly: 
Lying, Splotchy Bully” that is dedicated to criticizing the channel’s prime time issue oriented 
program host.   
 Applications to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC) from cable television providers seeking approval to air sell Fox News to cable 
subscribers sparked some debate.  However, in Maclean’s, Gillis (2004: 24) explains that:  
Considering Fox’s political baggage-and the protectionist streak that runs through 
Canadian cultural debate-this has all transpired with amazingly little fuss.  After 
eight years on the air, Fox has established itself as the greatest threat to American 
liberalism since Newt Gingrich, provoking a tide of hostile books, magazine 
articles, newspaper columns and even a documentary film south of the 
border….But when the CRTC invited comment on bringing the channel to 
Canada, fully 85 per cent of the 600 responses voiced support.  A few domestic 
broadcasters objected for competitive reasons, and a handful of critics on both 
sides of the border wrote in complaining that Fox is biased.  But on the whole, 
Canadians seem unafraid to add a nakedly partisan presence to the dial. 
 
While FNC is an American service, the CRTC’s decision to approve the distribution of the Fox 
News Channel in Canada demonstrates that the broadcaster has implications on the media and 
political landscape in Canada.  
 Discussion of the Fox News Channel represents an intersection between popular media 
and academic work.  For example, the study by Kull et al. (2003-4) has been discussed in the 
popular media.  Franken has described it in a range of contexts including his Air America radio 
program.  By measuring both misperceptions about Iraq related issues as well as support for the 
war; the Kull et al. (2003-4) study suggests a causal relationship between watching Fox News 
and opinion: effective material for popular talk show programs.  However, as with the present 
analysis, relationships based on cross-sectional data are insufficient in confirming causal 
relationships.   
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 There has been subsequent scholarly work that addresses the Fox News Channel.  Using 
data obtained in 2004, Morris (2005: 65) found that Democrats were more likely to watch CNN 
and network news and that Republicans were “much more likely” to watch Fox News and that 
party identification is more powerful in predicting exposure to Fox News in comparison with 
CNN or network television news.  The Fox News audience “is slightly more Republican than the 
CNN audience is Democratic” and time series data suggests that “both audiences are moving 
away from the middle” (Morris 2005: 73).  As no significant relationship between party 
identification and exposure to news sources was found in 1998, Morris (2005: 65) suggests that 
audiences are becoming increasingly polarized.  Morris (2005: 68) finds that Fox News viewers 
are more cynical about the mainstream media than CNN and network news viewers.  No 
association between newspaper reading and watching Fox News was found for 2004.  Regular 
newspaper readers were more likely to use CNN or network news.  Morris (2005: 68) argues that 
is evidence that Fox News viewers are especially sceptical of the mainstream media.  The Fox 
News audience, unlike the CNN and network television news audiences were much more likely 
to prefer news that “shares their point of view” (Morris 2005: 68).  Consistent with work from 
Kull et al. (2003-4), Morris (2005) finds Fox News viewers to be less informed than CNN and 
network news viewers.  The audience was also more likely to underestimate than to overestimate 
the number of American casualties in Iraq (Morris 2005: 72).  The observation that preference 
for in-depth interviews is associated with watching CNN or network news but not Fox News is 
not surprising in the context of this finding.  Morris (2005: 70) explains that differences in the 
amount of attention that CNN compared to FNC viewers paid to various news stories raises the 
possibility that Fox News provides greater coverage of soft news in comparison with CNN.  
Morris (2005) concludes that his findings demonstrate that Fox News audience members have 
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“less familiarity with issues and events in the news that may be critical of their point of view” as 
FNC gave less attention to stories that Morris identified as negative to the image of the Bush 
administration.  The analysis (Morris 2005: 66) also found that CNN viewers were more active 
voters than the Fox News viewers.   
Aday et al. (2005) offer further evidence that the content on the Fox News Channel 
stands out in comparison with other broadcasters.  They (2005: 10) claim that the Fox News 
Channel argued “that journalists do not need to be objective in wartime”.  For example, Fox 
News encouraged reporters to use the first person plural when describing coalition forces and the 
United Sates (Aday et al 2005: 18).   Their analysis finds that most of the stories that aired on the 
“big three” United States television networks, CNN and Al Jazeera, an Arab satellite service, 
during the month long sample period during the spring of 2003 were neutral at the story level.  
The Fox News Channel included a greater proportion of stories that identified as supportive of 
the war.  The researchers found that all of the American networks mostly ignored the antiwar 
sentiment; in contrast, Al Jazeera provided more coverage of protests and diplomacy (2005: 17).  
FNC and the Lou Doubs Show on CNN ran almost no stories or images of American or civilian 
casualties (Aday et al. 2005: 17).   
 The above research demonstrates that Fox News is distinct because of its content and 
audience.   While the present analysis does not analyze the broadcaster’s programming, it will 
examine which groups are drawn to the service that is positioned as an alternative to the 
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1.6.4 Political Identification: 
 
 Media scholars make use of the concept of political identification in their work.  
However, partisanship and ideology are generally used as control variables.   There is a shortage 
of work that attempts to predict political identification using media use habits.  However, 
Chapter 3 of the present analysis employs political identification as a dependent variable.  The 
large body of work on talk radio represents an area where media scholars have used political 
identification for purposes other than control.  Briefly, this work finds that political talk radio 
listening is associated with Republicanism (Bolce 1996; Bennett 2002; Barker 1999 and Holbert 
2004) and conservatism (Bennett 2002; Bolce 1996). The political identification of talk radio 
listeners will be discussed in further detail below and is explored in Chapter 3.  This section will 
focus on work that deals with political identification in contexts outside of the media.  The first 
part of the section focuses on the United States while the latter deals with research on political 
identification in Canada. 
 There has been research into the gender gap in partisan support in the United States.  
Males are more likely to support the Republican Party than females (Kaufmann 2004; Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004).  Kaufmann (2004) observes that those who are religious comprise a 
greater proportion of those supporting the Republican Party and that women are more religious 
than men yet women are more likely to support the Democratic Party.  This paradox is the focus 
of Kaufmann’s work that examines the relationships between religion, partisanship and gender. 
However, Kaufmann finds that those who are more religious are more politically conservative 
and that the gender gap in political opinion characterizes even those who are relatively more 
religious (Kaufmann 2004: 500).  “In spite of the greater allure of the Republicans for religious 
whites, the gender gap in party identification among the highly committed is nearly identical to 
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that of the low commitment group and is approximately twice that of the seculars.  It seems that 
the paradox of religious yet liberal women cannot be explained by variance in the gender gap 
across different levels of religious commitment” (sic.) (Kaufmann 2004: 500).  Kaufmann (2004: 
503) finds that religious commitment is more strongly related to social issues in comparison with 
other types of political issues for both males and females.  For instance, religious commitment 
has less explanatory power in predicting support for social welfare or with defence issues 
(Kaufmann (2004: 503).  This pattern was found for males and females (Kaufmann (2004: 503).  
While Kaufmann (2004) continues to see the gender religion paradox as unresolved, her finding 
that religious values influence cultural attitudes and that these attitudes are related to party 
preference suggests that gender differences on non-religious issues maintain the gender gap in 
Republican support.  
 Box-Steffensmeier, et al. (2004) approach the gender-gap issue by exploring trends over 
time.  Their analysis reveals that the gap is a dynamic phenomenon.  The authors describe that 
men and women had close levels of Republican and Democratic support in the late 1970s.  The 
gender gap has widened since the early 1980s (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 515).    Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. (2004: 517) observe that males were associated with much of the decline in 
Democratic support in the late 1970s.  In the late 1970s, women were about 5% more Republican 
than men but were 5 to 10% more Democratic than men between the late 1980s and 2000 (Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 517).  The authors explain that males and females are becoming 
increasingly Republican; however, this is happening at a faster rate among men (Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 517).   Box-Steffensmeier, et al. (2004) used a range of variables, 
including economic indicators to describe trends in the gender gap over time.  Their analysis 
finds that the partisan gender gap increases with the proportion of adults who identify as 
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conservative, economic deterioration and the proportion of women who are single (Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 525).  It was found that the gender gap increases about two and a half 
years after the political environment becomes more conservative (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 
525).  The authors observe opposing socio-economic trends that relate to the partisan gender gap.  
They describe that increases in the proportion of women with high levels of education and higher 
paying jobs reduce the differences in the positions of men and women (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 
2004: 521).  This increased presence of women in the “economically privileged class” 
encourages women to consider political views that may be different from men (Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 521).  However, it also results in more “shared experiences of men 
and women, potentially leading to shared or converging preferences.  It is thus not clear that 
autonomy must produce distinct preferences” (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 521).  However, 
the authors speculate if Democratic support among single women is due to their greater 
likelihood of relying on the social programs perceived as being better supported by a Democratic 
government (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 526).  This suggests that “economic vulnerability” 
best explains how these social changes impact the gender gap (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004: 
526-7): 
Where women are most likely to be independent from men-holding better and, on 
average, high-paying jobs-they find themselves more like men but also freer to 
develop their own perspectives, which may be similar to or different from those of 
men.  At the same time, as women heading households are more likely to be 
economically vulnerable, they are likely to hold both different preferences than 
men and also more liberal preferences, leading them to support the Democratic 
party at higher rates than men and producing a larger gender gap. 
  
This interpretation suggests that there is a connection between macroeconomic conditions, the 
number of women who are single and the gender gap in political partisanship in the United 
States. 
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 Nadeau, et al. (2004) also approach the dynamic quality of partisanship in the United 
States by focusing on the issues of region and class.  The authors explain that class-based 
partisanship among Whites in the Southern United States has increased over the years (2004: 
53).  In the 1950s, income differences had little predictive power for the party preference of 
Whites.  Those with lower incomes were more likely to support the Democratic Party.  However, 
among Whites native to the South, the opposite pattern applied as 90% of those in the top third 
of family incomes supported the Democrats in comparison with 79% of the bottom third 
(Nadeau, et al. 2004: 54).  By the 1960s, the pattern reversed among Southern natives (Nadeau, 
et al. 2004: 55).  In the 1970s the difference in party support for the Democratic Party between 
income groups widened among all Whites (Nadeau, et al. 2004: 54).  The income gap continued 
into the 1990s with the largest gap characterizing the South, especially among those native to the 
area (Nadeau, et al. 2004: 55).  For this group in the 1990s, those Whites with the bottom third of 
family incomes were 29% more likely to prefer the Democratic Party than those in the top third 
(Nadeau, et al. 2004: 55).  Those with lower incomes outside of the South also became 
increasingly Democratic.  However, as a whole, the South became increasingly Republican over 
the years (Nadeau, et al. 2004: 55).  Multivariate analysis suggests that the gap in partisanship by 
income and education groups only began to characterize those outside of the South more recently 
than is suggested by percentage data alone (Nadeau, et al. 2004: 56).   The author’s logistic 
regression analysis suggests that education polarized Whites in the United States more than 
income in 1950s and 1960s; however, income was more important in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Nadeau, et al. 2004: 61).  The authors do not identify a specific explanation for these trends.  
However, they raise the possibility that these changes signal a weakened influence of “race” on 
partisanship and political discourse in general in the Southern United States (Nadeau, et al. 2004: 
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61).  Nadeau, et al. (2004: 62) cite Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) and observe that the 1980s 
saw greater clarity between the ideological differences between parties facilitating “greater 
consistency between issue positions and partisanship”.  This change resulted in the wealthier and 
better educated shifting their partisanship.   
 Kelly and Kelly (2005) also approach the link between cultural identification and party 
preference.  Their analysis focuses on religious identification in the Latino community in the 
United States.  The authors clarify that Latinos are not overwhelmingly Catholic (2005: 89).  
They point out that 56% of Latino Americans are Roman Catholic and that this number has been 
declining over time (Kelly and Kelly 2005: 89).  Catholic Latinos show preference for the 
Democratic Party while evangelicals show the most support for the Republican Party (Kelly and 
Kelly 2005: 89).  These findings along with patterns relating religious identification to voting 
participation are advantageous to the Republican Party.  Kelly and Kelly (2005: 93) find that 
evangelicals participate in elections at almost the same rate as Catholics and that Protestants, 
who prefer the Republican Party, participate more than Catholics.  Further, there are high 
concentrations of Latinos in electorally important states such as Florida, California, Texas, New 
York and Illinois (Kelly and Kelly 2005: 93).  Kelly and Kelly (2005) argue that while as a 
whole, Latino Americans favour the Democrats; changes in the religious composition of the 
group should prompt further work on the political behaviour of the Latino population in the 
United States.   
 Examining the link between class and support for the New Democratic Party (NDP) is a 
useful test for the class vote in Canada as the NDP is perceived as being more class-oriented than 
the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties.  Exploring the rationales that voters use to make 
their choices also offers heuristic value in understanding political behaviour.  Lambert, et al. 
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(1998) examine how reasons that can be captured by the “left/right wing” political scale relate to 
political identification.  The authors found that 14.6% and 9.4% of primary reasons for party 
preference at the federal and provincial levels respectively could be placed on the “left/right” 
scale. Among the secondary reasons, these proportions are 5.3% and 3.0% (1998: 393).  Reasons 
that were not seen as relevant to the scale included explanations based on strategic voting, the 
leadership qualities of the political options and family voting behaviour.  “Left-wing” reasons 
were much more likely to be used than “right-wing” ones.  They were about twice as common as 
“right wing” reasons in the federal context and three times more common in the provincial 
context (Lambert, et al. 1998: 393).  The NDP had the largest percentage of its supporters 
providing leftist reasons at 41% of federal and 34% of provincial identifiers (Lambert, et al. 
1990: 394).  All other parties had less than 7% of identifiers citing leftist reasons for their 
support.  Fifteen percent of federal Conservatives used “right-wing” reasons to explain their 
support.  No federal party exceeded this (Lambert, et al. 1998: 395).  The authors see these 
findings as evidence that left-wing ideology is “more fully developed as counter-ideology” than 
right-wing ideology and predict that if a clearly defined right-wing party emerged as a 
“politically plausible alternative” to the centrist or centre-right ideology that dominates Canada 
emerged, supporters of that party would be more likely than others to explain their preference in 
right-wing terms (Lambert, et al. 1990: 402).  These observations reflect an expectation that 
ideological clarity in party discourse is related to use of reasons that can be placed on the 
left/right spectrum. 
 
1.7 Work Focusing on Talk Radio: 
 
 The rise of political talk radio has prompted a large body of work on the link between 
talk radio tuning and various political variables.  A section has been dedicated to the area of talk 
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radio because of the integrated way that scholars have approached the area.  Discussions of talk 
radio exposure, political identification and behaviour are often intertwined to help to emphasize 
the implications of findings.  The present analysis examines the relationship that talk radio has 
with political identification, perceptions of political party bias and poltical participation. 
Talk radio programming is often associated with “loudmouth” conservatism captured by 
icons such as Rush Limbaugh and Bill O-Reilly.   A number of scholars associate the genre with 
conservative content (for example, Jones 2004; Barker and Knight 2000; Barker 1999; Barker 
1998a; Holbert 2004; Bolce, et al. 1996; Mayer 2004).  Bolce, et al. (1996: 457) emphatically 
describes various perceptions of the industry: 
Detractors call them right wing nuts, apostles of hate, fomenters of violence.  Fans 
hear them as inspirational, voices of reason, enlighteners of the public.  Similarly, 
their audience is portrayed as maladjusted, intolerant, and dangerous-or as 
guardians of the republic, socially conscious, and public spirited.  Talk radio, its 
hosts and listeners: Is it a “bedlam of conservative yakkers?” A forum for 
seditionists? An electronic version of New England town meetings? Is it all of the 
above, some, or none?  
 
While Bolce, et al.’s rhetoric recognizes a debate on the image of talk radio; it suggests 
that the genre is more niche than it is mass.  However, predicting if a person is a talk radio 
listener is difficult (Bolce, et al. 1996; Bennett 2002; Hofstetter 1994).  Some research suggests 
that education, income and household size are not significantly related to talk radio listening 
(Hofstetter 1994: 474; Bennett 2002: 16).  Hofstetter, et al found that health, household size, 
“race” and gender were not significantly related to talk radio listening (1994: 474).  Some 
evidence suggests that being male is related to political talk radio exposure (Holbert 2004; Bolce, 
et al. 1996).  Bolce, et al. (1996: 464) describes that being White is associated with talk radio 
listening.  While Hofstetter found age to have a weak positive relationship with talk radio 
listening, he argues that “exposure to political talk radio is a general phenomenon not linked to 
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specific socially defined groups” (1994: 474).  Similarly, Bolce, et al. argues that talk radio 
listeners who vote in elections are not captured by traditional “analytic categories” based on 
categories such as ethnicity, occupation, region, class, religion and associational membership.  
He explains that, “The most salient and theoretically meaningful characteristic of talk voters 
appears to be the medium and the type of programming they listen to.  What binds these folks 
together is that they are “talk networked” (1996: 464).  However, Bennett (2002) found 
differences in the predictive power of some variables when comparing United States federal 
election years 1996 and 2000 with 1998, a non-election year.  “Race” was significant in the 
election years but not in 1998 (Bennett 2002: 16).  Republicans were more likely to listen to 
political talk radio during the election years.  Party affiliation was not a predictor in 1998.  
Conservatism was associated with listening in 1998 and 2000.  Ideology was not significant in 
1996 (Bennett 2002: 16).  
Those who listen to political talk radio are more likely than a random American to 
support the Republican Party (Bolce, et al. 1996; Bennett 2002; Barker 1999; Holbert 2004).  
Political talk radio listeners are also more likely to identify ideologically as conservatives 
(Bennett 2002; Bolce, et al. 1996).   Bolce, et al. (1996: 465) explain that male and female non-
listeners were less likely to vote Republican than talk radio listeners.  Because this analysis relies 
on percentage data without the use of control variables, it is not clear if this variation is related to 
other variables.  While Bolce, et al. (1996: 465) observe that, generally speaking, “race” and 
gender are the only demographic and socio-economic variables that are useful in differentiating 
the voting behaviour between listeners and non-listeners using percentage data, this is not 
sufficient evidence to claim that talk radio listening, on its own, explains voting differences.   
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Approximately 20 percent of both Blacks and Whites were found to listen to talk radio.  
However, in contrast with White Americans, talk radio listening does not seem to be related to 
the political identification of Blacks.  Specifically, White talk radio listeners were found to be 
more Republican than Whites that did not listen to talk radio.  However, Blacks, regardless of if 
they were talk radio listeners were at least eight times more likely to vote for Democratic 
candidates than the Republican candidates in House and Senate races (Bolce, et al. 1996: 465).   
Hofstetter (1998: 281) found that exposure to Rush Limbaugh explained some variation 
in partisanship and ideological identification with statistical significance.  This was not the case 
for the audience of a major conservative radio host in San Diego or for National Public Radio’s 
John Hockenberry’s audience in the San Diego area (Hofstetter 1998: 283).  Hofstetter (1998: 
284) speculates if, “conservative, but not NPR, political talk show hosts contribute to priming, or 
sensitizing, listeners in relation to partisan and ideological tendencies in program 
content…Simple exposure to ideological hosts may stimulate ideological and partisan resonance 
among listeners, but have little impact on mobilizing participation”. 
 Despite that political talk radio listeners are not easily defined using demography and 
other conventional background variables, talk radio tuning is a useful predictor of important 
political behaviours.   Evidence suggests that talk radio has a positive relationship with various 
forms of political participation (Hofstetter, et al. 1993; Hofstetter 1998; Bolce, et al. 1996).  
Barker’s (1998b: 269) work suggests that this relationship also applies to conservative and 
moderate listeners of Rush Limbaugh’s program.    
 Higher levels of political participation and the current affairs emphasis of political talk 
radio suggest that listeners would have higher levels of political interest.  Research supports the 
expectation that political interest is associated with exposure to talk radio (Holbert 2004; Bennett 
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2002; Hofstetter, et al. 1994).  While political talk radio listeners seem to take greater interest in 
politics and demonstrate this interest by following current issues on the radio, they are not more 
knowledgeable about public affairs.  Bennett (2001: 80) did not find exposure to political talk 
radio to significantly predict a person’s political knowledge as measured by the Knowledge of 
Public Affairs Scale for the 1996 and 1998 National Election Studies through his multivariate 
analysis.  The same pattern was found for national and local television news viewing.  
Newspaper reading was inconsistently positively associated with political knowledge (Bennett 
2001: 79).  Using a bivariate analysis, talk radio listeners appear to be better informed than non-
listeners. However, this relationship does not persist when other predictors of political 
information are included in the analysis (Bennett 2001: 82).  Bennett wonders if this is because 
talk radio listeners do not tune into political talk radio to learn the type of political knowledge 
tested by the National Election Studies. 
Work from Bolce, et al. examines the impact of the “talk radio vote” in the 1994 United 
States Presidential election.  The authors argue that talk radio listeners are “an emerging political 
category worthy of empirical analyses comparable to the treatment political scientists have 
accorded other categories of the electorate” (1996: 462).  Bolce, et al. (1996: 461) explain that: 
Talk radio is thought to have wielded considerable political clout in the 1994 
election, its influence pervading national, state, and local politics.  Indeed the 
1994 election has been called the “first talk-radio election.” Talk radio listeners 
made up 21 percent of House voters nationally; similar percentages held for all 
the individual states and in all regions surveyed by [Voter News Service].  In 
1994, talk voters cast 64 percent of their votes for Republicans in House races and 
six in ten voted for Republican Senate candidates.  These talk voters differed 
significantly from nonlistening voters, who cast 51 percent of their ballots for 
Democratic House and Senate candidates.   
 
Barker (1998a; 1998b; 1999; Barker and Knight 2000) has a done extensive work on the Rush 
Limbaugh audience.  He found that listening to Limbaugh is associated with support for the 
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Republican Party (1999).  While crosstabular data does not demonstrate causal relationships, 
Barker’s (2000) study on the political attitudes of the Rush Limbaugh audience offers 
compelling evidence that Limbaugh influences public opinion.   Barker and Knight (2000: 167-
8) summarize their findings: 
These analyses have revealed an unmistakable pattern: when Limbaugh levels 
criticism toward particular ideas, groups, or individuals on at least half of his 
broadcasts, regular listeners show a marked tendency to buy the Limbaugh 
message-displaying hostility toward those items beyond what can be accounted 
for by ideology, party identification, exposure to other conservative messages, 
affect for Limbaugh, or a host of other factors.  Moreover, regular listening not 
only correlates with attitudes that reflect Limbaugh’s message; listening also 
relates to opinion change toward greater conservatism and antipathy toward 
Limbaugh’s favourite targets. 
 
Barker’s emphasis on Rush Limbaugh is fitting when one considers that, “When 20 million 
Americans (the approximate size of the Limbaugh audience), largely homogeneous in belief 
structure, participate at a much higher than the electorate at large and spread their gospel to 
millions of others…the Republican Party and the conservative ideology that it represents reap the 
benefits” (1998b: 269).   
 
1.8 Agenda-Setting Framework: 
 
 This thesis does not assume that media content or usage directly cause outcomes related 
to any of the political variables discussed above.  Nor does it see political variables as 
determining media selection.  Instead, the thesis aims to reveal associational relationships and 
sees the connection between media use and the discussed political variables as being related in 
complex ways.  A discussion of these processes is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, 
agenda-setting helps to demonstrate such complexity by describing how the media can influence 
what people think about even if it does not determine beliefs. 
Chapter 1: Introduction & Review of Literature 
 59  
 
 
The agenda-setting framework is useful when considering causal issues in the field of 
mass communications.  Rogers, et al. (1997: 226) explain that before the introduction of the 
agenda-setting approach, mass communications scholars were mostly preoccupied with the 
examination of direct effects of the media on audience attitudes and behaviours.  The agenda-
setting framework had momentum because it was introduced in the 1970s when researchers were 
frustrated with the explanatory power of models that used public attitudes and opinions as 
dependent variables (Rogers, et al. 1997: 227). 
 The agenda-setting framework recognizes that news consumers have limited power.  It 
reveals a perspective that sees media users as having limited input into the content that they can 
choose from.  However, it recognizes that they have some agency in their evaluations of this 
content despite the power held by the media.  Agenda-setting work emphasizes the distinction 
between telling audiences “what to think” with “what to think about” and consequently how to 
think.   
 Agenda-setting research aims to understand the relationship between the exposure that an 
issue is given by the media and the level of importance that an audience associates with the issue.  
The approach seeks to determine the “degree to which the media agenda, measured as the 
number of news stories about each of the five issues salient at a point in time, influenced the 
public agenda, measured as the degree to which the members of a population rated each of the 
five issues in salience” (Rogers, et al. 1997: 228). 
 Researchers are drawn to the agenda-setting approach because it offers high levels of 
explanatory power.  McCombs (No date: 3) explains that most comparisons between how the 
media ranks issues and how the public ranks these issues yield correlations of at least +0.50.  For 
instance, McCombs (1997: 435) describes a study (McCombs and Shaw 1972) on the 1968 
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United States presidential election that found a rank order correlation of +0.97 between the 
election issues considered most important by voters and the coverage of those issues by the news 
media consumed by those voters.  Similarly, McCombs (1997) also describes Eaton’s (1989) 
work that examines the salience of eleven different issues including crime, fear of war, 
unemployment, poverty and inflation over three and half years.  This work finds that the changes 
in salience of ten of these issues on the public agenda were positively associated with the pattern 
of news coverage during the period.  “Morality in society” was the only issue with a negative 
correlation (McCombs 1997: 443). 
 McCombs (No date: 8) writes that, “Influencing the focus of public attention is a 
powerful role, but, arguably, influencing the agenda of attributes for an issue or political figure is 
the epitome of political power”.  He explains that an agenda is made up of objects, the “things on 
which the attention of the media and the public are focused” (McCombs, No date: 5).  However, 
each object is described using its traits and characteristics: attributes (McCombs, No date: 5).  
Like objects, the amount of attention paid to different attributes varies.  The media’s ability to 
emphasize or de-emphasize attributes gives the media much influence.  For example, McCombs 
(No Date: 6) describes how Becker and McCombs (1978) compared descriptions made by 
members of New York’s Democrat party of the candidates running for their party’s presidential 
nomination in 1976 with depictions of these candidates in Newsweek.  It was found that the 
correlation between the attributes on the news agenda and the voter agenda increased from +0.64 
in mid-February to +0.83 in late March.  In sum, the media’s decisions about the most important 
aspects of the primaries were forefront throughout the decision-making period and took on 
increased relevance as Democrats became more immersed in the primaries.   
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 While these findings suggest that the media have an ability to influence public opinion, 
McCombs (No date: 8) points out that the submissiveness of the public can be overestimated.  
He demonstrates this through his discussion of the inescapable coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky 
“scandal”.  He explains that despite the high profile style coverage of the issue; the American 
public did not use the scandal as key criteria in their assessments of Bill Clinton.  McCombs 
suggests that individuals play a key role in assessing what they find relevant.  He explains that 
those who find a topic relevant but have high uncertainty about that topic are more likely to pay 
attention to the news and be more influenced by the media agenda (McCombs No date: 10).   
 The term “priming” refers to the “ability of the media agenda to affect the criteria by 
which individuals judge issues” (Iyengar 1991 cited in Rogers, et al. 1997: 235).  McCombs (no 
date) describes findings from Iyengar and Kinder (1987) that suggest that audiences have 
problems separating the media agenda from newsmakers’ agendas.  These authors found that 
subjects who were exposed to extensive news coverage on one or more of five issues were more 
likely to assess the President on an overall basis using their assessment of how the President 
dealt with the issue or issues that was emphasized in the coverage that were exposed to.  This 
occurred even if the news story did not describe a high degree of presidential responsibility for 
the issue (McCombs, No date: 13). 
 Work by Lewis, et al. (1991) using American public opinion of the Gulf War reveals the 
significance that agenda setting has on public perception.  The authors explain that: 
Critics of the war policy say that it is hypocritical for the US to react so violently 
to one occupation in the Middle East, while ignoring- or supporting- others in the 
region.  In terms of public support for the war, the point is critical, since a 
majority of our respondents (53%) stated that the US should intervene with 
military force to restore the sovereignty of any illegally occupied country 
(compared with only 18% who supported intervention to protect oil interests). 
What this suggests is that (unless they are advocating a whole series of military 
interventions) most people are unaware of other occupations in the Middle East- 
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or anywhere else.  This is important, because such an awareness would undercut 
the moral cornerstone of the current war policy (Lewis, et al. 1991:3). 
 
The above argument is supported by findings that 31% of the Denver sample knew about Israel’s 
occupations in the Middle East.  A mere 3% were aware of Syria’s occupation of Lebanon 
(Lewis, et al. 1991: 3).  However, it was found that most of the sample knew that “the Patriot” 
was used to shoot down the Iraqi Scuds and that Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran 
and members of the Iraqi population.  Lewis, et al. (1991: 5) argue that audiences are 
“selectively misinformed” and that neither the “known” or “unknown facts” are “neutral”.   
The authors found the amount of television viewing to be significant in predicting a 
person’s knowledge of relevant issues.  For instance, those who watched less television were 
more likely to know that the United States had supported Iraq in its war with Iran (Lewis, et al.: 
6).  Lewis, et al.’s (1991: 7) finding that knowledge is strongly associated with opposition to the 
war suggests that the media agenda can have policy implications. 
 McCombs (1997: 433) explains that agenda setting is about the “transmission of 
salience” and that we need to focus our attention on “consensus building” to transcend times 
characterized by clashing individual differences.  He argues that the news media help the 
population to reach consensus but that they do not necessarily determine what the consensus will 
be (McCombs 1997: 437).  McCombs (1997: 438) outlines a continuum of “professional 
behaviour” ranging from “active” to “passive” that describes the news media’s role in agenda 
setting.  This continuum includes four benchmark positions. 
 At the most passive extreme is “Professional Detachment” where journalists act as 
“windows on the world.” In this situation, agenda setting is an “inadvertent by-product of 
reporting the news” (McCombs 1997: 438).  In “Targeted Involvement”, the news media make 
deliberate attempts to draw attention to certain issues by putting news stories on the agenda 
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through investigative reporting and editorial campaigns to help the public interest.  McCombs 
(1997: 438) explains that these stories are usually narrow in focus and deal with specific events. 
The third benchmark, “Boosterism” is seen by McCombs (1997: 438) as being an inevitable 
aspect of local news.  This benchmark is characterized by applauding positive news 
developments.  It is difficult to distinguish between “blatant publicity and boosterism and 
newsworthy community interest” (McCombs 1997: 438).  The least passive benchmark is 
“Proactive Agenda Setting.”  In this situation, the news media bring issues to attention to 
promote public interest.  McCombs argues that this style of news can be used to strengthen the 
bonds between citizens and government.  The goal is to “build community through 
communication” (McCombs 1997: 439).  He explains that the community agendas can be set 
from the top-down.  In this situation, journalists deliberately make topics salient.  With the 
bottom-up approach extensive public opinion polling is used to identify issues that concern the 
population (McCombs 1997: 439-40). 
 Using a case study approach of issues in Germany, Mathes and Pfetsch (1991) 
demonstrate that alternative media can bring issues into the media agenda.  The authors argue 
that the alternative media has the power to bring issues to light through a “spill-over effect” 
Mathes and Pfetsch (1991: 51).  In some of the case studies, Mathes and Pfetsch (1991: 51) 
observed issues that “spilled like a wave from alternative into established media.”  Mathes and 
Pfetsch (1991: 54) argue that issues are more likely to move onto the agenda of the mainstream 
press if “the issue threatens vital elements of society” and if “prominent and trustworthy 
‘witnesses’ for the issue” are available.   
  More recent research has explored the nuances of agenda setting.  Kiousis and McCombs 
(2004) found that media salience has strong positive relationships with attitude strength.   
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Kiousis and McCombs (2004: 49), found some evidence supporting the affinity model.  This 
model sees media salience as leading to attitude strength thereby reinforcing public salience.  
Tsfati (2003: 171) found that, on an individual level, those who are sceptical of the media are 
less likely to see the issues at the top of the media agenda as most important.  This finding 
persists after controls for demographics, political ideology, extremity, discussion, knowledge and 
involvement.  Wanta and Hu (1994) use path analysis to demonstrate that those who perceive the 
media to be credible are more reliant on the media for information causing them to have greater 
exposure to the media.  In consequence, this group is more “susceptible to agenda-setting 
effects” (Wanta and Hu 1994: 96).  This model was significant for newspapers, television and 
these media in combination (Wanta and Hu 1994: 97).  Wanta and Hu (1994: 97) also found that 
the perceptions of an affiliate news media’s are related to agenda-setting effects.  These feelings 
were measured by asking respondents if they feel that news organizations are concerned about 
their own personal interests, the public’s welfare and community well being.  “In other words, if 
individuals believe that the media are highly affiliated with society, will tend to believe that the 
issues covered [in the media] are in the best interests of society” (Wanta and Hu 1994: 97). 
 
1.9 Contributions to Existing Work: 
 
 The present analysis will address a number of deficiencies in existing research.  First, the 
analysis will use political identification as a dependent variable.  Generally, media scholars have 
been using ideology and partisanship as control variables.  While this thesis does not claim that 
media use patterns directly determine political identification, as discussed above, there is an 
absence of work that predicts political identification using media use.  Second, there is a lack of 
work that studies the significance of the number of news sources that a person uses.  This thesis 
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will examine the associations between the number of sources that a person uses and their feelings 
about the news media and socio-economic status.  Third, the present analysis will expand on the 
link between political participation and media use.  As described above, there has been research 
in this area.  However, such work tends to focus on political talk radio and news use.  This thesis 
will explore connections between political participation and the range of media sources that a 
person uses, broadcaster preference, a person’s use of non-news media and non-profit-media.  
Fourth, there is a lack of work that makes use of source specific information.  The present 
analysis will examine the associations that broadcaster preference has with the political 
participation and identification and perceptions of the news media.  Fifth, the present analysis 
will add to research on perceptions of media bias by using MRC techniques and using the 
amount of party bias a dependent variable.  Finally, this thesis will add another dimension to the 
area by controlling for place of residence.  As described above, Putnam’s work suggests that 
media use is related to commuting and commuting culture. A more detailed discussion of the 
aims of this analysis, including hypotheses testing, is described in Chapter 2.  
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2.1 Data Set: 
 
 Ideally, to provide a better understanding of our society the analysis would examine a 
Canadian population.  However, no data set that surveyed media use as well as political 
behaviours and beliefs using a Canadian sample was found.   
The data analysis aspects of this project use the results of survey the Early January 2004 
Political Communications Study conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People and The 
Press.  The centre conducted structured telephone interviews between 19 December 2003 and 4 
January 2004.  Pew’s survey focuses on media use for learning about the 2004 U.S. Presidential 
election.  In order to have findings that can be generalized, it will be assumed that respondents 
do not change their media choices prior to elections.   
Respondents were found using random digit dialling within telephone exchanges in 
continental United States.  Telephone exchanges were selected with probabilities proportionate 
to their size. The number of telephone numbers randomly sampled in each county is 
proportionate to that county’s share of telephone numbers in the population.  Ten or more 
attempts were made to complete an interview with each sampled telephone number.  The 
population is all people 18 years of age and older in continental United States. 
 Pew employs an over-sampling technique to help meet its population parameters.  
Interviewers first asked to speak to the youngest male adult in the home.  In situations where this 
was not possible, interviewers asked to speak to the oldest female adult in the home.  The data 
set has a sample size of 1506 respondents.   
 The contact and cooperation rates for the Pew data set are 74 and 44 percent respectively.  
Ninety-three percent of those who were initially cooperating and eligible to participate in the 
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survey completed the survey (Pew 2005a).  The overall response rate is 30 percent (the product 
of the contact, cooperation and completion rates). The unweighted sample is fairly close to 
population parameters with respect to gender, age and region.  There is under-representation of 
those who did not complete high school and over-representation of those who graduated from 
college.  The unweighted sample represents a disproportionately high number of non-Hispanic 
whites.  The sample was weighted so that each form of the survey matches Census parameters 
for sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin and region.  The weighted sample includes 3188 
cases.  The margin of error for the entire sample is plus or minus three percent.  Each form 
specific sample is associated with a margin of error of plus or minus four percent (Pew 2005a). 
The survey is limited by the use of forms.  Because not all respondents were asked the 
same questions about their media use, the utility of the survey is constrained.  Questions about 
use of religious radio, local television and morning television shows were asked to half of the 
sample.  Questions about talk radio and magazine television use were asked to the other half of 
the sample.  This has three major implications on the analysis.  First, it reduces the sample size in 
aspects of the analysis.  Second, it reduces the possibilities for crosstabular analysis.  Third, 
form-specific variables cannot be included in models that include both the income and income 
missing variables.  Because all cases that were not asked the form specific question were coded 
as missing, mean substitution is not appropriate in models that include form-specific variables.  
However, income and income missing can only be entered in the same model when missing 
cases are handled using mean substitution.  This is problematic, as fourteen percent of the sample 
did not answer the income question.  Further analysis suggests that these missing data on the 
income variable are not randomly distributed.  The other independent variables include far fewer 
missing cases.  The missing categories for religiosity, education, age and election interest include 
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0.7 percent or less of respondents.  Only six respondents did not answer the education attainment 
question. 
The constructions of the dependent variables are described in subsequent chapters.  
Education is measured by the respondent’s highest level of attainment.  Income is measured 
using an interval-proximate scale that is based on the midpoint of each income range divided by 
1000.  A value of 200 was used to represent the upper end category of more than $150, 000.  The 
education categories and income ranges used by Pew are used in the table in Appendix 1.  
Religiosity is measured using an interval-proximate scale based on attendance at religious 
services.  The other independent variables are described in the data analysis chapters.   
The survey design as well as the focus of the hypothesis testing has resulted in reliance 
on very crude variables.  Multiple regression assumes that errors are normally distributed and 
that the variance of errors is not a function of any of the independent variables.  The errors from 
the mean value of the dependent variable for each value of the various independent variables are 
assumed to be normally distributed.  However, most of the dependent variables are ordinal and 
include only a few categories.  These variable scales are characterized by highly skewed 
distributions, with the bulk of cases clustered at the low end of most scales.  The models 
described in subsequent chapters include a number of dummy coded independent variables.  
These conditions are not conducive to the assumptions that underlie multiple regression.  
Readers should interpret findings with consideration to these concerns.  The residual statistics 
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2.2 Research Hypotheses: 
 
The present analysis aims to test a variety of relationships involving political identification, 
the range of media sources that a person uses, perceptions of the media and political 
participation:   
 
• H1: Those who learn about the presidential campaign through political talk shows on cable 
television and the radio (religious and non-religious programs) will be more conservative and 
have higher levels of online and offline political participation in comparison with the United 
States as a whole.  They will be more likely to perceive a Democratic bias in the news media. 
 
Rationale:  The literature review describes work on the link between political identification and 
talk radio use.  There is an overlap between the talk radio and cable news genres.   For example, 
Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity both host programs on The Fox News Channel as well as talk 
radio programs.  Talk radio hosts are frequent guests on political talk shows on cable television.  
CNN is the result of Ted Turner’s idea to bring all-news radio onto the television screen (Auletta 
2003).  As earlier research has identified a link between conservatism and talk radio use, it 
expected that would also characterize users of political talk shows on cable television.  The 
“loudmouth” and “tell it like it is” styles associated with conservative hosts and guests on talk 
radio and cable television are expected to draw an audience that is frustrated with what they 
perceive as a liberal media.  It sees this programming as attracting viewers who are deliberately 
seeking political content.   
 
• H2: The Fox News Channel audience will be associated with conservatism.  It will be more 
likely to perceive the news media as having a Democratic bias than the population as a whole 
and demonstrate higher levels of online and offline political participation. 
 
Rationale:  This hypothesis is based on the expectation that FNC is positioned as a news service 
for those who are concerned about a “liberal bias” in the news media.  As described in the 
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literature review, FNC is more trusted by Republicans than Democrats or Independents (Pew: 
2005: 43).  Media critics including Al Franken (2003) accuse the broadcaster of a conservative 
bias in its programming.  It is expected that conservative viewers are drawn to the broadcaster 
because of this positioning.  The expectation that viewing Fox News will be associated with 
higher levels of political activity stems from the expectation that Fox News will have a very 
politically defined audience.  Such an audience is expected to be more emphatic about their 
views and will demonstrate these concerns through higher levels of political involvement. 
 
• H3: The audiences of services that are not mandated to generate profits, such as PBS, NPR 
and the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN), will be distinct.  The use of non-
profit media will be associated with:  
 
 H3 a: High socio-economic status;  
 H3 b: Liberalism; 
 H3 c: Perceptions of Republican biased news media and  
 H3 d: Higher levels of political participation. 
 
Rationale: Work by Kull (2003-4) and Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) suggests that the non-
profit media audience is unique.  Because non-profit media do not have the same concerns about 
audience size as commercial broadcasters, they are better suited to offer content with less mass 
appeal.  Such content is less sensational and more information and analysis based.  Such 
programming is expected to draw an audience with higher socio-economic status.  The 
operational model used by non-profit broadcasters, despite drawing on corporate donations, 
reflects concerns about market forces.  This approach to revenue generation is expected to attract 
a more liberal audience.  The positioning of non-profit media as an alternative to the “corporate 
media” is expected to draw an audience that associates the mainstream media with a conservative 
bias.  Choosing non-profit media represents a deliberate and politically motivated approach to 
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information seeking. It is expected that the political concerns that draw audience members to 
non-profit media will also encourage these media users to be more politically active. 
 
• H4 a: Black Americans will be less likely to watch local television news and are more likely 
to perceive a bias in the news media.   
 
Rationale: There has been much discussion about the representation of Black culture in the 
media (for example, hooks 2004 and Torres 2003).  Many argue that the style of crime news 
stories encourage the perception that Blacks are more likely to be involved with criminal and 
violent behaviours.  For example, Dixon and Linz’s (2000) analysis of local television news 
content in Los Angeles and Orange Counties found that Blacks were more likely to be portrayed 
as perpetrators than as victims of crime.  The opposite was found for Whites.  Further, in 
comparison with criminal justice reports, Dixon and Linz (2000) found Blacks to be over-
represented as perpetrators of crime.  Local news draws extensively on crime stories 
(McChesney 2004: 86-7; Gilliam, Jr. and Iyengo 2000: 560).  For these reasons, it is anticipated 
that Blacks will be less likely to consume local news content.   
 
• H4 b: Non-Black Americans will differ from Black Americans in that non-Blacks who watch 
local television news will have higher levels of political participation in elections, online and 
in other forums.   
 
Rationale: Mastin (2000) suggests that the Black community in the United States has a unique 
relationship with local news.  Her Black sample did not seem to use local news in ways that were 
consistent with expectations suggested by work on the link between local news consumption and 
civic participation that does not distinguish between “races”.  Unlike the work she reviewed, 
Mastin did not find local news to be a useful to predictor of civic participation among Blacks 
(Mastin 2000: 123).  Mastins’ work encourages the examination of this sub hypothesis. 
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• H5: As perceived news bias increases, so too will the number and variety of media sources 
used by respondents. 
 
Rationale:  This hypothesis is based on the expectation that those who perceive a high level of 
media bias will use multiple sources in order to reduce their reliance on a particular source.  As 
discussed in the literature review, there is little research on the range of sources that a person 
uses.  While Tsfati and Cappella’s (2003) work does not focus on the total number of sources 
that a person uses, their work suggests that media sceptics incorporate mainstream and non-
mainstream sources in their media diets.  This hypothesis anticipates that attempts to use a 
diversity of media sources will be evident in the total number of sources used.   Those who see 
more bias in the media will use a greater total number of media sources. 
 
• H6: Survey participants were asked if they prefer news that shares their political point of 
view or if they prefer sources that do not have a particular point of view.  Those who 
indicated a preference for the latter will use a greater number of media and media sources. 
 
Rationale: Those who are concerned about the objectivity of news coverage will make use of a 
range of sources in order get a more “objective” sense of current events.  This reflects an 
assumption that news media consumers see the various media offerings as different from 
another.   
 
• H7 a: Using a greater number of hard news media sources (media that aims to inform its 
audience about current events) will be associated with higher socio-economic status. 
• H7 b:  Using a greater number of sources will be associated with higher levels of political 
participation in elections, online and other political forums. 
 
Rationale: These hypotheses stem from the discussion of work by Milbrath and Goel (1977) 
described in the literature review.  The expectation is that those with greater resources will be 
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more concerned about politics because they will feel more connected to the decisions made by 
political leaders.  This concern with political affairs will encourage information seeking about 
current affairs.  This political interest as well as higher consumer spending power will facilitate 
the use of more hard media sources. As well, subscription and technology costs reduce the 
availability of some media to low-income groups. 
 
• H8: Those who learn about the presidential campaign through entertainment-oriented 
programming will have lower levels of online and offline political participation. 
 
Rationale: It is expected that viewers are not drawn to entertainment oriented programming 
because of its educational benefits.  Baum’s (2005) analysis of appearances of major party 
presidential candidates on entertainment oriented television talk shows (e-talk) finds that election 
campaign coverage on these shows referred less to substantive elections issues than traditional 
interviews and national news reports.  Baum (2005) identifies e-talk as a forum for election 
candidates to reach voters that are less engaged in politics.  Viewers of these programs learn 
about the election issues through osmosis instead of deliberately seeking it out.  This passive 
approach to politics is expected to be associated with low levels of political participation.   
 
• H9: Viewers of Sunday morning network talk programs will be more politically active in 
elections and other political forums than the rest of the sample. 
 
Rationale: Baum’s (2005) work finds that traditional interview programs such as Meet the Press 
and This Week include much more issue-oriented discussion with election candidates in 
comparison with e-talk television.  This content is expected to draw an audience that is 
politically active.  The discussions on these programs often require background knowledge of 
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current issues.  These programs rely on their viewer’s interest in the topics discussed.  They are 
less produced and “shouting match” oriented than other media that deal with current issues.   
 
• H10: Those who learn about the presidential campaign through television magazine 
programs such as 20/20 and 60 Minutes will have lower levels of online and offline political 
participation. 
 
Rationale:  This hypothesis is based on reasoning similar to the above hypothesis pertaining to 
the link between viewing entertainment programs and political participation.  The difference 
between tabloid and magazine television programs is blurry.  The increased presence of celebrity 
shows may make magazine shows appear closer to the news genre.  Magazine shows are often 
positioned as “hard-hitting”, “proactive” and “investigative.” However, these programs draw 
many of their viewers through sensationalism and celebrity and lifestyle stories.  A report by the 
Project for Excellence in Journalism (1998: 4), found that 55 percent of stories on prime time 
magazine programs pertained to “people stories, lifestyle/behavior, news you can use and 
celebrity entertainment”.  Only eight percent of stories were found to deal with any of: 
education, economics, foreign affairs, the military, national security, politics or social welfare 
issues.  Grabe and Zhou (2003: 334) describe techniques used by the producers of 60 Minutes to 
enhance “the spectacle of dramatic storytelling”.  This type of programming is a more accessible 
way of gathering political information.  Such programming is expected to draw a less politically 
active audience. 
 
• H11: Hard news (media that aims to inform its audience about current events) consumption 
will be a stronger predictor of online and offline political participation for younger 
Americans in comparison with older Americans.   
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Rationale: It has been found that older people are more likely to seek news content (Holbert et 
al., 2003: 186; Vincent and Basil, 1997: 386; Shah et al. 2001b: 492).  Walker and Bellamy 
(1991) found that sample of university students see television remote control devices as a tool for 
avoiding political content. Because advertisers covet those with high amounts of disposable 
income who have yet to form brand loyalties, there is a wealth of content aimed at younger 
audiences.  Today’s television audience has access to more celebrity news than any other.  As a 
result, it is easy for today’s young media consumers to avoid news content.  Because of audience 
fragmentation, news audiences are more filtered than they have been in the past.  It is expected 
that younger consumers of news will be especially concerned about politics and will demonstrate 
this interest with high levels of political participation.   
 
2.3 Assumptions and Limitations: 
 
The above discussion of the hypotheses implies that some media are more political than 
others.  Topics that broadly relate to policy issues have been labelled as “political”.  It is 
reductive to see media content as being either political or not political.  The present analysis is 
not grounded in a perspective that sees some media content as being detached from socio-
political forces.   
 The hypotheses described above make distinctions between entertainment and non-
entertainment oriented programs.  This language does not suggest that producers of news and 
current affairs programming do not aim to entertain their audiences.  For the purpose of the 
present analysis, the “entertainment” label refers to content that is considered entertaining in the 
normative sense: content that is not information or analysis oriented.  For this analysis, late night 
talk, morning shows and comedy programs are considered entertainment oriented.  Morning 
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television shows while often considered “news” programs by networks, are considered 
entertainment-oriented for the purpose of the present analysis.  While these programs include 
multiple local and national newscasts per episode, the majority of the segments between 
newscasts are lifestyle, consumer and celebrity oriented.  In some cases, the national newscaster 
is also involved these segments.  Other segments involve guests describing their personal 
experiences and community involvement.  While these programs include some segments that are 
based on news stories, overall, these programs emphasize non-news content.  They appear to aim 
to make their viewer’s morning routines more pleasant through familiar friendly hosts and lighter 
fare while including enough news content to make audience members feel sufficiently informed 
about the day’s top stories. 
 The survey instrument allows for the identification of users of specific non-profit media 
sources.  For the purpose of this analysis, NPR, PBS and C-SPAN are considered non-profit.  
The term “public media” is not used because C-SPAN is a “private, non-profit public service of 
the cable television industry” (C-SPAN, 2006).  The company generates its revenue from license 
fees paid by the carriers that offer the service to their customers.  While religious radio stations 
are not profit motivated; they are not included in the “non-profit” category for the purposes of 
this analysis.   The term “talk radio” denotes respondents who claimed to use talk radio.  NPR 
and religious radio use are measured using their own variables.   
 Some of the hypotheses refer to “liberalism” or “conservatism”.  Groups that are 
predicted to be associated with liberalism are also expected to be associated with voting for Al 
Gore in 2000 and with identifying with the term “Democrat”.  Groups that are predicted to be 
associated with conservatism are also expected to be associated with voting for George W. Bush 
in 2000 and with identifying with the term “Republican”.   
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 The rationales for some of the hypotheses described above refer to perceptions of a 
“liberal media”.  The survey instrument does not ask respondents if they perceive a liberal or 
conservative bias in the media.  However, the survey allows for the measurement of perceived 
political party bias in the news media.  There are conceptual differences between ideological and 
party bias.   The terms “liberal bias” and “Democratic bias” should not be used interchangeably.  
The present analysis sees perceptions of party bias as way of accessing ideologically rooted 
concerns about the media. 
Cross-sectional survey data cannot confirm causal relationships between variables, for 
that experimental designs would be needed.  This project does not aim to make causal claims.  
Further, it is difficult to make such claims about the connection between media consumption and 
political behaviour and identification.  This project does not aim to determine if a person’s views 
and political activeness are tied to their media use or if they are a prerequisite to their media 
consumption.  Media consumption likely has a complex relationship with the dependent 
variables examined in the present analysis.  Generally, media related variables are entered as 
second blocks of the multivariate models presented.  This allows for the isolation of the amount 
of variation explained by media variables.  The entering of media variables after independent 
variables that relate to a person’s ascribed status is an oversimplification of the role of media use.  
For example, it is reductive to assume that media habits stem from a person’s income.  Media 
messages can influence a person’s material aspirations and achievement.  Multiple regression 
analysis can mislead by implying detachment between variables.   
 Further, survey data do not lend themselves to understanding how people experience the 
media.  Qualitative techniques are better suited to understanding the processes that characterize 
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how media users see and respond to specific media content and the context of the decisions that 
draw a person to one media source instead of another.   
 There are limitations to using sample survey data to make inferences and generalizations.  
Using the telephone to interview respondents subjects the data to several biases.  For example, 
people who screen their telephone calls or spend more time away from their home phone or do 
not own a residential landline are less likely to be surveyed.  It is not clear how respondents 
differ from those who could not be reached by Pew in terms of the variables examined in the 
present analysis.  Because aspects of the present focus on sample subsets associated with few 
respondents, this analysis is particularly sensitive to sampling error.   
 This analysis is also limited by the dynamic nature of public opinion.  Perceptions and 
views on political issues change over time.  For example, according to data collected by during 
March of 2006, 33% approved of “the way that George W. Bush is handling his job as President” 
(Pew 2006).  However, the data set used in the present analysis, which was collected during the 
winter of 2003-4, finds the President to have the approval of 58% the sample.   Both surveys 
were administered by Pew using the same methodology.  It is unclear how developments and 
coverage of events since the survey collection period have impacted the variables addressed in 
the analysis.  However, it appears that the American public is less satisfied with the Republican 
Party than it was during the collection period of the survey used in this analysis suggesting that 
re-administering the survey in the spring of 2006 would find different distributions of cases in 
the political identification variables. 
 The present analysis does not aim to offer findings that are only applicable to the United 
States.  All of the media sources in the analysis are either available to Canadians and/or have a 
counterpart in Canada.  However, it is unclear how applicable the findings are to the Canadian 
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media context.  The Canadian media landscape is unique because it includes an extensive range 
of Canadian and American sources and the CRTC is mandated to ensure the availability of 
content in both official languages.  Canadian media users are forced to make decisions about 
how actively they are going to seek coverage of Canadian news stories.  This dynamic is less 
applicable to the media habits of Americans as foreign media has much less prevalence in the 
United States.   The applicability of the findings in the present analysis to the Canadian context is 
also impacted by differences in the political systems.   These differences likely explain 
differences in how Canadians and Americans identify with political parties and cleavages.  The 
parliamentary system has implications on political participation and voting behaviour that differ 
from the United States.  For example, strategic voting is less of a consideration to American 
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3.0 Political Identification: 
 
 
The present analysis measures political identification through voting behaviour, party 
identification and ideology.  Several media sources were expected to have relationships with 
political identification.  The audiences for the Fox News Channel, political talk shows on cable 
television and the talk and religious radio audiences were predicted to be associated with 
conservatism, the Republican Party and support for Bush in the 2000 election while the non-
profit media are expected to be associated with liberalism, the Democratic Party and voting for 




Respondents were asked whom they voted for in the Presidential race in 2000 and if they 
identify as a Republican, Democrat or Independent.   
The ideology scale is a self-placement scale with five categories.  Respondents were 
asked, “In general, would you describe your political views as “very liberal” or “liberal” or 
“moderate” or “conservative” or “very conservative?”  The “very liberal” respondents were 
coded as 1 and “very conservative” respondents were coded as 5.   
Because the ideology question is a self-placement scale, it reveals how a person identifies 
ideologically.  The ideological categories available to respondents are not clearly defined.  For 
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3.2 Voting Behaviour: 
 
TABLE 3.1: ELECTION 2000 VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF VARIOUS MEDIA AUDIENCES 
 
  Cable Radio Non-Profit   
  FNC Political Talk Religious^ Talk^ C-SPAN NPR PBS 
Total  
Sample 
N 622 1400 323 738 915 1104 1041 3,188 
Gore 19.6% 34.4 24.8 28.5 35.3 33.7 36.4 28.6 
Bush 45.3% 33.9 44.6 37.7 30.7 32.6 32.5 33.6 
Nader 0.8% 1.3 0.3 2.6 1.6 3.3 2.4 1.6 
All other* 34.2% 30.4 30.3 31.3 32.3 30.4 28.7 36.2 
Total 65.8% 69.6 69.7 68.7 67.7 69.6 71.3 63.8 
^ Form-specific variable (Total Sample N=1594) 
*Did not vote or voted for a candidate other than Bush, Gore and Nader.  
 
The voting behaviour of the various media audiences are presented Table 3.1.  The Fox 
News audience is dummy coded to capture those who do and do not watch the broadcaster.  In 
the cases of the other media, audiences were defined as those who “sometimes” or “regularly” 
learned about the 2004 election through that media source. The analysis focuses on those who 
voted for Bush and Gore.  Ralph Nader is included in the above table to present a more complete 
picture of voting behaviour. The other respondents either did not vote or voted for one of the 
other candidates. 
  FNC viewers were more likely to vote for Bush in 2000 and less likely to have voted for 
Gore in comparison with the total sample providing evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. Of this 
audience, about 45 percent voted for Bush and about 20 percent voted for Gore.  Fox News 
Channel viewers were the least supportive of Gore and the most supportive of Bush of all of the 
examined media with a relative concentration of Bush supporters that is slightly higher than that 
found among religious radio listeners.  Forty-five percent of religious radio listeners voted for 
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Bush and 29 percent voted for Gore.  Talk radio listeners were about as likely as the total sample 
to have voted for Gore and slightly more likely to vote for Bush in 2000.   
Cable political talk show and non-profit media users were more likely to have voted for 
Gore but did not differ from the total sample in their likelihood of having voted for Bush in 
2000.  The latter is offers evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.  Between about 34 and 36 percent 
of these audiences voted for Gore.   
With the exception of the political talk show on cable television audience, all other 
audiences were more likely to vote for the expected candidate in 2000. 
 
3.3 Party Identification: 
 
TABLE 3.2: PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF VARIOUS MEDIA AUDIENCES 
 
  Cable Radio Non-Profit   
  FNC Political Talk Religious^ Talk^ C-SPAN NPR PBS 
Total  
Sample 
N 622 1400 323 738 915 1104 1041 3188 
Democrat 24.4% 37.6 37.7 32.8 41.7 36.5 39.3 33.6 
Republican 43.1% 29.0 33.3 31.2 24.8 25.4 24.8 29.1 
^ Form-specific variable (Total Sample N=1594)           
 
The same criteria were used to define audiences to examine party identification in Table 
3.2.  Those not included in either category identify as independents or did not answer the party 
identification question.  The Fox News Channel audience was more Republican and less 
Democratic than the total sample offering more evidence supporting Hypothesis 2.  The non-
profit media audiences were less Republican and more Democratic than the total sample.  These 
findings are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3.  The political cable talk show audience was 
more Democratic than the total sample, which contradicts Hypothesis 1.  The religious radio 
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audience includes a slight over-representation of both Democrats and Republicans.  The talk 
radio audience is closely mirrors the total sample.  The C-SPAN and FNC audiences were the 
most unique as the former included 8.1 percent more Democrats and the latter included 14.0 
percent more Republicans than the total sample. 
A comparison between Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicates that there were more respondents 
who identify as Democrats than who voted for Gore in 2000.  The opposite applies to 
Republicans: more cases are associated with voting for Bush in 2000 than identifying as 
Republicans. These findings are consistent with Citrin et al.’s (2003) analysis of Senate 
elections.  The authors found that, generally, non-voters are more Democratic than voters.  Some 
of the differences in voting participation by partisanship group are explained by differences in 
the demographic composition of partisan groups.  The authors simulated election results with 
voter turnouts that included equal representation of income groups and Blacks at the ballot box 
for various election years.  These simulations increased helped the Democrats in comparison 
with actual election results. 
However, the present analysis suggests that media audiences differ in the extent that 
partisan groups support their party’s candidate on Election Day.  Some of these differences are 
related to the demographic composition of these audiences and changes in partisanship that 
occurred between the 2000 election and the data collection period of the winter of 2004.  
However, some media content may draw audiences that are more active in elections and loyal to 
the political parties that they identify with.   The Fox News Channel audience has the narrowest 
gap between the percentage of the audience that identify as Republicans and the percentage that 
voted for Bush in 2000 suggesting that the news service draws an audience that is more loyal to 
the Republican Party.  On the other hand, all audiences and the total sample included more 
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Democratic identifiers than people who voted for Gore in 2000. The audiences for NPR, PBS 
and political talk shows on cable had the narrowest gap between the percentage that identify as 
Democrats and the percentage that voted for Gore in 2000.  This suggests that these audiences 
more actively demonstrate their support for the Democratic Party in elections.  All audiences, as 
well as the total sample, include a greater proportion of people who voted for Bush in 2000 than 
identify as Republicans.  This gap was widest for the religious radio audience. This may be a 
result of the emphasis on religious and “moral” issues in the 2000 election and the Republican 
campaign organizers’ ability to encourage born again and religious Christians to vote.  However, 
differences between partisanship and voting behaviour among religious radio listeners should be 
interpreted with caution due to the small N value associated with this audience. 
 
3.4 Distribution of Cases on Political Ideology Scale: 
 
About one in twenty respondents did not answer the ideology question.  This is not 
surprising, as properly responding to the question requires that study participants understand the 
words “conservative”, “moderate” and “liberal”.  Because the question asks respondents to 
provide an overall assessment of their political ideology those respondents who felt conflicted 
about their placement on the scale may have decided not to answer the question. 
 There were respondents associated with each category.  Excluding those who did not 
answer the question, about twice as many respondents placed themselves in the conservative 
categories in comparison with either of the liberal categories.  Almost twenty percent identified 
as either liberal or very liberal while about forty percent identified as conservative or very 
conservative.  The moderate option is the modal category with 40.7 percent of valid cases.  The 
extreme ends of the scale were associated with about five percent of respondents each.   
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Excluding missing cases, the total sample mean is 3.20.  This score represents a location 
on the scale associated with being slightly conservative.  The sample’s standard deviation score 
of 0.93 demonstrates that there is high dispersion on the scale.  The scale is characterized by a 
platykurtic distribution, as most of the cases are associated with the liberal, moderate and 
conservative categories. 
 
3.5 Bivariate Analysis-Political Ideology: 
 
TABLE 3.3: MEAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF VARIOUS GROUPS  
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Total Sample 3.20 0.93 3016 
 
This clustering of cases in the moderate and conservative categories is highlighted by a 
comparison of the ideological identification of groups defined by voting behaviour. The gap 
between Gore and Bush voters was narrow.  Those who voted for Presidential Candidate Al Gore 
in 2000 had a mean score of 2.90 on the ideology scale.  This score is the most conservative of 
possible scores within the liberal categories of the spectrum.  The mean among those who voted 
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for President Bush in 2000 was in the moderate to conservative range at 3.57.  Both groups 
scored close to the scale midpoint.  Those who identify as Republicans scored slightly more 
conservative than those who voted for Bush in 2000.  Those who identify as Democrats differed 
less from the total sample.  The mean scores for Republicans and Democrats respectively were 
3.67 and 2.97. All groups were associated with large standard deviation scores.  Most other 
groups had standard deviation scores that were slightly less than one scale unit.  Gore voters 
were associated with the smallest standard deviation of all groups examined.   
 Few variables emerged at the bivariate level as powerful explainers of ideological 
identification.  Variables that were found to offer predictive power had weak relationships with 
the ideology scale.  The correlation between religiosity and ideology was 0.21.  The mean score 
among those who identified as born-again was 3.43.  These weak relationships are consistent 
with popular expectations about the “religious right”.  Roman Catholics and Protestants differed 
less from the total sample.   
None of the ethnically defined groups examined in the analysis differed greatly from the 
total sample.  Hispanics were slightly more conservative than the total sample, with a mean score 
of 3.36. 
Few of the hypothesized relationships between media use and political ideology were 
supported at the bivariate level of analysis.  Fox News Channel, cable talk show and political 
radio use were expected to be associated with conservatism while non-profit media use was 
expected to be associated with liberalism.  Fox News users were slightly more conservative than 
the total sample. This variable was dummy coded to distinguish between users and non-users.  
To measure respondents use of the other media that were expected to be associated with 
ideology, interviewers asked study participants to indicate, “how often, if ever,” they “learn 
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something about the presidential campaign or the candidates” from the media in question.  The 
response categories for these survey items are: “regularly”, “sometimes”, “hardly ever” or 
“never”.  Generally, the correlations between these media and ideology were either non-
significant or of trivial magnitude.  However, a correlation of 0.15 was found between the 
ideology scale and learning from religious radio.  At the bivariate level, there is little evidence 
supporting the hypotheses about media use and political ideology.  There is only weak evidence 
that FNC and religious radio use are related to ideology. 
However, for the purposes of the present analysis, asking respondents how often they 
“learn something” through a particular type of media is problematic.  This language blurs 
exposure with perceived educational benefit.  Ideally, the survey instrument would include an 
indicator of the amount of time an individual spends using the various media.  Because exposure 
is a prerequisite to learning from a particular media source, such survey items have been treated 
as an indication of how much a respondent uses a particular type of media.  However, the 
wording of these questions may have resulted in seemingly smaller and less loyal audiences for 
media that are perceived as having less educational value. 
 As one would expect, those who see a Democratic bias in the news media are more 
liberal than the total sample and those who see a Republican bias are more conservative.  Those 
who see a Republican bias in the news media are more liberal than those who voted for Gore or 
those who identify with the Democratic Party.   
 
3.6 Multivariate Analysis-Political Ideology: 
 
 The ideology models are impacted by Pew’s usage of survey forms.  Two of the survey 
items were expected to be related to ideology but were not asked to the entire sample.  The 
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questions about religious radio and talk radio were asked to different halves of the sample.  
Separate models were built for each form because of the multicollinearity resulting from using 
form-specific items from both forms.  This reduces the number of sample members that can be 
included in each model.  Because half of the sample was treated as missing when form-specific 
items were used, pairwise deletion was used.  Income was not significantly related to ideology in 
this context.  However, because it is inappropriate to use mean substitution in this context, it is 
not known if income would have been significant had an income missing dummy variable also 
been entered into the model. 
 Watching FNC and listening to talk radio are identified in Chapter 5 as being related to 
perceptions of a Democratic bias in the news media.  A variable describing the amount of 
Democratic bias that a respondent sees was entered in the final block of the Form 2 model to 
help isolate the relationship between political ideology and use of these media sources.  This 
variable is an interaction term between the type of bias that a respondent sees and the amount of 
bias that a respondent sees.  Respondents were asked how much “political bias” they see in news 
coverage.  Response categories range from “not at all” to “a great deal”.  The former was coded 
as 0 and the latter as 3.  These codes were then multiplied by 1 if the respondent indicated that 
they see a bias favouring the Democrats in coverage of the presidential race or 0 if respondents 
indicated they saw no bias or a bias favouring the Republican Party.  The rationale for including 
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Variables b Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant 2.558  30.489 ** 
Age 0.004 0.071 2.734 ** 
Male 0.246 0.133 5.309 ** 
Black -0.187 -0.064 -2.520 * 
Hispanic 0.225 0.073 2.786 ** 
Religiosity 0.004 0.165 5.906 ** 
Protestant 0.193 0.104 2.852 ** 
Roman Catholic 0.169 0.081 2.392 * 
Born Again 0.185 0.094 3.119 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.082    
       
Block 2      
Constant 2.640  29.985 ** 
Age 0.004 0.070 2.683 ** 
Male 0.266 0.143 5.764 ** 
Black -0.184 -0.063 -2.469 * 
Hispanic 0.229 0.074 2.867 ** 
Religiosity 0.004 0.146 5.063 ** 
Protestant 0.150 0.081 2.214 * 
Roman Catholic 0.143 0.069 2.039 * 
Born Again 0.138 0.070 2.315 * 
FNC 0.197 0.084 3.432 ** 
C-SPAN -0.048 -0.053 -2.040 * 
NPR -0.032 -0.039 -1.512   
PBS -0.059 -0.069 -2.565 * 
Religious Radio^ 0.093 0.093 3.255 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.102    
* p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1567 
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TABLE 3.5: REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY USING FORM 2 
 
Independent 
Variables b Beta t   
Block 1          
Constant 2.558  30.369 ** 
Age 0.004 0.071 2.724 ** 
Male 0.246 0.133 5.289 ** 
Black -0.187 -0.064 -2.510 * 
Hispanic 0.225 0.073 2.775 ** 
Religiosity 0.004 0.165 5.883 ** 
Protestant 0.193 0.104 2.840 ** 
Roman Catholic 0.169 0.081 2.382 * 
Born Again 0.185 0.094 3.106 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.082    
       
Block 2       
Constant 2.563  28.691 ** 
Age 0.004 0.077 2.963 ** 
Male 0.238 0.128 5.122 ** 
Black -0.165 -0.056 -2.227 * 
Hispanic 0.225 0.073 2.806 ** 
Religiosity 0.005 0.179 6.421 ** 
Protestant 0.153 0.082 2.253 * 
Roman Catholic 0.129 0.062 1.839   
Born Again 0.169 0.086 2.869 ** 
FNC 0.177 0.076 3.066 ** 
C-SPAN -0.060 -0.067 -2.534 * 
PBS -0.054 -0.063 -2.361 * 
NPR -0.052 -0.064 -2.380 * 
Talk Radio 0.090 0.108 4.003 ** 
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Table 3.5 cont’d: 
Block 3         
Constant 2.550  29.027 ** 
Age 0.004 0.078 3.047 ** 
Male 0.213 0.115 4.646 ** 
Black -0.107 -0.037 -1.465   
Hispanic 0.238 0.077 3.014 ** 
Religiosity 0.004 0.166 6.056 ** 
Protestant 0.147 0.079 2.208 * 
Roman Catholic 0.142 0.068 2.057 * 
Born Again 0.145 0.074 2.507 * 
FNC 0.095 0.041 1.644   
C-SPAN -0.055 -0.060 -2.325 * 
PBS -0.059 -0.069 -2.626 ** 
NPR -0.050 -0.061 -2.316 * 
Talk Radio 0.063 0.075 2.798 ** 
See Democratic Bias 0.165 0.184 7.259 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.136     
* p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1581         
 
 The lack of variation between categories makes predicting scores on the ideology scale 
challenging.  However, the models in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 explain about one-tenth of the variation 
in ideology.  Entering the media source variables into the models does not result in major 
increases in the amount of variance explained and most of the media variables are associated 
with low magnitude beta values.  However, some of the media variables are relatively powerful 
predictors.  In particular, the radio variables rank relatively high in their influence on predicted 
scores before controlling for Democratic Party bias.  Listening to either talk or religious radio is 
associated with conservatism as expected by Hypothesis 1.  Based on beta values, both variables 
rank third in their models in terms of their relative influence on predicted scores.  In the second 
blocks, the variables both have b values of about 0.09.  However, contrary to the expectations of 
Chapter 3: Political Identification 
 92  
 
 
Hypothesis 1, no significant relationship between tuning to political talk programs on cable 
television and ideology was found.   
The models offer some evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.  As anticipated, watching 
public television programs and using C-SPAN were associated with liberalism in both versions 
of the model.  However, learning about the election through public radio was only significant in 
the Form 2 version of the model.  Reverse regression procedures suggest that the public radio 
variable is significantly related to all of the media variables included in the above models with 
the exception of the religious radio variable.  The religious radio category was exemplified to 
respondents through the radio program Focus on the Family.  This type of content is unique from 
that of C-SPAN, NPR, PBS and FNC because it gives less attention to timely events and more to 
discussions about “values” and “morals”.  In comparison with the other media sources, religious 
radio is more reflection than information based.  These differences may explain why NPR is not 
significantly related to religious radio.  
 Being Hispanic is associated with b values of about 0.23.  Gender is more influential on 
predicted scores.  Consistent with other research, being male is associated with conservatism.  
The Protestant, Roman Catholic and born again variables were all significantly related to the 
scale in the form 1 model and the final block of the form 2 model.  A comparison between the 
different versions of Block 2 provides further evidence that religion is related to ideology.  In the 
context of the Form 1 model, religious radio is the third most influential variable in the model.  
In the model using only the Form 2 variables, identifying as a born again has greater relative 
influence on predicted scores.  As demonstrated by Appendix 1, the religious radio audience is 
largely Protestant and includes a high proportion of born again identifiers.  Because of the 
overlap between the religious radio audience and the group that identifies as born again, some of 
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the variation explained by the born again variable in the Form 2 model is explained by religious 
radio variable in Form 1 variable.  Identifying as a born again increases scores by 0.169 in the 
second block of the Form 2 model.  The dummy coded born again variable is associated with a b 
value of 0.138 in the Form 1 model.   
 In contrast, use of non-profit media is associated with liberalism and has less influence on 
predicted scores.  In the Form 2 model, the non-profit media variables are associated with low 
ranking beta magnitude values between -0.060 and -0.069.  Using C-SPAN has the least 
influence on scores of variables in the Form 1 model and is associated with a low magnitude beta 
value of -0.053.   
 Watching the Fox News Channel has more influence on scores than using non-profit 
media before the perceived Democratic bias variable is entered.  In this context, the dummy 
coded variable can increase predicted scores by 0.197 in the context of the Form 1 variables and 
0.177 Form 2 version of the model.  Reverse regressions suggest the FNC tuning is positively 
related to talk radio listening and negatively to public radio use.  The Fox News Channel has 
much in common with talk radio.  The broadcaster’s most notorious face, Bill O’Reilly also 
hosts a syndicated radio program.  As discussed above, talk radio is seen as a forum for 
conservative views and Fox News is positioned as a “fair and balanced” service in an otherwise 
liberal media.  The chapter discussing perceptions of political party bias demonstrates that both 
talk radio and Fox News use are associated with perceptions of a Democratic Party bias in the 
news media.  This suggests that the link between ideology and use of these media are partly 
explained by perceptions of the media.  Further, in both cases, partial correlations between these 
media and ideology were not significant when controlling for perceived Democratic bias.   
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 The variable measuring the amount of perceived Democratic bias is entered after the 
media use variables to demonstrate the relationship between media use and ideology when 
controlling and as well as not controlling for perceived Democratic bias.  A variable capturing 
perceived Republican bias was not included because none of the media variables were associated 
with perceived Republican bias at the multivariate level.  The variable is only entered into the 
Form 2 version of the model because it includes both of the media variables that were related to 
perceptions of party bias in the media in Chapter 5. 
 Entering the amount of perceived Democratic bias variable reveals that the relationships 
that Fox News viewing and talk radio listening have with ideology are mediated by perceptions 
of the media.  Fox News use is no longer significant in the third block of the Form 2 model.  
While talk radio listening has the third most influence on predicted scores in the second block of 
the model, it has the seventh most influential effect when the media perceived bias variable is 
entered into the model.   
 Entering this variable in the model results in other changes to the model.  It becomes the 
highest magnitude variable and increases the amount variance explained by three percent.  One 
would expect those who see a Democratic bias in the news would be more conservative.  The 
variable is associated with a beta value 0.184.  Seeing “a great deal” of Democratic bias 
increases predicted scores by 0.495.  Being Black is not significant in this block of the model.  
Being Roman Catholic is significant in Block 3 but was not significant in Block 2.  In contrast, 
entering in the variable does not impact age.   
 One of the weaknesses of the model is that there are few variables that reduce predicted 
scores.  Only being Black or using non-profit media are associated with negative b and beta 
values.  All of the religion variables as well as the Hispanic dummy coded variable increase 
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scores.  The distribution of standardized residuals scores is broadly normal in both models.  
Analysis of residual statistics reveals that both models are likely to over-predict scores.  While 
about one in five valid cases are associated with being “liberal” or “very liberal”, in both models, 
the lowest predicted score is about 2.4, which is in the liberal to moderate category.  In both 
cases, the highest predicted score is slightly above four.  This is fairly close to the highest 
observed score of five.  Analysis of residual and standardized residual statistics provides further 
evidence that both models over-predict scores.  
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4.0 Range of Media Sources: 
 
 
Scales were constructed to analyze the range of sources that a person uses.  The range of 
sources that a person uses is expected to have positive relationships with socio-economic status 
and the amount of bias that a person sees in the news media.  Those who prefer “objective” news 




 The range of media sources that a person uses was measured using three indicators: the 
number of television news services and mediums that a person uses as well as the information-
seeking scale.   
The information-seeking scale ranges from 0 to 39.  All of the items are drawn from 
questions worded the same way as the non-profit media and radio questions described in the 
political ideology chapter.  Respondents indicated how often they “learn something” about the 
election from that source.  For each source, responses are coded from 0 to 3.  “Regularly”, 
“sometimes”, “hardly ever” and “never” are coded 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively.  Because thirteen 
sources are measured by the information-seeking scale the scale ranges from zero to thirty-nine.  
Only hard news sources were included in the scale.  No form-specific survey items were 
included.  The scale aims to measure deliberate information seeking.  While using content that is 
not associated with labels such as “news” or “current affairs” may increase knowledge about the 
campaign, this scale attempts to measure information seeking.  The sources measured by the 
scale include television (national newscasts, cable news, public television, political talk shows on 
cable television and Sunday morning network talk shows), print magazines, C-SPAN (the survey 
does not distinguish between television and radio), newspaper, public radio and Internet use.  
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Four Internet items were included: general Internet use, news pages from Internet service 
providers, news organization websites and “online news magazine and opinion sites”.  The latter 
was exemplified to subjects through the websites of Slate Magazine and National Review 
Online.  The scale is associated with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.779. 
The medium scale ranges from 0 to 3 and includes three mediums: television, Internet 
and newspaper use.  Unfortunately, due to the use of survey forms, radio could not be included 
on the scale. 
Those respondents who indicated that they used television to follow the election were 
also asked which television sources respondents get “most of” their “news about the presidential 
campaign from”.  Up to five of the eight options named by interviewers were recorded.   This 
survey question is problematic because it allows respondents to offer several responses while 
encouraging them to focus on their preferred broadcasters.  This list of possible television 
sources included the following: local news programming, network news from the American 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC), CNN, MSNBC (a portmanteau of “NBC” and “Microsoft Network”), Fox 
News Channel and the Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC).  Because the survey is 
national, it does not name specific local services.  As a result, a respondent who uses multiple 
local television news services and no national services will be coded as one.  This is a limitation 
of the survey design.  If a respondent watches a local newscast on a station affiliated with a 
national network as well as a national network newscast, he or she will be coded as two 
regardless of if the local and national newscasts are on the same station.   
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4.2 Distribution of Cases on Indicators of Number of Media Sources Used: 
 



















Cases weighted by "weight"
 
The information-seeking scale allows for the greatest variation among cases.  All points 
on the scale are associated with cases.  Cases are not especially clustered at any point along the 
information-seeking scale.  Almost half of the sample scored between ten and nineteen on the 
information-seeking scale.  There were more cases at the low end of the scale as few respondents 
scored above thirty.  The sample’s mean and median were 13.8 and 13 respectively.  The modal 
category is eight sources.  The scale is associated with skew and kurtosis statistics of 0.403 and  
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–0.158 respectively.  This indicates a somewhat bell shaped distribution with a slight positive 
skew. 
The range of the medium scale is three.  Almost half of cases were associated with using 
of two of the three examined mediums for their election research resulting in a platykurtic 
distribution and a slightly negative skew.  The mean was 1.9 mediums and the median and mode 
were two mediums.  About a quarter used only one medium.  About one-fifth of cases were 
associated with using three mediums.  The standard deviation of the scale is 0.813.  
Unfortunately the survey did not force respondents to describe their use of talk radio.  The 
powerfulness of talk radio use variables in other contexts of the present analysis suggests that the 
inclusion of talk radio in the scale likely would have increased the variation of cases and added 
heuristic value to the analysis.   
There was little variation in the number of television news services that a person uses.  
There is a high concentration of cases that only named one broadcasting service.  Over half of 
the sample named only one television broadcaster. This distribution has a mean of 1.1 television 
broadcasters and observed range of five.  The median and mode are one broadcaster. The second 
largest group which included about 24 percent of cases and did not use any of the offered 
networks or cable broadcasters for their election research or was not asked the survey item 
because they did not name television as a primary information source.  About fifteen percent 
named two sources.  The high concentration of cases resulted in a standard deviation of 0.968 
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4.3 Bivariate Analysis-All Indicators: 
 
 Most of the examined independent variables were not useful in predicting the number of 
sources that an individual uses.  No group differed greatly from the total sample in terms of the 
number of mediums or television sources that it uses.  All examined groups used between about 
1.0 and 1.2 mediums and between about 1.8 and 2.1 television sources.  There were some groups 
that differed from the total sample in their mean score on the information-seeking scale.  
However, in contrast with expectations, those who want “objective” news scored 14.07 on the 
scale: only slightly higher than the total sample offering little support for Hypothesis 6.   
 
TABLE 4.1: MEAN SCORES ON INFORMATION-SEEKING SCALE FOR VARIOUS 
GROUPS 
 
Independent Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N 
Background    
Black 16.10 8.46 362 
Income Missing 11.54 7.16 445 
Use Computer 15.20 7.28 2235 









Election 2000    









Party Identification    













Perceived Democratic Bias 14.78 7.11 690 
Perceived Republican Bias 16.22 6.94 533 
Perceives No Bias 13.60 7.25 1229 
Want Objective News 14.07 7.08 2148 
Total Sample 13.83 7.29 3188 
 
Chapter 4: Range of Media Sources 
 101  
 
 
TABLE 4.2: CORRELATIONS: SOURCES USED AND VARIOUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 






Age -.075** -.101** .106** 
Education .259** .235** -0.017 
Income (in $1000s) .221** .194** -0.020 
Election Interest .427** .287** .080** 
Political Ideology -.067** -0.036 0.015 
General News Bias .294** .239** .057** 
Bias among those who see a Republican Bias .080** .063** 0.032 
Bias among those who see a Democratic Bias .171** .129** 0.014 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   
 As indicated in Table 4.1, computer users made use of slightly more media than the total 
sample.  This dummy coded variable captures those who “use a computer” at their “workplace, 
at school, at home or anywhere else on at least an occasional basis”.  This is not surprising as 
computer access is a prerequisite to using the online scale items. 
 The scores of the examined groups were fairly heterogeneous.  Standard deviation scores 
range from 6.68 to 8.46.  There was slightly less dispersion among Bush voters and Republicans 
than among Gore voters and Democrats.  Blacks and union members were the most 
heterogeneous.  Union members scored slightly higher than the total sample. 
 Gore voters, those who perceive a Republican bias in the news media and Democrats use 
more sources than the total sample.  In contrast, those who voted for Bush, perceive a 
Republican bias in the news media or identify as Republicans differed less from the total sample.  
Those with more “left” leaning political views scored higher on the information-seeking scale.  
For example, those who voted for Gore in 2000 had a mean score that was 2.29 higher than the 
total sample while Bush voters differed by less two tenths of a scale unit from the total sample.  
This suggests that those who identify with the “left” are more likely to be active news media 
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users than those who are more “right wing”.  It is not clear at the bivariate level if this is because 
these groups are more sceptical of news sources and make greater efforts to use multiple sources 
to increase the breadth of the coverage that they expose themselves to.  The relationship between 
political identification variables and the information-seeking scale may be partly explained by 
background variables.   Education and income are associated with correlations of 0.26 and 0.22 
respectively.  These findings are consistent with the expectation that socio-economic status will 
have a positive relationship with range of sources used outlined in Hypothesis 7a.  However, 
those who did not answer the income question had a mean score of 11.54.  The high score among 
computer users is further evidence that socio-economic status is positively associated with the 
scale.   
It is curious that despite that voting behaviour and party identification highlight 
differences in the number of sources that an individual uses, political ideology was only weakly 
related to the information-seeking scale as indicated in Table 4.2.  Consistent with the other 
political identification variables, the scale is associated with liberalism.  This weak relationship 
is likely an implication of the loosely defined categories on the political ideology scale.   
The correlation between the information-seeking scale and the amount of bias that a 
person sees is 0.294.  This finding supports Hypothesis 5.  The correlation between the amounts 
of bias seen among those who see a Republican bias is stronger than those who see a bias that 
favours the Democratic Party.  These correlations are 0.17 and 0.08 respectively.  The former is 
the same variable as was used in the model predicting political ideology.  The latter variable was 
derived using the same process, however, it represents bias among those who see a Republican 
bias.  The correlation between the information-seeking scale and the amount of bias that a person 
sees regardless of if they associate the bias with one of or neither of the major political parties is 
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0.29.  This suggests that party bias weakens the relationship between the amount of bias seen and 
the number of sources used. 
 While the information-seeking scale and the number of mediums used variables have the 
same type of relationship with the higher order variables described above, in many contexts the 
number of television sources variable has the opposite relationship.  Age is only positively 
related to the number of television sources used.  Both of the socio-economic status variables are 
positively related to the number of mediums used and information-seeking scale but negatively 
related to the television variable.  All three media use indicators were related the amount of bias 
seen in the media and election interest.  However, these relationships were much weaker for the 
television variable.  Election interest was measured by how respondents answered the question, 
“How much do you enjoy keeping up with political news about campaigns and elections?”  No 
significant relationships between the television indicator and the perceived party bias variables 
were found, whereas, weak relationships were found between the perceived party bias variables 
and the other media use indicators.   
These findings suggest that “channel surfing” is less motivated by political interest and 
support Putnam’s (2000) characterization of television, as described in the literature review, as 
an activity that requires “minimal costs”.  This fits with Putnam’s (2000) observations that see 
television as time filler.  The correlations described above suggest that those who with higher 
political interest use multiple mediums including television.   
 The finding that those who reside in suburbs scored slightly above the total sample on the 
information-seeking scale is somewhat consistent with Putnam’s (2000) observations.  As 
described earlier, Putnam (2000: 213) describes that those who live in communities with more 
commuters spend more time watching television even if they do not commute themselves.  The 
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suburb variable does not specifically address commuting.  However, those who live in suburbs 
are more likely to have to spend time travelling to downtown cores or other communities for 
work.  Those who reside in suburbs scored 15.84 on the information-seeking scale.   This 
suggests that those in suburbs use more media. However, suburbanites did not use more 
television news sources than the total sample.   It is possible that the higher amount of time spent 
in front of televisions among those living in suburbs is not explained by newscast watching.  
Those living in suburbs may be less likely to tune to supper-hour news programs because of the 
time that they spend commuting home after their workdays.  
 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis-Information-Seeking and Mediums Scales: 
 
Models were built to predict the scores on the information-seeking scale as well as the 
number of mediums.  Mean substitution for missing cases was selected in order to allow income 
and income missing to be included in the models.  As discussed in the methods chapter, with the 
exception of income, independent variables had few missing cases.  Mean substitution is not 
resulting in a clustering of cases.  For the reasons described above, both models control for 
suburban residence.   
 Attempts were made to develop a multiple regression model predicting the number of 
television broadcasters that a person uses.  However, no model was able to explain more than 
four percent of variation associated with the dependent variable scale.  Analysis of the residual 
statistics associated with these exploratory models suggested that they predicted scores with very 
little accuracy.  For these reasons, no model predicting scores on this scale is presented.  These 
are outcomes of the problematic question wording of the survey question. 
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 Almost one-third of the variation in the information-seeking scale can be explained 
through eleven independent variables as presented in Table 4.3.  Election interest is the most 
influential independent variable in the model predicting variation among cases on the 
information-seeking scale.  The variable is associated with a beta value of 0.343 in the second 
block of the model.  The variable is associated with a b value of 2.601 meaning that those who 
claim to get “a lot” of enjoyment out of “keeping up with the political news about campaigns and 
elections” had about 10.4 added to their predicted score.   
The Black and Hispanic dummy variables are positively related to the dependent 
variable.  However, being Hispanic is only significant when all independent variables are 
included in the analysis.  Being Black is a more powerful predictor in comparison with being 
Hispanic.  The former is associated with a beta value of 0.101 while being Hispanic is associated 
with a beta value of 0.038.   
Education and income are relatively powerful in explaining variation on the information-
seeking scale.  As anticipated, income and education were both associated with higher scores on 
the scale.  These findings are evidence that socio-economic status is positively related to the 
range of sources that a person uses supporting Hypothesis 7a.  The income-missing variable is 
significantly and negatively associated with the scale.   
Age and income missing are the only variables that reduce predicted scores.  Age and 
gender were relatively less influential when predicting scores on the scale.  Being male is 
associated with higher levels of information seeking.  Being male increases predicted scores by 
1.156.  Age is negatively associated with the scale construct.   
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Variables b Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant 2.960  5.606 ** 
Age -0.033 -0.080 -4.984 ** 
Male 1.269 0.087 5.725 ** 
Black 2.201 0.096 6.212 ** 
Hispanic 0.470 0.019 1.252   
Education 0.598 0.135 8.224 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.020 0.116 7.247 ** 
Income Missing -1.683 -0.080 -5.284 ** 
Suburb 1.130 0.063 4.069 ** 
Election Interest 2.833 0.373 24.254 ** 
Gore Voters 2.084 0.129 8.246 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.288    
       
Block 2      
Constant 1.824  3.456 ** 
Age -0.036 -0.087 -5.511 ** 
Male 1.156 0.079 5.308 ** 
Black 2.320 0.101 6.672 ** 
Hispanic 0.919 0.038 2.481 * 
Education 0.443 0.100 6.100 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.019 0.111 7.024 ** 
Income Missing -1.535 -0.073 -4.906 ** 
Suburb 1.090 0.061 3.999 ** 
Election Interest 2.601 0.343 22.332 ** 
Gore Voters 2.139 0.133 8.625 ** 
General News Bias 1.348 0.174 11.176 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.315     
*p<0.05, **p<0.01      
N=3188         
 
The amount of bias that a person sees in the news media is seen as being based on the 
variables included in block 1.  It has been entered in separate block to reflect this temporal 
ordering of variables related to the information-seeking scale.  As expected, the amount of bias 
that a person sees in the news media is positively related to the range of sources that they use.  
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The variable has the second greatest impact on scores in the final block of the model.  Entering 
this variable into the model increases the R-Square value by 2.7 percent.  The amount of overall 
bias that a person sees is more powerful than indicators that measure the amount of bias seen by 
those who observe a bias favouring either the Democratic or Republican parties.   This 
observation is explained by the higher variation in the overall bias scale in comparison with the 
filtered scales.  In contrast with expected outcomes, preference for “objective” news was not 
significantly related to the information-seeking model in this context. 
The idea that news may not be “objective” represents a more critical perspective raising 
questions about the relationship that education has with this relationship.  For example, media 
literacy has become a part of school and university curriculum.  The model above demonstrates 
that perceptions of a bias in the media are related to the number of sources used when controlling 
for education.   
Entering the general news bias variable into the model results some changes in the 
ranking of beta magnitude.  The most notable is the change in education.  Education has the 
second most influence on scores in Block 1 and the sixth most influence in Block 2.  This is 
more evidence that education has is related to perceptions of a bias in the news media. 
Consistent with the bivariate analysis, having voted for Gore in 2000 is positively 
associated with the scale and is among the most influential independent variables in the model. 
This variable is associated with a beta value of 0.133.  Having voted for Bush in the 2000 race 
was not significant in this context.  This distinction may speak to discourse about the “liberal 
media”.  Those with more conservative beliefs may be less likely to use multiple sources because 
they see the entire news media as liberal.  While there is some debate about a “conservative 
media”, those who make these claims are generally seen as “fringe”.  Michael Moore and Al 
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Franken are among the popular culture figures that describe a conservative media.  As discussed 
in the next chapter, the perception of a Democratic biased media is much less prevalent than the 
perception of a Republican biased media.  Rhetoric criticizing the media for being too “left” 
tends to attack the media as an industry.  In contrast, those attempting to escape from what they 
perceive as a “right wing media” may be less likely to generalize that the entire media is 
conservative.  Using multiple sources seems to have no utility in mitigating media bias to those 
that perceive that all media represent the same bias. 
 Residuals associated with the model are broadly normally distributed.   Residual statistics 
suggest that the model somewhat under-predicts scores.  The highest predicted score is 25.67 and 
the lowest predicted score is 2.22.  The highest predicted score is well below the highest 
observed score of 39.  About ten percent of cases are associated with scores outside of the 
predicted range.   
 The model predicting the number of mediums that an individual uses is divided into two 
blocks and is presented in Table 4.4.  As with the model predicting scores on the information-
seeking scale, the perceived general news bias is entered in the second block of this model.  The 
amount of bias that a person sees in the news media is seen as being based on the demographic 
and voting behaviour variables included in block 1.  It has been entered in separate block to 
reflect this temporal ordering of variables related to the number of mediums used.  The first 
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Variables b Beta t   
Block 1         
Constant 0.729  14.781 ** 
Male 0.079 0.049 3.062 ** 
Black 0.154 0.060 3.752 ** 
Education 0.025 0.050 2.779 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.001 0.064 3.799 ** 
Income Missing -0.228 -0.097 -6.143 ** 
Suburb 0.101 0.051 3.108 ** 
Election Interest 0.205 0.242 15.142 ** 
Gore Voters 0.145 0.081 4.968 ** 
Use Computer 0.481 0.271 15.599 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.218    
       
Block 2      
Constant 0.652  12.919 ** 
Male 0.072 0.044 2.804 ** 
Black 0.163 0.064 3.992 ** 
Education 0.017 0.034 1.874   
Income (in $1000s) 0.001 0.063 3.715 ** 
Income Missing -0.221 -0.094 -5.990 ** 
Suburb 0.099 0.050 3.068 ** 
Election Interest 0.188 0.222 13.726 ** 
Gore Voters 0.146 0.081 5.035 ** 
Use Computer 0.457 0.257 14.800 ** 
General News Bias 0.093 0.108 6.546 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.228     
* p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=3188         
 
 In both cases, income and education are positively associated with the range of sources 
used while not answering the income question has a negative relationship.  As in the context of 
the information-seeking scale, education is positively related to the scale.  These findings support 
offering evidence that supports Hypothesis 7a.  Living in a suburb or being male slightly 
increases the number of mediums used.   
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 Computer use is the strongest predictor in the model.  The variable is included in the 
model despite its obvious connection to the dependent variable because many computer users do 
not use their computers for political research or have Internet access.   
Voting for Gore in 2000 is among the most influential variables and is associated with a 
beta value of 0.081.  This is further evidence that these political cleavages see the media 
differently.  The association between talk radio and conservatism suggests that a scale that also 
includes information about respondent’s use of talk radio would offer heuristic value. 
In contrast with expected outcomes, preference for “objective” news is not significantly 
related to the number of mediums used.  However, the amount of general news bias that a person 
perceives is the third most influential on predicted scores despite that entering it into the model 
only results in a one percent increase the amount of variance explained by the model.  This 
supports Hypothesis 5.  The variable is associated with a beta value of 0.108.  The full model 
explains 22.8 percent of the variance in the number of mediums used.  The finding that education 
is not significant in the final block of the model is further evidence that education is related to the 
amount of bias that a person sees in the news media.  As expected, income and education are 
positively related to the number of mediums that a person uses.  The income-missing variable is 
negatively related to the dependent variable and is associated with a b value of –0.221 in the final 
block of the model. 
Consistent with the model predicting scores on the information-seeking scale, election 
interest is associated with using more mediums.  As 91.4 percent of cases are associated with 
television use, it is not surprising that those with more interest in the election supplemented their 
viewing with newspaper reading and/or Internet use.  As with the information-seeking scale, 
being male, Black or living in a suburb is associated with using more mediums.   
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 The residual values associated with this model are broadly normally distributed.  There is 
some evidence that the model slightly over-predicts scores.  Predicted scores range from 0.751 to 
2.775.  Observed scores range from zero to three.  The model offers little accuracy when 
predicting which individuals use none of the mediums.  
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5.0 Perceptions of Political Party Bias in the Media: 
 
Analysis using a scale measuring perceptions about political party bias in the media was 
used to identify groups that see bias in the media.  The non-profit media audiences were 
expected to see a Republican bias in the news media while the Fox News viewing audience, 
those who watch political talk shows on cable or listen to talk or religious radio were expected to 




 The political party bias scale ranges from -3 to 3.  The coding scheme is based on both 
the political party that a person sees as benefiting from overall coverage from the news media as 
well as the amount of political bias that a person sees.  The amount of bias that a person sees was 
multiplied by one or negative one.  Those who perceive a Democratic bias are associated with 
scores ranging from -1 to -3.  Those who perceive a Republican bias are associated with scores 
ranging from +1 to +3.  Those who answered “not too much” when asked how much political 
bias they see in the news media were scored as either -1 or +1.  Those who answered “a fair 
amount” were scored as either -2 or +2.  Finally, those who answered “a great deal” to the 
question will score -3 or +3.   
 This scale only measures perceptions of the level of political party bias in the media.  For 
this reason, cases that saw a bias in the media but did not associate a bias with one of the 
political parties were treated as missing.  The scale only includes respondents that saw no or 
some political party bias.  Cases that answered “not at all” when asked how much political bias 
they see in the news media and also indicated that saw no party bias were coded as 0.  Cases that 
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indicated that they saw a party bias but answered “not at all” when asked how much political 
bias they see in the news media where also coded as 0.  This rule only applied to 39 cases.  
Only about nine percent of cases are associated with claiming to see no political bias in 
the news media when asked the question that does not refer to the political parties.  A later 
survey question reveals that about half of respondents did not see a bias that favours either the 
Democratic or Republican parties.  Just less than one-third of those who answered the question 
see a bias that promotes the interests of the Democrats while just over 20 percent see a bias that 
favours the Republican Party.  About 23 and 3 percent of the sample did not answer the bias type 
and amount of bias questions respectively.   As a result of the number of respondents who chose 
not to answer these questions and the methodology described above, 1464 or about 46 percent of 
cases were placed on the scale. 
 This scale assumes that there is a match between the amount of a bias that a person sees 
and the party that they associate news media bias with.  For example, a person indicating that 
they see a “great deal” of bias when asked about the extent of “political bias” that they see who 
also indicates that they see a “Democratic bias” in a subsequent question may not agree that they 
see a “great deal of Democratic bias”.  However, most likely respondents connected the 
questions about the amount and type of bias that they see as the questions were asked during the 
same part of the interview. 
 
5.2 Distribution of Cases on Perceived Party Bias Scale: 
 
 This distribution is trimodal.  Of those respondents who placed at one of the seven points 
on the political party bias scale, 45 percent saw some degree of Democratic Party bias and 
slightly more than one-third see some degree of bias that favours the Republicans.  The 
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remaining 20 percent did not see a bias that favours either the Democrats or Republicans.  More 
cases fall into the category that sees a “great deal” of Democratic bias in the media than any 
other category.  This category represents about one quarter of valid cases.  The second largest 
category sees no political party bias.  One in five cases are a part of this category.  In the case of 
both types of bias, the number of cases increases as the amount of perceived bias increases.  
About ten percent of cases saw “not too much” of a bias.   Within this group, about as many 
people saw a Democratic as saw a Republican bias.  About fifteen percent saw a great deal of 
Republican bias.  The scale has a standard deviation score of 2.19.  The mean score of –0.30 falls 
between the points associated with seeing no bias and seeing a “not too much” of a bias that 
promotes the interests of the Democrats.   
 
5.3 Bivariate Analysis-Perceived Party Bias Scale: 
 
 Political party bias means were calculated for a number of groups.  The “See Democratic 
Bias” variable represents only those who scored below 0 on the dependent variable scale.  The 
Republican bias counterpart variable represents those who scored above 0 on the dependent 
variable scale.   
Audiences for talk radio, religious radio, those who watch political talk shows on cable 
television, C-SPAN, NPR and public television were based on the amount of learning that 
audiences perceived as being associated with the media.  Those who stated that they 
“sometimes” or “regularly” learn about the election were included in the reference group for that 
media.  The reference category for the Fox News variable includes those who named the Fox 
News Channel as one of their television news sources for the election.  Few groups differed 
greatly from the total sample.  Generally, only groups that saw more bias than the total sample or 
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those groups addressed by the hypotheses are included in the table below.  Both males and 
females are included in the table despite that neither group differed by more than 0.3 in 
comparison with the total sample to highlight that there is a difference of 0.54 between the sexes.  
The score among females is close to the neutral point on the scale while males are associated 
with seeing some Democratic bias in the news media. 
 





Background       
Male -0.57 2.23 715 
Female -0.03 2.13 749 
Black 0.65 2.07 172 
Roman Catholic 0.09 2.16 412 
Born Again -0.66 2.09 539 
Union 0.15 2.29 145 
 
Election 2000 
      
Gore Voters 1.22 1.90 434 
Bush Voters -1.58 1.76 563 
 
Party Identification 
      
Republicans -1.59 1.74 498 
Democrats 0.81 1.96 497 
 
Media 
      
Perception of Democratic Bias  -2.38 0.78 675 
Perception of Republican Bias 2.22 0.82 528 
*Religious Radio^ -0.48 2.34 174 
**Talk Radio^ -0.62 2.33 364 
Cable Political Talk -0.18 2.35 687 
C-SPAN^ -0.01 2.40 425 
FNC -1.15 2.29 333 
NPR^ -0.23 2.35 517 
PBS^ -0.22 2.43 484 
Total Sample -0.30 2.19 1,464 
* Form 1 only (Total Sample N=740, Standard Deviation=2.15) 
**Form 2 only (Total Sample N=724, Standard Deviation=2.24) 
^Regularly/Sometimes learn something from      
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As discussed in the literature review, being male is associated with Republicanism.  This 
likely explains much of the difference between males and females on this scale.  Those who 
identify as born-again saw slightly more Democratic bias than the total sample.  This group is 
associated with a mean score of –0.66.  Roman Catholics perceive little party bias.  Respondents 
with ties to unions had a mean of 0.15 representing that group’s perception of a news media with 
little party bias.  The union members group was one of the few groups, apart from the political 
identification related variables that saw a Republican bias.  However, union membership was not 
significant at the multivariate level.  In contrast, Blacks had a mean score of 0.65.   
Not surprisingly, groups defined by their political identification were the most 
homogeneous and scored furthest from the total sample mean.    For example, Gore and Bush 
voters scored 1.22 and –1.58 respectively.  Those who voted for Bush in 2000 saw slightly more 
bias than those who voted for Gore in the same election.   Republicans differed more from the 
total sample mean in comparison with Democrats.  Those who identify as Republicans scored 
about the same as those who voted for Bush in 2000.  This suggests that the idea of a Democratic 
bias in the media is pervasive among Republicans even if they did not vote in 2000.  However, 
those who identify as Democrats saw less Republican bias than those who voted for Gore in 
2000.  This suggests that the idea of a Republican bias in the media not as widespread among 
Democrats.  The finding that Gore voters scored further from zero in comparison with 
Democrats suggests that those Democrats who did not vote for Gore in 2000 are less concerned 
about media bias.  There is a higher concentration of people who see higher levels of Republican 
bias among Gore voters than among Democrats in general.  In contrast, there is little difference 
between voters and party identifiers among Republicans. 
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 This is further evidence that those “on the right” are more critical of the media.  These 
observations support the claims that perceptions of a “liberal media” are more dominant than 
claims of a “conservative media”.  Further, this analysis demonstrates that the idea of a “liberal 
media” influences the perceptions that those on “the left” have of the media.  Those associated 
with the Republican Party are more likely to see Democratic bias than Democrats are to see a 
Republican bias.  However, the mean score among those who see a Republican bias (those who 
scored below zero) is roughly the equal distance from zero as the mean score among those who 









The crosstabular analysis in Table 5.2 confirms that “the right” is more critical of the 
news media and more united on the issue of media bias.  They are less likely to see the news 
media as neutral and more likely to see a bias that favours their opponents.  Slightly more than 
half of Republicans saw a Democratic bias but only about 36 percent of Democrats saw a 
Republican bias.  Differences based on voting behaviour were less emphatic.  About two in five 
Gore voters saw a Republican bias while about 52 percent of Bush voters saw a Democratic bias.  
About half of the sample saw no party bias in the media.  Gore voters and Democrats were more 
TABLE 5.2: PERCEIVED PARTY BIAS BY POLITICAL 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
Perceived Party Bias  
 Democratic None Republican N 











Republican 51.1 41.0 7.9 757 
Democrat 14.2 50.2 35.5 858 
Total Sample 28.2 50.1 21.7 2453 
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likely than Bush voters or Republicans to not see any party bias.  Specifically, 45 percent of 
Gore voters saw no bias while about 40 percent of Bush voters saw no party bias.  About forty 
percent of Republicans saw no bias but about half of Democrats saw no party bias.  Democrats 
were slightly more likely than Republicans to see a bias that favours the interests of their own 
party.  About 14 percent of Democrats see a Democratic bias while about eight percent of 
Republicans see a Republican bias in the news media.   
The N values above demonstrate that perceptions of political party bias are widespread.  
Slightly less than one thousand respondents identified with either the Republican or Democratic 
parties.  About the same number voted for either Bush or Gore in 2000.  However, over 1200 
saw a party bias in the media.  This demonstrates that seeing a political party bias is not 
restricted to those with party identifications or to voters.   
A comparison of the means of the media audiences presented in Table 5.1 suggests that 
none of the examined media audiences see a Republican bias in the news media.  Most of the 
audiences scored very close to the total sample. Standard deviation values demonstrate that the 
audiences for all of the media sources are fairly heterogeneous.  The most distinct audience was 
the Fox News viewers.  As expected by Hypothesis 2, those who watch the Fox News Channel 
saw Democratic bias.  The audience’s mean score of –1.15 is slightly closer to zero than those 
who voted for Bush in 2000 and equally distant from zero in comparison with Gore voters.  As 
anticipated, those who use talk radio or religious radio saw Democratic bias in the media.  
However, these scores are only marginally different from the total sample offering little support 
for Hypothesis 1.  The talk radio audience is associated with mean score of -0.62 and the 
religious radio audience is associated with a mean score of -0.48.  While political cable talk show 
viewers saw a Democratic bias, they saw less of a bias than the total sample.  The group is 
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associated with a mean score of –0.18.  This finding is too close to 0 to support the expectation 
of Hypothesis 1 that this audience would see a Democratic bias.  The variable was not significant 
at the multivariate level.  Contrary to expectations, the non-profit media audiences each scored 
means that suggest that they see almost no party bias in the news media.  These audiences were 
expected to see a Republican bias.   
Correlations were also used to examine the relationship between the perceived 
educational value of various media sources and the party bias scale.  In these cases, media 
variables were coded from zero to three.  Higher scores are associated with higher levels of 
perceived learning.  Correlations were calculated for all of the above media sources with the 
exception of the Fox News audience.  The survey instrument does not allow for a higher order 
coding scheme of this variable.   
Only the C-SPAN and radio variables have significant relationships with the scale.  The 
talk radio audience had the strongest relationship.  The correlation between perceived learning 
from talk radio and the scale was -0.135.  The religious radio and C-SPAN audiences were 
associated with correlations of –0.091 and 0.062 respectively.  In the case of the C-SPAN 
audience, the correlation suggests the opposite of what is demonstrated by the means analysis.  A 
closer analysis suggests that those who “regularly” learn about the campaign through C-SPAN 
see a Republican bias while those who “sometimes” or “hardly ever” learn through C-SPAN see 
a Democratic bias.   Scores increase linearly as respondents claim to learn more from C-SPAN.  
This finding offers little evidence to support Hypothesis 3. 
 Income and religiosity both had negative and very weak associations with the scale.  
These correlations were –0.099 and -0.094 respectively.  No significant relationship was found 
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for age.  A moderate relationship of –0.354 was found for ideology.  This is not surprising as the 
scores the highest scores on the scale capture those who identify as “very conservative”. 
No significant relationship was found for education.  This seems to contradict the above 
discussion about the connection between education and the amount of perceived bias in the news 
media.  Education may not be related to the above scale because it addresses two types of bias.  
Education is less related to party bias.  Significant relationships were found between education 
and the amount of overall political bias that a person sees as well as scales that measure only one 
type of party bias.  The correlation between education and overall political bias is 0.240.  The 
correlations between education and Democratic and Republican bias are 0.123 and 0.137 
respectively.  The closeness of these correlations demonstrates that education is not particularly 
related to one type of party bias.   
 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis-Perceived Party Bias Scale: 
 
The model in Table 5.3 uses pairwise deletion for missing cases in order to allow for the 
use of the form variable: talk radio.  As a result income missing cannot be entered into the 
model.   
The voting behaviour variables have the greatest impact on individual scores.  Entering 
them into the model almost quadruples the percentage of variance explained by the first block of 
the model.  This is not surprising as the bivariate analysis demonstrates that voting behaviour is 
related to placement on the perceived party bias scale.  Having voted for Gore has a greater 
impact on scores than having voted for Bush in 2000.  The model increases the scores of Gore 
voters by about 1.5 points and decreases the scores of Bush voters by about 1.2 points.  While it 
seems redundant to include these election variables in the model, they have been included to 
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isolate which media people choose because they are concerned about the credibility of the media.  
Without controlling for political identification it would be difficult to determine if the media 
sources were only related to the implicit party identification aspect of the scale.  The aim of this 
model is to identify which media people use when they are concerned about media bias.   
 
TABLE 5.3: REGRESSION RESULTS: PERCEIVED PARTY BIAS SCALE 
 
Independent 
Variables B Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant 1.326  6.007 ** 
Male -0.591 -0.135 -3.730 ** 
White -1.022 -0.192 -5.343 ** 
Born Again -0.814 -0.175 -4.802 ** 
Income (in $1000s) -0.005 -0.101 -2.782 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.078    
       
Block 2      
Constant 0.661  3.220 ** 
Male -0.400 -0.091 -2.904 ** 
White -0.499 -0.094 -2.939 ** 
Born Again -0.515 -0.111 -3.472 ** 
Income (in $1000s) -0.003 -0.065 -2.027 * 
Gore Voters 1.443 0.297 8.525 ** 
Bush Voters -1.325 -0.285 -7.944 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.308    
     ** 
Block 3      
Constant 1.001  4.717 ** 
Male -0.322 -0.073 -2.363 * 
White -0.518 -0.097 -3.113 ** 
Born Again -0.502 -0.108 -3.457 ** 
Income (in $1000s) -0.003 -0.064 -2.030 * 
Gore Voters 1.473 0.304 8.828 ** 
Bush Voters -1.197 -0.258 -7.260 ** 
Talk Radio^ -0.213 -0.107 -3.453 ** 
FNC -0.730 -0.132 -4.296 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.337     
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1352 
^Form-specific variable        
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Entering the talk radio and Fox News variables increases the amount of variance 
explained by almost three percent.  The FNC dummy variable is the third most influential 
variable on predicted scores.  Being a part of this audience decreases scores by 0.730 points.  The 
variable is associated with a beta value of –0.132.  This is more evidence that concerns about 
bias in the news media draw viewers to the cable station and supports Hypothesis 2.  As expected 
by Hypothesis 1, talk radio listening is also related to the scale at the multivariate level.  
However, the variable has less impact on predicted scores than watching Fox News.  The talk 
radio variable is almost as influential on scores as the born-again variable.  In contrast with 
expected outcomes, the non-profit and cable television talk show and religious radio variables 
were not significant in the context of the above model.  The model does not identify any sources 
that are used by those who are concerned about a Republican bias.  After entering the media 
variables into the model, over a third of the variation between cases can be explained.  The 
background variables explain only 7.8 percent of the variation associated with the scale. The 
media offers no support for Hypothesis 3 and supports aspects of Hypothesis 1.   
“Race”, sex and income have relatively less influence on scores than the other variables.  
Income is the least influential variable throughout all blocks of the model.  No significant 
relationship was found for education.  Being White is the most powerful variable in Block 1.  In 
the final block of the model, “race” is among the least influential variables.  Identifying as born 
again becomes more influential on scores than being White when voting behaviour is included in 
the equation. 
The only variable that reduces scores is the Gore variable.  Analysis of residual statistics 
demonstrates that the model is more likely to under-predict scores.  Predicted scores range from 
–3.2 to 2.4 while observed scores range from –3 to 3.  The distribution of standardized residuals 
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values is somewhat normal and ranges from –2.339 to 3.086.  There is an above normal 
concentration of values between –0.45 and –0.30.
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6.0 Political Participation: 
 
 
Political participation refers to a person’s involvement, including activism, with political 
processes and institutions including government and non-government organizations.  A number 
of media sources were expected to be related to the political participation scales.  The 
entertainment oriented content variables (comedy, late night and morning show television) and 
magazine television use were expected to have negative relationships with the scales.  Fox News 
Channel viewing, non-profit media (C-SPAN, PBS and NPR) and issue oriented talk 
programming (talk radio, religious radio, political talk shows on cable television and Sunday 
morning network talk shows) use were expected to have positive relationships with the scales.  
Four of the above variables are form-specific survey items.  The morning show and religious 
radio variables only appear on Form 1 while the talk radio and television magazine show 
variables were only asked on the Form 2 version of the survey.    
As per Hypothesis 4, Blacks are expected to be less likely to use local television news, 
see more bias in the news media and will differ from the total sample in its relationship between 
local news use and political participation.   
Hard news use is expected to be a stronger predictor of political participation among 
younger Americans in comparison with the total sample.  Local news is expected be positively 
associated with political participation for the total sample but not among Blacks.   
The language used to describe media content can be confusing.  To clarify, the “comedy” 
label represents programs such as Saturday Night Live and The Daily Show whereas the “late 
night” label refers to comedy programs that air late at night such as those hosted by Jay Leno and 
David Letterman.  Sunday morning network programs are politically oriented and are 
exemplified to respondents through This Week and Meet the Press.  In contrast, the morning 
Chapter 6: Political Participation 
 125  
 
 
television variable captures programs such as Good Morning America and The Today Show, 
which draw on news stories as well as lifestyle-oriented topics.  The political cable talk show 
category was exemplified to respondents through CNN’s Crossfire and CNBC’s Hardball. 




Four scales were used to measure political participation.  These scales include the online 
political participation, election participation and political involvement and combined scales.  The 
combined scale is the sum of a respondent’s scores on each of the other scales.  
The online political participation scale ranges from 0 to 7.  The scale items are associated 
with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.809.  Respondents’ scores on the scale increase by one point 
for each of the following questions that respondents answered, “yes” to: 
Have you sent or received e-mails about the candidates or campaigns, either with 
personal acquaintances or from groups or political organizations? 
 
Have you participated in any other campaign-related activities using the Internet, such as 
reading discussion groups, signing petitions, or donating money? 
 
Respondents’ scores were increased by one point for each of the following activities that they 
claimed to have participated in: 1) Online discussions about the election including involvement 
with “blogs” or “chat” groups; 2) Online research on candidate positions; 3) Online research 
about local campaign organizations and activities; 4) Visiting campaign websites or 5) Visiting 
websites set-up by groups or organizations that promote candidates or positions. 
 The wording of questions leaves the timing ambiguous.  It is unclear if respondents are 
being asked specifically about their involvement with the 2004 election or if they are being asked 
about their general online behaviour.  Because the survey was collected during the winter of 
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2003 and 2004, it is likely that many respondents used the Internet for campaign related activities 
between the time of the survey and the election in November of 2004. 
 The election participation scale combines information about the 2000 and 2004 elections.  
The scale ranges from 0 to 3.  Those who voted in 2000 scored one point.  Those who claimed 
that they had registered for the 2004 election at the time of the survey scored an additional point.  
Respondents who were “absolutely certain” that had registered scored an additional point.  These 
three scale items are associated with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.830. 
 The political involvement scale ranges from 0 to 4.  This scale measures the extent that 
the respondent demonstrates political concern.  All of the behaviours that contribute points to 
this scale represent actions that reveal high levels of political concern.  Each activity requires 
time or a financial commitment.  While some political interest is associated with voting, the 
items in this scale demonstrate higher levels of interest.  Respondents scored one point for each 
of the following activities that they have ever engaged in: 1) contributing monies to a candidate, 
2) contacting an elected official, 3) joining an organization in support of a particular cause or 4) 
attending a campaign event.  These scale items are associated with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.637.  The activities on this scale range in the amount of time required.  For example, while it 
only takes a few minutes to write a cheque, attending a campaign event involves a longer time 
commitment.  These differences may explain the modest scale reliability associated with this 
scale.   
 The combined scale is the respondent’s aggregate score on all three of the scales 
described above.  This indicator allows for wider variation between cases as scores range from 0 
to 14.  The combined scale is associated with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.773. 
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6.2 Distribution of Cases on the Political Participation Scales: 
 
 The online political participation scale is the most homogeneous of all of the political 
participation indicators as about 81 percent of cases scored zero on the scale representing no 
online political participation.  As a result, the distribution is platykurtic and very positively 
skewed.  The distribution is associated with a skew statistic of 3.0.  The mean score was 0.466 
and the standard deviation was 1.182.  About seven percent of cases scored one on the online 
participation scale.  The remaining categories included four or less percent of cases.   
The election participation scale is the only participation scale where the bulk of cases are 
associated with high levels of participation.  About 60 percent of cases were associated with the 
highest point on the scale.  The mean score and standard deviation associated with this scale are 
2.188 and 1.145 respectively.  This represents a wide range of deviation from the mean for such 
a narrow scale.  The zero and two categories are each associated with about one in six cases.  
The distribution negatively skewed, as the bulk of cases are associated with the highest category.  
The distribution is associated with a skew statistic of –1.045. 
The range of the political involvement scale is four.  About 52 percent of cases did not 
score any points on the political involvement scale.  About 23 percent of cases scored one on the 
scale.  The number of cases associated with each point on the scale decreases as political 
involvement increases.  About fourteen percent scored two on the scale.  This scale is associated 
with a mean score of 0.90 and has a standard deviation of 1.15.  The distribution is positively 
skewed and peaked as the majority of cases are associated with no points on the scale.   
 Because of the clustering of cases in each of the above political participation scales, the 
scale scores have been added together to create a higher order indicator of political participation.  
The scale range is fourteen. 
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Cases weighted by weight
FIGURE 6.1: BAR CHART DISTRIBUTION OF CASES ON COMBINED
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCALE
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates that the distribution of cases on this scale is fairly leptokurtic and is 
associated with a kurtosis statistic of 1.711. There is a clustering of cases in a few categories.  
The asymmetrical distribution is positively skewed as most cases are associated with the low end 
of the scale.  The mode and median scores are three.  About 27 percent of cases are in this 
category.  Eleven percent scored more than six on the scale.   
 
6.3 Bivariate Analysis- Political Identification Scales: 
 
 
As indicated in Table 6.1, age has a weak positive association with the political 
involvement scale and a weak negative association with online political participation.  These 
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correlations are 0.152 and –0.133 respectively.  These findings are not surprising as online 
activities are somewhat generational.  A moderate positive association of 0.319 between voting 
and age was found.   
 
TABLE 6.1: CORRELATIONS: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND VARIOUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 Online Election 
 
Involvement Combined N 
Age -.133** .319** .152** .156** 3166 
Income (in $1000s) .157** .164** .251** .267** 2743 
Education .219** .227** .288** .346** 3182 
Religiosity -.053** .122** .056** .057** 3176 
Election Interest .231** .220** .296** .351** 3166 
Political Ideology -.115** .053** -0.024 -.042** 3016 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
Education and income are positively associated with all three forms of political 
participation.  In all cases, education had stronger associations.  The correlation between 
education and the combined scale was 0.346.  Religiosity is weakly and positively associated 
with participation in voting and the political involvement scale and has a weak negative 
association with online political participation.  However, no religious group was found to differ 
significantly from the total sample at the bivariate level. 
Positive weak to moderate associations between election interest and the three forms of 
political involvement were found.  The strongest correlation of 0.351 was found for the 
combined scale.   
Political ideology was most strongly related to online political participation.  The 
negative correlation suggests that online political participation is associated with liberalism.  The 
other indicators had relationships with ideology that were very weak or not significant. 
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TABLE 6.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR VARIOUS 
GROUPS  
 
  Online Election Involvement Combined   
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. N 
Black 0.53 1.23 2.15 1.13 0.54 0.97 3.22 2.24 362 
Hispanic 0.34 0.99 1.57 1.33 0.55 0.92 2.45 2.26 317 
Income Missing 0.34 1.04 2.25 1.09 0.67 1.02 3.27 2.08 445 
Rent 0.58 1.37 1.79 1.21 0.65 0.98 3.02 2.52 846 
Union 0.66 1.41 2.54 0.92 1.22 1.27 4.42 2.51 281 
Suburb 0.66 1.39 2.38 1.01 1.07 1.19 4.10 2.50 667 
Bush Voters 0.40 1.02 2.85 0.49 1.09 1.19 4.34 1.90 1071 
Gore Voters 0.75 1.55 2.81 0.56 1.14 1.28 4.70 2.45 912 
FNC 0.44 1.13 2.20 1.14 1.04 1.22 3.67 2.49 622 
Total Sample 0.47 1.18 2.19 1.15 0.90 1.15 3.55 2.46 3188 
 
Hispanics were slightly less active according to all three scales.  In particular, the 
findings suggest that Hispanics are less likely than the total sample to vote. There is a difference 
of 0.62 between the mean score among Hispanics and that of the total sample on the election 
scale.  The survey instrument does not address citizenship.  Low election participation among 
Hispanics, in some cases, is likely attributed to citizenship status.  Blacks scored slightly lower 
than the total sample on the political involvement, election and combined scales.  However, the 
group scored above the total sample in online political participation.  Those with union ties were 
slightly more politically active than the total sample according to all of the indicators.  This 
group’s high score on the political involvement scale is related to the scale item measuring 
membership in organizations included in the scale. 
Those who voted for Gore in 2000 scored means slightly above the total sample on all 
forms of political participation.  Bush voters scored closer to the total sample on the online and 
political involvement scales.  Party identification did not offer utility in making distinctions 
between groups. 
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TABLE 6.3: CORRELATIONS: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PERCEIVED MEDIA 
LEARNING 
 
  Online Election  Involvement Combined N 
Talk           
Talk Radio^ .130** .105** .133** .174** 1594 
Religious Radio^ 0.014 .055* .005 .035 1594 












Non-Profit           
C-SPAN .175** .073** .166** .196** 3188 













Entertainment           
Comedy .132** -.099** .020 0.027 3188 













Current Affairs           
TV Magazine^ -.044 .113** .024 0.040 1594 
Sunday Morning Network .117** .163** .161** .207** 3188 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.   
 ^Form-specific variable           
 
Many significant correlations were found between political participation and media use.  
All of the non-profit media are positively related to all of the scales offering support for 
Hypothesis 3.  The strongest relationships were found for the combined scale.  Correlations 
between perceived learning from C-SPAN, public radio and public television and the combined 
scale were 0.196, 0.233 and 0.245 respectively.  As expected by Hypothesis 1, cable talk show 
and talk radio learning were positively related to all of the indicators of political participation.   
Religious radio was only significantly related to election participation.  This relationship was 
very weak.  There was little evidence at the bivariate level to support the hypothesis that the 
perceived learning from entertainment-oriented content would be negatively associated with 
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political participation.  Comedy and late-night television were weakly and negatively related to 
election participation offering support for Hypothesis 8.  These correlations were –0.099 and -
0.058 respectively.  Most other relationships between the entertainment media and political 
participation were not significant.  In contrast with Hypothesis 8, perceived learning from 
comedy programming was positively associated with online political participation.  No 
significant relationships were found for morning television.  There is no evidence supporting the 
expectation that of Hypothesis 10 that television magazine use is associated with political 
participation.  However, as anticipated, the Sunday morning network programs variable was 
positively related to all of the indicators as anticipated by Hypothesis 9.   
The relationship between Fox News Channel viewing and political participation was 
evaluated through a mean analysis as the FNC variable is dummy coded.  There is little evidence 
to support the hypothesis that the Fox News Channel audience is more active than the total 
sample.  The Fox News audience scored only marginally above the total sample on the scales 
offering little evidence for Hypothesis 2.   
The percentages of each media audience that voted for Bush or Gore or Nader in 2000 
have been summed together in Table 6.4 to approximate the voting participation of each 
audience.  Those who “regularly” or “sometimes” learn from the media were considered to be 
part of the audience.  Again, the Fox News audience is dummy coded and is not measured using 
the perceived learning scale.  The talk, non-profit and current affairs audiences were more likely 
than a random respondent to vote in 2000 offering evidence that supports Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
However, Hypothesis 10 expected the television magazine audience to be less active in elections.  
In the cases of the FNC and magazine television audiences, viewers were only marginally more 
likely to vote.  The comedy and late-night audiences were slightly less active than the total 
Chapter 6: Political Participation 
 133  
 
 
sample.  The comedy audience differed the most from the total sample.  In contrast with the 
outcomes expected by Hypothesis 8, the morning television audience included a greater 
percentage of voters than the total sample did.   
 
 
TABLE 6.4: VOTERS IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
AUDIENCES 
 
    N 
Talk     
Talk Radio^ 68.70% 738 
Religious Radio^ 69.7 323 
Cable Political Talk 69.6 1400 
      
Non-Profit     
C-SPAN 67.7 915 
NPR 69.6 1104 
PBS 71.3 1041 
      
Entertainment     
Comedy 55.6 840 
Late Night 59.3 874 
Morning Television^ 66.6 727 
      
Current Affairs 
FNC 65.8  622 
TV Magazine^ 64.7 1104 









^Form-specific variable  
 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis-Political Participation Scales: 
 
 Models have been built to predict scores on each of the political participation scales.  
Several media sources were found to be related to political participation.  The small sample size 
resulting from the use of form-specific variables likely reduces the number of significant 
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relationships between media and the scale constructs.  In some cases, form-specific variables 
were not entered because background variables that were significant in models that did not 
include survey specific variables were not significant in the context of the smaller sample.   
All of the media variables were entered into the same block of each model because there 
is no substantive reason to enter the media in separate blocks.  As a result, the models presented 
do not represent all combinations of media use variables.  In some situations entering one media 
variable into the model increases the p value of another media variable to value above the criteria 
level.  The models below were selected because they explain more variation than other possible 
combinations of media variables.  All of the models predicting political participation use 
pairwise deletion of missing data in order to accommodate form-specific variables. 
There was a range in the amount of variance explained by the models.  These differences 
reflect the amount of variation between cases on the scale.  The models predicting online 
participation explain the least.  Each model explains about one sixth of the variation on the scale.  
Almost one-third of the variation in the combined political participation scale is explained by 
each of the models.  Election interest has not been included in any of the models despite that it is 
a powerful predictor of political participation in order to focus on more measurable variables.  In 
this context, the variable offers little analytic utility.   
Two models predicting online political participation are presented because of the use of 
form-specific variables.  These models are presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. 
In both models, computer use is the strongest predictor of online computer use.  This 
variable is included in the model despite its obvious connection to the dependent variable in 
order to help to isolate the relationship that media use has with online participation.  It is possible 
that someone who occasionally uses a computer may not use the Internet or use a computer for 
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political activities.  The variable is associated with of beta values of 0.188 and 0.194 in the Form 
1 and Form 2 versions of the model respectively.  In both cases, using a computer on an 
occasional basis for any purpose increases predicted scores by about half of a point.  Having 
voted Gore in 2000 is also a powerful predictor in both models.  Those in the reference group for 
that variable had their scores increase by about three-tenths of a point.  Voting for Bush was not 
significant.  Being Roman Catholic is the only background variable that decreases scores in the 
models.  In both models, the variable is among the least powerful predictors.   
 
TABLE 6.5: REGRESSION RESULTS: ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION USING 
FORM 1 
 
Independent Variables B Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant -0.132  -2.056 * 
Roman Catholic -0.200 -0.075 -2.929 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.003 0.104 3.879 ** 
Use Computer 0.562 0.218 8.199 ** 
Gore Voters 0.395 0.151 5.893 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.093    
       
Block 2      
Constant -0.278  -3.806 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.002 0.072 2.767 ** 
Roman Catholic -0.178 -0.067 -2.683 ** 
Use Computer 0.485 0.188 7.227 ** 
Gore Voters 0.314 0.120 4.753 ** 
Comedy 0.141 0.122 4.256 ** 
C-SPAN 0.097 0.084 3.209 ** 
Late Night -0.084 -0.072 -2.515 * 
Morning TV^ -0.062 -0.063 -2.486 * 
NPR 0.128 0.122 4.662 ** 
PBS 0.118 0.108 4.019 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.151    
^Form-specific variable        
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1391         
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TABLE 6.6: REGRESSION RESULTS: ONLINE 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION USING FORM 2 
 
Independent Variables B Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant -0.132  -2.027 * 
Roman Catholic -0.200 -0.075 -2.887 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.003 0.104 3.825 ** 
Use Computer 0.562 0.218 8.083 ** 
Gore Voters 0.395 0.151 5.809 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.093    
       
Block 2      
Constant -0.154  -1.919   
Roman Catholic -0.164 -0.062 -2.440 * 
Income (in $1000s) 0.002 0.069 2.634 ** 
Use Computer 0.500 0.194 7.383 ** 
Gore Voters 0.317 0.121 4.774 ** 
Comedy 0.130 0.113 3.913 ** 
C-SPAN 0.112 0.097 3.634 ** 
Late Night -0.076 -0.065 -2.261 * 
NPR 0.126 0.120 4.555 ** 
PBS 0.139 0.128 4.613 ** 
TV Magazine^ -0.136 -0.120 -4.554 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.160    
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1352 
^Form-specific variable 
        
 
In both models, the media variables are powerful predictors.  In the Form 1 model, media 
variables increase the amount of variance explained by 5.8 percent.  In the Form 2 model, media 
use increases the amount of variance explained by 6.7 percent.  In most cases, the media 
variables had the predicted relationship with the dependent variable.  However, consistent with 
the bivariate analysis, comedy program use/learning was positively related to online political 
participation: the opposite of that predicted by Hypothesis 8.  Further, comedy television use is 
among the most powerful media variables.  The variable is associated with beta values of 0.122 
and 0.113.  This raises questions about the effect of age.  The comedy audience is younger than 
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other media audiences and online activities have a generational component.  However, age was 
not significant in the context of the models above.  The partial correlation between the comedy 
variable and online participation controlling for age was 0.095.  The positive value of this 
correlation suggests that generational differences in computer use do not explain the positive 
relationship between the comedy variable and online participation.  Income is positively related 
to the scale and is associated with beta values of 0.072 and 0.069 in the Form 1 and 2 models 
respectively.  Because income is a determinant of computer and Internet access, it is likely that 
income would be associated with a higher beta value if computer use were not included in the 
model. 
It is curious that the late night and comedy variables had opposite relationships with 
online political participation.  The survey is not detailed enough to offer a sense of which 
comedy programs respondents are watching most.  However, interviewers used The Daily Show, 
hosted by Jon Stewart, to describe the category.  The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences selection of Jon Stewart as the 2006 Oscar awards ceremony host is evidence that The 
Daily Show resonates with the American public.  While those who claim to learn from comedy 
shows may or may not be viewers of the program, The Daily Show is a leader in the comedy 
program category.  Assuming that many of the respondents who claimed to be viewers of 
television comedy programs are viewers of Jon Stewart’s show that mocks American journalism 
and draws heavily on news stories, this difference in relationship with the scale construct may 
suggest that comedy programs draw a more politically concerned audience because of its greater 
emphasis on news stories.  While The Daily Show deals with current affairs in each episode, late 
night programs give less attention and detail to current events.  Generally these programs draw 
on political news stories only when they facilitate “one liners” or humour that does not require 
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producers to provide the audience with background information.  For example, the late-night talk 
show hosts drew extensively on the relationship between Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.  In 
contrast, The Daily Show includes many segments that focus on specific issues using mock 
investigative reporters thereby exposing viewers to more political content.  The Daily Show, 
despite airing on Comedy Central in the United States and the Comedy Network in Canada 
seems to capture the attention of those looking for politically loaded content. 
The morning and magazine television had negative relationships with online political 
participation as expected by Hypotheses 8 and 10 respectively.  They are associated with b 
values of –0.062 and –0.136 respectively.  Further research using content analysis would be 
useful in comparing the amount of explicitly political content that is included in these programs.  
On the surface, morning television shows appear to emphasize lifestyle and celebrity oriented 
topics over detailed political stories.  While magazine programs are associated with the news 
genre, they are often sensational and represent the qualities of the tabloid described in the 
literature review.  These issues may explain how programs that are considered news oriented are 
not associated with online political participation. 
All of the non-profit media variables were positively associated with the scale offering 
support to Hypothesis 3.  PBS and NPR were among the most influential variables.  In most 
cases, non-profit media variables are associated with unstandarized values of more than 0.1.  
This suggests that these audiences are more politically inclined.   
In comparison with the online political participation scale, the model in Table 6.7 can 
explain a greater proportion of the variation between cases on the political involvement scale.  
However, entering the media variables has less relative impact on the amount of variance 
explained.  Entering the media variables into the model increases the amount of variance 
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explained by just less than five percent.  Only one model predicting placement on the political 
involvement scale is presented as no form-specific variables were used. 
 
TABLE 6.7: REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL 
INVOLVEMENT SCALE 
 
Independent Variables b Beta t   
Block 1         
Constant -0.607  -6.941 ** 
Age 0.010 0.145 7.768 ** 
Male 0.140 0.061 3.421 ** 
Black -0.317 -0.087 -4.806 ** 
Roman Catholic -0.128 -0.050 -2.789 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.004 0.159 8.468 ** 
Education 0.151 0.216 11.312 ** 
Union 0.200 0.049 2.790 ** 
Bush Voters 0.255 0.105 5.030 ** 
Gore Voters 0.383 0.151 7.177 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.174    
       
Block 2      
Constant -0.800  -8.720 ** 
Age 0.010 0.149 7.787 ** 
Male 0.080 0.035 2.008 * 
Black -0.370 -0.102 -5.744 ** 
Roman Catholic -0.130 -0.050 -2.895 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.004 0.140 7.637 ** 
Education 0.131 0.187 9.925 ** 
Union 0.208 0.051 2.982 ** 
Bush Voters 0.240 0.099 4.837 ** 
Gore Voters 0.301 0.118 5.722 ** 
Comedy 0.070 0.063 3.067 ** 
C-SPAN 0.090 0.081 4.415 ** 
FNC 0.183 0.063 3.679 ** 
Late Night -0.044 -0.039 -1.984 * 
NPR 0.129 0.127 7.030 ** 
PBS 0.064 0.060 3.135 ** 
Sunday Morning Network 0.055 0.054 2.887 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.223    
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=2730         
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Education, income and age are the most influential on predicted scores.  These variables 
all have positive relationships with the political involvement scale.  Education is associated with 
a beta value of 0.187.  Being Black or Roman Catholic decreases predicted scores.  The former is 
associated with a beta value of –0.102 and the latter is associated with a beta value of –0.050.  
The Black variable becomes more powerful than the variable capturing Bush voters when the 
media variables are included in the model.  Not surprisingly, those who voted in 2000 are more 
politically involved.  Gore voters were more active than Bush voters. These variables are 
associated with beta values of 0.118 and 0.099 respectively.  Union membership increases 
predicted scores on the scale by 0.208.  Being male is among the weakest predictors and became 
less powerful than the union and Roman Catholic variables after the media variables were 
entered into the model. 
As with the models predicting online political participation, all of the media variables that 
were included in the model had the expected relationship with the dependent variable with the 
exception of comedy television use.  The NPR variable is the most influential of all of the media 
variables offering further support to Hypothesis 3.  It is associated with a beta value of 0.127.  
The other non-profit media variables were less powerful predictors than voting behaviour.  Being 
a part of the Fox News Channel’s audience increases predicted scores by 0.183 offering support 
to Hypothesis 2.  Late night television viewing is the least powerful variable in the model. 
These findings are further evidence that using content that is more politically detailed or 
presented as “hard news” draws an audience that is more politically active.  This observation is 
based on the assumption that watching The Daily Show largely drives comedy program viewing. 
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About a quarter of the variation on the election participation scale can be explained by 
the model in Table 6.8.  Adding the media variables only marginally increases the powerfulness 
of the model.   
 
TABLE 6.8: REGRESSION RESULTS: ELECTION 
PARTICIPATION SCALE 
 
Independent Variables b Beta t   
Block 1      
Constant 0.247  2.435 * 
Male -0.077 -0.034 -1.958   
Age 0.018 0.283 15.531 ** 
Hispanic -0.441 -0.115 -6.464 ** 
Protestant 0.242 0.105 4.543 ** 
Roman Catholic 0.329 0.128 5.504 ** 
Education 0.157 0.226 12.503 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.002 0.081 4.367 ** 
Union 0.255 0.063 3.713 ** 
Rent -0.165 -0.063 -3.500 ** 
Identifiers 0.322 0.136 7.981 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.230    
       
Block 2      
Constant 0.215  2.125 * 
Male -0.095 -0.041 -2.419 * 
Age 0.018 0.272 14.963 ** 
Hispanic -0.446 -0.117 -6.583 ** 
Protestant 0.229 0.099 4.326 ** 
Roman Catholic 0.293 0.114 4.909 ** 
Education 0.152 0.217 12.059 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.002 0.076 4.155 ** 
Union 0.237 0.059 3.473 ** 
Rent -0.184 -0.071 -3.921 ** 
Identifiers 0.299 0.126 7.433 ** 
Cable Political Talk 0.046 0.045 2.482 * 
Sunday Morning 
Network 
0.088 0.087 4.775 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.242    
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=2730         
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Age and education had the greatest influence on predicted scores.  These variables were 
associated with beta values of 0.272 and 0.217 respectively.  Those who identified with either of 
the major political parties were found to be more active.  Being in the reference group for this 
variable increases predicted scores by about 0.3.  In contrast with the political involvement scale, 
being male is negatively related to this scale while being Roman Catholic is positively related to 
the scale.  Being Protestant is associated with a b value of 0.229.  Being Hispanic is negatively 
related to the scale and is associated with a beta value of –0.117.  Renters were found to be less 
active.  This is not surprising as two of the scale items deal with election registration.  Renters 
tend to be more transient making their registration process more involved. Union ties are 
positively associated with the scale.  Being male is only significant in the last block of the model. 
Only two media variables were found to be significant in the model above.  Both Sunday 
morning network program and political talk shows on cable use/learning increased scores 
offering some evidence to support Hypotheses 9 and 1 respectively.  The former was more 
influential on scores and is associated with a beta of 0.087 and a b value of 0.088.  The cable talk 
show variable is associated with a beta value of 0.045.  This is further evidence that issue 
oriented shows draw audiences that are more likely to vote.   
Two models predicting scores on the combined political participation scale are presented.  
While only one uses form-specific variables, both are presented because when used together they 
identify more relationships between media use and the scale.  The model using the Form 2 
specific variables includes variables for talk radio and television magazines.  The comedy and 
late night variables are only significant in the other model.  The born again variable is not 
significant in either block of the Form 1 model.  This suggests that this issue is related to the 
smaller sample size that that model is based on. 
Chapter 6: Political Participation 
 143  
 
 
TABLE 6.9: REGRESSION RESULTS: COMBINED 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCALE USING 
FORM 1 
 
Independent Variables b Beta t   
Block 1         
Constant -0.866  -3.173 ** 
Age 0.031 0.224 8.331 ** 
Hispanic -0.741 -0.090 -3.656 ** 
Born Again 0.259 0.050 2.032   
Education 0.378 0.253 9.349 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.008 0.156 6.005 ** 
Union 0.621 0.072 2.988 ** 
Use Computer 0.968 0.180 6.338 ** 
Democrats 0.525 0.101 4.179 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.231    
       
Block 2      
Constant -0.994  -3.606 ** 
Age 0.030 0.214 8.192 ** 
Hispanic -0.790 -0.096 -4.056 ** 
Born Again 0.224 0.043 1.831   
Education 0.328 0.220 8.359 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.007 0.133 5.305 ** 
Union 0.512 0.059 2.560 * 
Use Computer 0.912 0.170 6.187 ** 
Democrats 0.401 0.077 3.272 ** 
C-SPAN 0.170 0.071 2.817 ** 
NPR 0.208 0.096 3.799 ** 
PBS 0.208 0.092 3.512 ** 
Sunday Morning 
Network 
0.236 0.108 4.162 ** 
Talk Radio^ 0.137 0.062 2.453 * 
TV Magazine^ -0.207 -0.088 -3.551 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.292     
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=1343 
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TABLE 6.10: REGRESSION RESULTS: COMBINED 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCALE USING NO 
FORM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
     
Independent Variables b Beta t   
Block 1         
Constant -0.866  -4.518 ** 
Age 0.031 0.224 11.861 ** 
Hispanic -0.741 -0.090 -5.205 ** 
Born Again 0.259 0.050 2.893 ** 
Education 0.378 0.253 13.310 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.008 0.156 8.550 ** 
Union 0.621 0.072 4.255 ** 
Use Computer 0.968 0.180 9.024 ** 
Democrats 0.525 0.101 5.950 ** 
Adjusted R-Square  0.233    
       
Block 2      
Constant -1.194  -6.036 ** 
Age 0.031 0.219 11.360 ** 
Hispanic -0.757 -0.092 -5.518 ** 
Born Again 0.246 0.047 2.858 ** 
Education 0.331 0.222 11.967 ** 
Income (in $1000s) 0.007 0.134 7.625 ** 
Union 0.544 0.063 3.862 ** 
Use Computer 0.884 0.165 8.529 ** 
Democrats 0.337 0.065 3.909 ** 
Comedy 0.163 0.068 3.499 ** 
C-SPAN 0.183 0.076 4.373 ** 
Late Night -0.124 -0.051 -2.743 ** 
NPR 0.240 0.110 6.406 ** 
PBS 0.182 0.080 4.382 ** 
Sunday Morning 
Network 
0.201 0.092 5.193 ** 
Adjusted R-Square   0.290     
*p<0.05, **p<0.01         
N=2730         
 
The modeles predicting scores on the combined political participation scale are presented 
in Tables 6.9 and 6.10.  In both models, media variables increase the amount variance explained 
by about six percent.  The most powerful variables do not vary from model to model.  Education, 
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age, computer use and income are the most powerful predictors in the models.  Education and 
age are associated with beta values of about 0.2.  Computer use is also a top predictor of scores 
on the scale.  This is not surprising as half of the points on the scale pertain to online activities.  
Identifying as a Democrat is positively associated with the scale.  The variable capturing those 
with union ties is associated with beta values of about 0.06.  Consistent with the scale predicting 
election participation, being Hispanic decreases scores.  In both models predicting scores on the 
aggregate scale, the Hispanic variable ranks near the middle in terms of its relative powerfulness. 
In both models, the NPR and Sunday morning network programs variables are the most 
powerful of all media variables offering evidence that supports Hypotheses 3 and 9 respectively.  
In the case of the full sample model, NPR is associated with a beta value of 0.110.  The other 
non-profit media variables are more powerful than the late night and comedy media variables.  
The comedy variable is associated with a beta value of 0.068 and the late night variable is 
associated with –0.051.  The Form 1 model allows for the inclusion of the talk radio and 
television magazine variables.  Talk radio is the least powerful media variable in this model.  It is 
associated with a b value of 0.137 and a beta value of 0.062.  The television magazine model is 
not as influential on predicted scores as the PBS, NPR and Sunday morning network television 
variable.  It is associated with a beta value of –0.088. 
All of the media variables have the anticipated relationship with the combined scale.  No 
media variable was significant only in the combined scale model.  Media variables that are 
included in multiple models have the same relationship with each dependent variable.   
The clustering of cases and crude nature of the scale constructs and independent variables 
is reflected in the analysis of the residuals statistics associated with the above models.  With the 
exception of the election participation model, all models are more likely to under-predict than to 
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over-predict scores.  This reflects that the voting participation scale was the only scale with the 
more cases at the positive end.  The distribution of residuals is somewhat normal for the 
combined scale models.  In the context of the political involvement scale, there are more cases 
associated with standardized residuals values between zero and negative one in comparison with 
what would characterize a normal distribution of residual values. The standardized residual 
values in this model range from –2.300 to 3.545.   
There is a clustering of standardized residuals values between about –0.8 and 1 for the 
models predicting online political participation.  The standardized residual values for this model 
range from about –1.5 to 6.1 in the case of the Form 1 model and 5.5 in the case of the Form 2 
model.  The mean standardized residuals for Forms 1 and 2 are -0.082 and 0.097 respectively.   
The voting participation model is also problematic.  Its standardized and non-
standardized residuals range from about –3.4 to 2.2.  The mean standardized residual and 
residual are about –0.015.  This distribution is somewhat leptokurtic with a major peak where 
residuals values are between zero and one.  There are more cases with negative residual values.  
The standard deviations of standardized residuals on the online and election participation scales 
are about one.  The distribution of residuals for the models predicting scores on the aggregate 
scale is close to normal.  The mean standardized residual for the Form 1 model is 0.07.  The 
other model predicting scores on the scale has a mean residual value of 0.009. 
These residual statistics are a function of the dependent variable scale constructs.  
Because these variables are ordinal and include relatively few categories, they are problematic 
for multiple regression analysis.  Continuous variables are better suited to such techniques. 
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6.5 “Race”, Local News Use and Political Participation: 
 
 Hypothesis 4 expects that Blacks are less likely to use local television news, see more 
bias in the news media and will differ from the total sample in its relationship between local 
news use and political participation.   
Blacks were marginally over-represented in the local news audience.  While Blacks 
represent about eleven percent of the total sample, approximately thirteen percent of Blacks 
claimed that they “regularly” or “sometimes” learned about the Presidential campaign through 
local television news.  This suggests that Blacks are only slightly more likely to watch local 
news than the total sample.  The mean score on the overall media bias scale for Blacks was only 
marginally higher than the total sample’s mean.  The mean score among Blacks on the perceived 
news media bias scale was 1.76, slightly less than the total sample mean of 1.88.  These findings 
offer little support for Hypothesis 4a.   
 
TABLE 6.11: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVED LEARNING FROM LOCAL TV 
NEWS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR BLACKS, NON-BLACKS AND TOTAL 
SAMPLE 
 
Perceived Learning From Local TV  Online Election Involvement 
Combined 
Scale N 
Blacks -0.020 0.007 -0.096 -0.048 184 
Non-Blacks -0.048 .139** .079** .081** 1411 
Total Sample -.051* .123** .052* .060* 1594 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
Local News Learning is a form-specific variable.        
 
 As indicated in Table 6.11, for the total sample and non-Blacks, watching local television 
news is weakly and positively associated with participation in elections, the political 
involvement scale and the combined political participation scale.  This is consistent with the 
work discussed in the literature review.  However, a negative relationship between local news 
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use and online political participation was found for the total sample.  No significant relationship 
was found for non-Blacks.  As anticipated, local news learning among Blacks was not 
significantly related to any of the indicators of political participation.  However, these findings 
should be interpreted with caution due to the few number of Black respondents that were asked 
the Form 1 survey questions.   
Perceived local news learning was measured using the same survey question structure 
used for the other media that places cases on a scale that ranges from 0 to 3.   
 
6.6 Age, Hard News Use and Political Participation: 
 
Hypothesis 11 anticipates that hard news consumption will be a stronger predictor of 
political participation among younger Americans in comparison with the total sample. 
 
TABLE 6.12: CORRELATIONS: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION-
SEEKING BY AGE GROUP 
 
 Online Election Involvement 
Combined 
Scale N 
18-34 years .466 .197 .290 .457 961 
35 and older .372 .166 .313 .404 2227 
Total Sample .407 .164 .292 .409 3188 
All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Partial correlations between the information-seeking scale and the political participation 
indicators controlling for age group were calculated to test Hypothesis 11.  The correlations in 
Table 6.12 reveal that the range of hard news sources that a person uses as measured by the 
information-seeking scale is positively associated with all indicators of political participation.  
This supports Hypothesis 7b.  Generally, these relationships were stronger among younger 
Americans.  However, the relationship between the information-seeking scale and the political 
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involvement scale did not differ for younger Americans.  According to most indicators, hard 
news use is a slightly stronger predictor of political participation among those under thirty-five 
years of age than for the total sample.
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7.0 Conclusions and Recommendations: 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings: 
 
 In general, the media related variables were weakly related to the dependent variables 
examined in the present analysis.  Most of the beta coefficients describing media use were 
associated with values that had absolute values that were less than 0.1.  Blocks including media 
related variables generally increased the amount of explained variance by only a few percent.  
This is largely related to narrow and crude scales used in the analysis.  Most dependent variable 
constructs were highly skewed, as cases were very clustered at the low end of scale constructs. 
The use of survey forms limited the analysis by reducing the sample sizes in some models, 
restricting the possibilities for crosstabular analysis and making it inappropriate to use mean 
substitution in some models. 
 The analysis found support for most of the hypotheses.  Multivariate analysis found that 
listening to talk radio, religious radio and watching the Fox News Channel were weakly 
associated with conservatism.  Closer analysis revealed that the relationships between talk radio 
and FNC use and political ideology were mediated by perceptions of Democratic bias in the 
news media.  The expectation that political talk shows on cable television would be related to 
conservatism was not supported.  Multivariate analysis found that all of the non-profit media use 
variables were weakly associated with liberalism.   
 The expectation that those who prefer news that does not “have a particular point of 
view” would use more sources was not supported.  However, positive relationships between the 
amount of bias that a person sees in the news media and the range of sources and mediums used 
was found.  More specifically, in the case of medium, most respondents used television to get 
their election news.  Those who perceive bias in the news media were more likely to also use the 
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Internet or newspapers.  The information seeking scale, which measures the number of news and 
current affairs sources that a person uses, was positively related to the amount of perceived bias 
in the news media.  These mediums and information seeking scales were positively related to 
income and education and all of the indicators of political participation.  Generally, the scales 
had slightly stronger relationships with political participation for those less than 35 years of age.  
There was some evidence that television use is less related to socio-economic status and political 
objectives than the other media use scales examined in Chapter 4.  The analysis suggests that 
those on the “left” use slightly more sources in comparison with those on the “right”.   
 Using the Fox News Channel and talk radio were associated with perceptions of a 
Democratic Party bias in the news media at the multivariate level.  The analysis found little 
bivariate and no multivariate support for the expectation that using non-profit media was 
associated with perceptions of a Republican bias in the news media.  The analysis suggests that 
Republicans are more sceptical of the news media than Democrats.  No variable was found to be 
associated with perceptions of a Republican bias in the news media.  
 Many of the expected relationships between media use and political participation were 
found.  However, in contrast with expectations, comedy television use was positively related to 
most of the indicators of political participation at the multivariate level.  Comedy television use 
negatively related to election participation at the bivariate level.  With the exception of the 
comedy television variable, none of the media variables had both positive and negative 
relationships with the various political participation indicators.  As expected, late-night television 
use was negatively related to many of the political participation indicators.  Morning and 
magazine television were negatively related to online political participation.  The latter had the 
same relationship with the combined scale.  Sunday morning network talk show use was 
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positively related to most of the indicators and was associated with weak to moderate 
relationships with political participation at the bivariate level.  There was little evidence that 
watching FNC is associated with political activity.  The FNC use variable was only weakly 
associated with higher levels of participation according to the political involvement scale.  
Watching political talk shows on cable and listening to talk radio were each related to one 
indicator of political participation at the multivariate level.  These media were positively related 
to all of the political participation indicators at the bivariate level.   Many multivariate positive 
relationships between non-profit media use and political participation were found.  While local 
television news use is positively associated with most of the political participation indicators for 
the total sample, no significant relationships between the variables were found for Blacks.  There 
was little evidence that Blacks are less likely to watch local news or that Blacks see more bias in 
the news media.   
 While the analysis identified a number of associations, the generalizability of findings is 
limited by a sample that only included those in the United States.  The implications of this are 
discussed in further detail below.  
 
7.2 Implications of Findings and Areas for Future Research: 
 
 The term “narrowcasting” is used by the broadcasting industry to denote television 
services with niche programming.  The implication of this is that media consumers have a great 
range of channels to choose from each offering distinct programming.  In addition to the 
expanded list of television channels to choose from, media users now have an increasing range of 
media to choose from as a result of new media including Internet based media such as 
WebPages, audio and video streaming and file sharing.  These developments have triggered what 
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the media industry calls a “fragmentation” of media audiences.  The term continues to be a 
buzzword in industry discourse.  It implies that media consumers have greater choice and control 
over their media use.  Recently, Rosen (2004-5) coined the term “egocasting”.  She explains that, 
“we have moved beyond narrowcasting into ‘egocasting’-a world where we exercise an 
unparalleled degree of control over what we watch and what we hear.  We can consciously avoid 
ideas, sounds, and images that we don’t agree with or don’t enjoy” (Rosen 2004-5: 67).  This 
concept was influenced by the advent of technologies such as the iPod1 and Digital Video 
Recorders (DVR)2 that make it easier for media users to filter the media that they are exposed to.   
The concepts of narrowcasting and egocasting both suggest a more empowered media consumer. 
The former is the framework that explains the exponential growth in media offerings for one to 
choose from, while the latter refers to the tools that allow media users to negotiate their use of 
these offerings.  The present analysis aims to identify associations in the choices that media 
consumers make.   
The idea of a more empowered media user and the availability of highly specific media 
content suggest that media use habits would be fairly patterned.  While many associations were 
identified through the present data analysis, in general, these relationships were weak.  While 
this is may be partly due to the methodological limitations of the project, it raises questions about 
the distinctiveness of the various media offerings.   
A number of media scholars demonstrate that the media is far less diverse than many 
would perceive based on the range of choices available.  The small beta coefficients described in 
                                                 
1 iPod is a product of Apple Computer Inc. that allows for portability of large volumes of digital files including 
media files.  The devices allow owners to listen to music or watch videos using small hand held devices. 
2 DVRs allow for the storage of large volumes of broadcast television content on hard drives.  The implication is that 
owners of the devices can develop large libraries of television content without concern for broadcast schedules, skip 
commercials and pause live television.  Many of the devices include features that track the user’s viewing 
preferences to suggest and store content. 
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the present analysis can be interpreted to support the arguments made by McChesney (2004) and 
Herman and Chomsky (1998) described in the literature review.  These thinkers argue that media 
content is highly filtered by market forces resulting in a homogeneous range of content that 
favours conservative values.  From this perspective, most media content encourages viewers to 
prefer larger police forces, longer prison sentences, less government involvement, lower taxes, 
privatization and high defence spending.  This view sees media use as only weakly related to the 
dependent variables in the present analysis because media content is not unique enough to draw 
easily defined audiences. McChesney (2004: 182) calls the current media system in the United 
States “an irony” and explains that, “what is lost in the blizzard of channels is that twenty of the 
twenty-five largest cable TV channels are now owned by the five first-tier media firms, the same 
firms that own the networks and many of the TV stations in the largest markets.”  Mullen (2003) 
also points to a lack of diversity on cable television despite the exponential growth in the number 
of cable channels. She identifies reliance on syndicated programming and “reruns” as 
characterizing the development of cable television.   
The present analysis finds that perception of a bias in the news encourages use of a 
greater number of sources and mediums.  This finding, in the context of the agenda-setting 
framework and expanding media options, requires further examination.  As described in the 
literature review, agenda-setting research demonstrates that people place greater importance on 
the news stories that are given more attention by the media.  How has growth in the number of 
news services impacted agenda setting?  If coverage levels, on their own, explain a lot about why 
people find some stories to be more important than others, one would expect that a greater 
diversity of news services would reduce the media’s agenda setting capacity.  This interpretation 
assumes that a greater number of available sources encourage coverage of a greater number of 
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issues from more angles.  The implication of a broader range of media choices is a less shared 
culture.  In an environment with a greater number of media sources, each with differentiated 
coverage, agenda setting is highly regulated by media use choices.  However, as described 
above, media critics do not equate growth in the number of television channels with expanded 
coverage.  Future research examining if those who make attempts to broaden their coverage by 
using more sources are exposed to broader coverage will help in understanding the diversity that 
media users are exposed to.  Is there evidence that those who deliberately seek information from 
multiple news organizations are actually exposed to a greater number of news stories and story 
attributes?  The present analysis found that socio-economic status was positively related to the 
range of sources and mediums that a person uses, suggesting that the costs associated with 
different media subscriptions and technologies restrict those with lower incomes from using 
some media.  Research examining if use of a broader range of sources exposes users to greater 
coverage will help to assess the extent of class bias in information access.  The arguments that 
depict a homogeneous media suggest that discretionary income would have little influence on the 
range of news items and story attributes that a person can be exposed to. 
Media fragmentation is related to forces that both increase and decrease the diversity of 
news content.  Intuitively, growth in the number of media offerings provides media consumers 
with more choices and the potential for a broader range of content producers.  However, the 
implication of fragmentation is that the audiences for individual sources are smaller.  By 
reducing the potential sizes of audiences, fragmentation also reduces the budgets allocated to 
individual services.  As discussed earlier, budget sizes impact media content by discouraging 
investigative journalism and encouraging the use of official sources.  Cost constraints also 
encourage a greater influence by interested public relations (PR) firms on news stories.  These 
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firms can reduce newsroom costs by providing background information, footage and experts.  
McChesney (2004:71) explains that: 
Media owners welcome PR because it provides, in effect, a subsidy for them by 
offering filler at no cost.  Surveys show that PR accounts for anywhere from 40 to 
70 percent of what appears as news.  Because PR is most successful if it is 
surreptitious, the identity of the major players and knowledge of their most 
successful campaigns is usually hidden from the general public. 
 
By recognizing how increases in the number of sources can decrease the range of coverage, 
connecting choice with a more empowered media user looses credibility.   
Others would attribute the lack of diversity in the media to the dominance of a “liberal 
media”.  This argument also points to homogeneity as explaining why media audiences are not 
particularly distinct.  However, instead of seeing a media that is overwhelmingly conservative, 
this argument assumes that liberal values are widespread in media content.  As described in 
Chapter 5 the perception of a Democratic bias is much more prevalent than seeing a Republican 
bias.   
There is debate over the type of political bias that characterises media coverage.  If one 
were to reduce the argument to two sides: those who describe a conservative bias and those who 
point to a liberal bias, both sides of the debate are associated with organizations that document 
political ideological bias in the media.  While public opinion sees more liberal than conservative 
bias, the academic community (for example, Herman and Chomsky 1998, McChesney 2004, 
Alterman 2003, Winter 1997 and Bagdikian 2004) describes a conservative bias.  Arguably, 
Chomsky has the highest profile of those describing a free market bias in the media.  However, 
there appears to be no counterpart among those who see a liberal bias in the academic realm.  
Generally, scholars highlight the structural forces that filter media content.  These arguments 
tend to be rooted in political economy and emphasize systemic forces that are maintained by 
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power relations.  This group sees journalists as being manipulated directly and indirectly by the 
interests of media company owners and advertisers.  The high profile faces among those who 
draw attention to liberal biases come from non-academic circles: politics, religion and talk radio.  
These claims point to evidence that journalists overwhelmingly identify as liberals (Sutter 2001: 
440).  The divergent area for these interpretations is the difference in extent of power that 
journalists are perceived to have.  
While some will argue that the lack of peer reviewed scholarly work describing a liberal 
bias is evidence that the argument is flawed, the reasoning used by those arguing that the media 
has a liberal bias questions the integrity of the academic on the same grounds that it questions the 
veracity of journalists.  Both workforces are perceived as attracting those who place higher value 
on egalitarianism than on individualism and market forces.   
Rush Limbaugh is known for his anti-university polemics.  For example, he writes that 
(1993: 211), “We have known for some time that liberals believe in moral relativism.  It now 
appears that they believe in physical and gender relativism as well.  Pretty soon we will probably 
be seeing university courses spring up whose purpose is to inquire into whether our existence is 
real or merely an extension of Freddy Krueger’s dream”.  This excerpt reveals a connection 
between the university and liberalism.  Such a perspective would attack the academic peer 
reviewing process for discouraging non-liberal work.   
Lipset (1979: 36) also draws parallels between academics and journalists.  He explains 
that, “in the United States and in other Western countries, journalists and broadcasters 
increasingly have the same values and political orientations as the critical intellectuals.”  Lipset 
(1979) and Ladd Jr. and Lipset (1975) document survey findings that point to a high 
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concentration of liberals in the university, particularly in the social sciences. To the straight 
talking radio host, both groups are dominated by “bleeding liberals” who complicate issues. 
Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) ideas address the connection between intellectualism and 
language use.  They see the university “tending to rule out the question of the informative 
efficiency” of its communication in order to help maintain the “status authority” of the 
professoriate (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990: 108).  The authors observe that the language used in 
universities is not a language that children, of any social class, are socialized to speak. (Bourdieu 
and Passeron 1990: 115).  Bourdieu and Passeron (1990: 110) explains that: 
If dissertational rhetoric gives the teacher the impression that his words have not 
been too badly understood, this is because the dissertation authorizes a discourse 
and a relation to discourse which prohibit clear-cut choices and induce the marker 
to pass a judgement as prudent as its object” (emphasis added).   
 
 Many conservative talk radio hosts position their shows as cutting through the “BS” with 
easily understood arguments that do not hide behind abstraction.  They claim to offer more clear-
cut logic.  This is evident in the book titles of books written by talk radio hosts.   For example, 
Bill O’Reilly (2001) wrote a book called, The No Spin Zone.  His title links truthfulness with the 
accessibility of communication.   
While the analysis in Chapter 4 only finds very minor differences between the number of 
sources used by the political cleavages, those on the “left” were more likely to use more sources.  
This finding is consistent with the connection between liberalism and perceptions of a more 
complicated world.  With this interpretation, liberals are more inclined to use more sources 
because they seek nuance.  However, as proposed in Chapter 4, this finding may also stem from 
depictions of a “liberal media”.  If one sees the entire media as “liberal” there is little perceived 
advantage to using additional sources as all sources are seen as reflecting the same bias.   
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Mayer (2004) also questions why talk radio has become a conservative forum.  He 
considers the argument that talk radio “demands broad slogans and uncomplicated, simple-
minded discussions of the issues, a task at which conservatives, it is argued, are particularly 
good.  Liberals, by contrast have a more nuanced view of the world not easily reducible to 
simple catch-phrases and quick solutions” (Mayer 2004: 93).  He eventually dismisses this 
interpretation, which he sees as ego massage for liberals.  He explains that: 
For every simple-minded conservative slogan there is an equally vacuous catch-
phrase on the Left.  For every Republican who has ever claimed that “big 
government” is the cause of all our problems there is a Democrat who thinks that 
all Republican policies are “tax cuts for the rich” and sweetheart deals for big 
business (2004: 93).   
 
While both political cleavages have the ability to develop catch phrases, future research 
should assess if conservative values are better suited to the techniques that draw audiences to talk 
radio.  It appears that conservative values better lend themselves to such phrases because it is 
easier to excite a listener about their own social location and problems.  Content analysis that 
compares the use of catch phrases by liberal and conservative radio hosts will help to evaluate 
this expectation. 
Mayer (2004: 101) explains that “demographic and identity-based divisions” make liberal 
talk radio more of a challenge.  Anyone feeling overtaxed is in the market for programming 
hosted by someone raving about how far away “Tax Freedom Day” is.  Conservative talk radio 
demonstrates that comments rooted in individualism can easily trigger excitement and emotional 
responses from listeners.  It is more challenging to peak a listener’s interest through discussion 
about other people’s problems.  The paradox is that people are united by their individualism.  In 
contrast, liberal concerns have less mass appeal.  They focus on the experiences of specific 
marginalized groups making them less able to cross demographic boundaries.  With this in mind, 
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it is not surprising that conservative talk radio’s presence is largely attributed to its use of 
syndicated distribution allowing one program to be heard nationwide.  Conservative talk is less 
dependent on attention to local issues than liberal talk because of the more universal appeal of 
individualism.   
While the non-profit media that were examined in the present analysis are not specifically 
academic media sources, they embody the qualities that characterize academic materials through 
their attempts to avoid reducing their ideas to short arguments: the opposite of the strategy used 
by the talk radio loudmouth genre.  The findings in the present analysis that link political 
ideology with media choices match popular perceptions of conservatives being drawn to “black 
and white” while liberals are drawn to “grey”.  Talk radio listening, a medium associated with 
straight-forward clear cut logic, was found to be associated with conservatism while public 
media sources, which are perceived as emphasising the complexity of topics; were associated 
with liberalism.   
However, it is possible for liberal oriented media to make use of sound-bite style media.  
This has been demonstrated by Michael Moore’s various films as well as Mark Achbar and Bart 
Simpson (2003) who produced the film The Corporation. These filmmakers draw in audiences 
because of their emphasis on power relations.  They offer examples and implications of 
disparities in wealth and influence in the sense that Mills (1959) describes.  They aim to mobilize 
activism by appealing to their audiences’ vulnerabilities by illuminating exploitation and 
encouraging viewers to relate with those on the screen.   Ultimately, this style also uses 
individualism to stimulate viewers.  Qualitative research would be useful in examining if these 
techniques explain the box office success of films that use individualism to attack neo-
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conservatism.  Such research would interview viewers about which aspects of these films are 
most resonate and easy to identify with.   
Few American syndicated radio programs air on Canadian stations.  Because the CRTC 
encourages local programming, apart from Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) radio, 
Canada does not have high profile national talk radio voices.  Further research would be useful in 
determining if this has any implications on differences in the role that talk radio has in Canada in 
comparison with the United States.  The “tell it like it is” quality of talk radio has positioned the 
medium as a conservative forum for those frustrated with the media in the United Sates.  Canada 
also has a wealth of conservative talk radio hosts; however, Canada’s lack of high profile 
national hosts may mean that Canadians are less likely to recognize the medium as a 
conservative forum.  The present analysis suggests that many in the United States see talk radio 
as an alternative to the liberal media.  As Canadians may be less likely to see the genre this way, 
those in Canada may be more likely to see the media as more unified and lacking non-liberal 
alternatives.  However, it is not clear if Canadians are as sceptical of the media as Americans and 
if they perceive a liberal bias to the extent that Americans do.  Future research that surveys both 
those in Canada and the United States about their perceptions of media bias using consistent 
indicators and methodology will help to explore this question.   
While the present analysis associates non-profit media use with liberalism, it offers no 
evidence that those who use non-profit media are concerned about a Republican bias in the news 
media.  This is evidence of the pervasiveness of discourse pointing to a liberal bias in the media.  
Claims of a liberal bias not only encourage liberals to perceive a liberal bias; they also 
discourage liberals from seeing a conservative bias.  This manifests itself in survey data by 
revealing that those on the “left” are more likely not to perceive a bias in the news media.  
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Regardless of how one evaluates the balance of media coverage, claims of media bias are 
influential because they open the foundations of arguments to question.  They suggest that 
citizens have insufficient information to properly evaluate the claims and reasoning used by 
newsmakers.  As described in the literature review, there is some evidence that claims of media 
bias influence public opinion about Presidential candidates.  Critical discourse analysis offers 
utility in understanding how claims of media bias are used to support and discount arguments.  
Briefly, critical discourse analysis studies how language and discourse relate to power.  The 
approach sees “semiosis as an irreducible element of all material social processes.  Social life is 
seen as interconnected networks of social practises of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, 
family, etc.)” (Chiapello and Fairclough 2002: 193). Fairclough (1985: 746) who has published 
extensively on the approach explains that, “ideologies and ideological practises may become 
dissociated to a greater or lesser extent from the social base, and the particular interests, which 
generated them”.  Research making use of these techniques can address how claims of media 
bias are supported and presented.  Critical discourse analysis will be useful in identifying 
assumptions that underlie claims of media bias and reveal how such claims become “truths”.  
Further, the approach, through attention to logic and reasoning, can reveal how assumptions 
about media credibility are implicitly and explicitly used to support arguments that pertain to 
public policy. 
Elite claims of media bias relate to Abercrombie’s (1990) assessment of Gramsci’s work 
in comparison with Adorno.  In contrast with Adorno, Abercrombie and Gramsci see hegemony 
as a process that involves some struggle and negotiation.  Elite claims of media bias reveal a 
perception that the public has ability to question.   Further, they represent attempts to encourage 
the public to see conservative ideas as more legitimate than liberal ones.  From this perspective, 
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by encouraging the public to see liberal ideas as lacking substantiation, the dominant class, while 
not acknowledging its own power, is seeking the “consent” of the public by influencing its trust 
in values and reasoning that conflict with its interests.  
While some non-profit media users who identify as liberals are influenced by depictions 
of the media as liberal, other liberal audience members will point to the leverage that corporate 
sponsors have on public media.  This group sees corporate sponsors as having the ability to 
encourage programming to conform to their interests.  While this group sees a conservative bias 
in the media and may prefer non-profit media to corporate owned media, its first choice for news 
is likely non-government organizations and alternative media that is user funded.    
In contrast, cable news services are generally owned by media conglomerates and depend 
on advertising revenue.  As mentioned earlier, CNN is the result of Ted Turner’s idea to apply 
the news radio format to television (Auletta 2003).  While CNN is not a part of the present 
analysis, the Fox News Channel was found to attract a conservative audience that see a 
Democratic bias in the news media.  FNC and talk radio use were the only media that predicted 
perceptions of a party bias in the media.  Both audiences were associated with perceptions of 
Democratic Party bias.   
These findings speak to the parallels between talk radio and 24-hour news services.  Both 
rely on the use of segments: a style that encourages the use of sound-bite production techniques.  
Generally, both are continuous news services.  They aim to extend the duration of the time that 
audience members spend watching them.  This encourages the use of climax building strategies 
such as sensationalism, teasers and is incentive for sound bite production.  Stories are presented 
as ongoing and constantly developing.   However, the small portion of overall viewing that they 
represent limits the revenue generated by these services. They have endless time to fill and much 
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pressure to keep costs low.  As described above, Herman and Chomsky (1998) and McChesney 
(2004) describe how the pressure to keep costs low influences programming. Future research 
would be useful in assessing if pressure for sound bites and cost minimization pushes 24-hour 
news services into appealing to conservative values.  While identifying connections between 
these pressures and the values encouraged by 24-hour television is difficult, discussions with 
journalists about which kinds of footage and news stories are more likely to be covered and aired 
will help to determine how operational objectives influence what is broadcast on 24-hour news 
services.  The use of experimental design and content analysis could assess the link that these 
pressures have on content.  For example, a comparison of what is produced by journalism 
students given different objectives and resources will help to reveal how the values included in 
television content are influenced by various restraints. 
Critics of the argument that 24-hour news services face some of Herman and Chomsky’s 
(1998) filters to a greater extent than other media may raise CNN as evidence of a liberal profit-
motivated 24-hour news service.  Work by Morris (2005) described in the literature review 
points to differences in the audiences and raises questions about differences in content on CNN 
compared with FNC.  However, it is not clear how CNN’s programming stands on its own terms.  
CNN’s programming may be perceived as liberal in comparison with that of Fox News; but 
further analysis is necessary to evaluate CNN.   
There is evidence that small budgets and continuous coverage are not deterministic 
features of the 24-hour news format.  The Fox News Channel in the United States and Canada’s 
CBC Newsworld represent different approaches to the format.  As described in the literature 
review, Fox News has been the subject of much discussion because of its distinct approach to 
news: one that self-identifies as objective but is criticized by those who see it as hyper-patriotism 
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and neo-conservatism propaganda disguised as value free news.  The findings in the present 
analysis and the literature in the area of media credibility suggest that marketers may see Fox 
News as an attempt to capitalize off of the segment of the news seeking audience that is 
concerned about the liberal bias that they see in the other news services.  The Fox News Channel 
is very emphatic about its flag-waving approach.  For example, in March of 2003 when anti-war 
protesters were demonstrating in New York City, the electronic ticker on the Fox News offices 
suspended regular headlines to display, “Attention Protesters: The Michael Moore Fan Club 
Meets Thursday at a Phone Booth At Sixth Avenue and 50th Street” (Auletta 2003).   
In contrast with Fox News, CBC Newsworld’s schedule includes a number of programs 
that prioritize information ahead of climax building and sound-bite production including 
investigative journalism programs.  On the surface, Newsworld’s programming seems closer to 
what is aired on PBS than to Fox News programming.  While Newsworld includes debate-
oriented programs, it does not seem to rely on shouting-matches to the extent that FNC does.  
The major difference between Fox and Newsworld is that both advertisers and the government 
fund the latter.  The Fox News Channel is not a public broadcaster.  A political economy 
perspective points to these operational differences between the broadcasters in explaining why 
FNC and CBC Newsworld represent different approaches to news.   
As described in discussion of the methodological aims of this project, the present analysis 
does not attempt to point to causal connections between media use and political variables.  
However, media companies are becoming increasingly niche oriented and consumers have a 
greater range of individual media sources to choose from.  It is becoming easier for people to 
restrict the ideological range of the content that they are exposed to.   
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Satellite radio is of interest to discussions about such trends.  These services, which were 
licensed for distribution in Canada in June of 2005, sell subscribers access to at least one 
hundred radio channels.  Company press releases indicate that there are approximately 180, 000 
satellite radio subscribers in Canada (Sirius Satellite Radio Canada 2006 and XM Satellite Radio 
Canada 2006)3.  Because of greater economies of scale and their operational models, satellite 
radio companies include dozens of niche-oriented channels in their offerings.  Some news and 
talk stations are named and branded to communication associations with political ideologies.  
Most non-music stations have very little or no advertising.  Because of subscriber revenues and 
the niche-oriented aspect of the service, advertisers have a different relationship with satellite 
providers than they do with more traditional media.  Satellite companies market their line-ups to 
subscribers as packages whereas terrestrial radio and television broadcasters aim to increase their 
individual share of overall radio tuning.  Because of the breadth of channels on satellite, 
advertisers can choose stations that suit their ideologies and business objectives.  Programmers 
have far less, or no pressure, to produce consumer oriented or mass appeal content.  Satellite 
radio represents an opportunity for radio that is less influenced by advertisers.  Examples of 
channels that provide news coverage and discussion of current events include Sirius Satellite 
radio’s Public Radio International (PRI) which airs news from several international public radio 
news organizations and The Power, an African American talk station, which is carried by XM 
Satellite Radio and currently available only to subscribers residing in the United States.  
However, most of the news channels available to satellite radio subscribers are services offered 
by existing news organizations such as CNN, ABC, Fox, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
                                                 
3 Sirius Satellite Radio Canada claimed to have 100,000 subscribers on May 10 2006.  XM Satellite Radio Canada 
claimed to have 80,000 subscribers on June 5 2006. 
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(BBC), CBC and Bloomberg.  The present range of news channels available on satellite radio 
duplicates many of the services available on cable and satellite television.   
Satellite radio does not address all of the limitations of profit-motivated media described 
by McChesney (2004) and Herman and Chomsky (1998).  The operations are very centralized 
and potential owners are reduced by the highly capital intensive nature of the infrastructure 
required.  While some satellite radio companies are publicly traded allowing for ownership by 
the middle class, controlling ownership is out of reach for the vast majority of people.  In 
contrast, The Real News (formerly International World Television) is a non-profit organization 
that plans to fund itself completely from small donations from the international community to 
support a to be launched network that will aim to diversify news.  The founding Chair of the 
organization is Paul Jay, Creator and former Executive Producer of CBC Newsworld’s 
counterSpin.  Other founders include actress and Air America host Janeane Garofalo, labour 
leader Buzz Hardgrove, author and activist Naomi Klein, professor and activist Robert 
McChesney and former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations Stephen Lewis among 
others including some from outside of North America.  The organization is adamant about the 
implications that advertisers and owners, including governments, have on content representing a 
deterministic view of ownership and profit motivations.  Both satellite radio and The Real News 
demonstrate attempts to add diversity through new operational models.  
The findings described of the present analysis demonstrate that existing media differ in 
the types of associations that they have with political participation.  Most of the media use 
variables that were found to be significantly related to the various political participation scales at 
the multivariate level had the expected relationship with the dependent variables.  The comedy 
television variable was the exception to this.  As discussed in Chapter 6, The Daily Show 
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includes much discussion of current events and is expected to represent a major portion of the 
tuning to comedy programs described by respondents.  Despite that Baumgartner and Morris 
(2006) found through experimental and survey analysis that watching The Daily Show was 
associated with lower support for presidential candidates and higher cynicism for the electoral 
process among college students, the findings from the present analysis found that watching 
comedy programs was positively associated with political participation.  While these associations 
were weak, the association between comedy television use and online political participation is 
among the strongest of all of the coefficients involving media use in the various models.  
Assuming that the expectation about the relative influence of Jon Stewart’s program in 
comparison with other programs is accurate, these findings raise questions about the connection 
that Putnam (2000) makes between cynicism and low participation.   However, there are a 
number of considerations to be mindful of when placing the present analysis in the context of 
these works.  First, the findings in the present analysis do not address cynicism with the electoral 
process and therefore cannot support the inference that cynical members of The Daily Show 
audience are also politically active.  Second, Putnam (2000) discusses civic participation, a more 
general concept than political participation.  Finally, Baumgartner and Morris (2006) used a 
much narrower sample.  However, the findings pertaining comedy television identified by the 
present analysis, in the context of other research, raise the possibility that media has the potential 
of motivating participation through cynicism.  The present analysis found associations between 
comedy television use and scales that included items that measured political participation outside 
of the electoral system suggesting that some comedy television audience members may be 
frustrated with the electoral system and therefore seek other political forums.  Future qualitative 
research would be useful in understanding if and how such processes take place.  A stronger 
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understanding of the connection between electoral cynicism and political activism can be gained 
by interviewing members of political organizations about their perceptions of the electoral 
system and their motivations for activism.  Further cross-sectional survey data analysis would be 
useful in identifying trivariate relationships between media use, political cynicism and political 
participation.   
The findings pertaining to comedy television watching and political participation 
suggests that news is not the only media that can be associated with political participation.  
Further, as described in the literature review, not all current affairs news sources are associated 
with political participation and studies are inconsistent in their findings.  There is evidence that 
newspaper use is positively related to political participation (Eveland Jr. and Scheufele 2000; 
Shah, et al. 2001b; Scheufele 2002).  Baum’s (2003 and 2005) work points to the link that 
entertainment oriented media can have on attentiveness to current issues.  Baum (2003: 270) 
explains that: 
Strategic media practices, undertaken in response to changing economic, 
regulatory, and technological circumstances, have altered many American’s 
propensity to pay attention to select high-profile political issues, including foreign 
policy crises.  My findings demonstrate that this effect is most pronounced for 
individuals who are neither intrinsically interested in such issues nor actively 
seeking such information. 
 
While attentiveness does not always translate into participation, Baum’s (2003) findings 
and the present analysis have implications on the debate about the link between television use 
and civic participation.  As described in detail in the literature review, Putnam’s works see 
television as reducing civic participation.  In response, Norris (2002) suggests that it is important 
to consider the specific type of media use.  Norris’ argument is supported by the present analysis 
as media with both positive and negative relationships to political participation were identified.  
The findings that describe comedy television use point to the complexity involved when 
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distinguishing between media sources.  It demonstrates that the entertainment/information 
dichotomy is reductive and highlights the difficulty in separating the two categories.   
Putnam (2000) sees television as time filler and therefore an inhibitor of civic 
engagement.  Further research that focuses on specific media sources while distinguishing 
between appointment viewing and television use that is unplanned would be useful.  Putnam’s 
characterization of television seems to emphasize non-appointment television use.  Consideration 
of this distinction will help to separate the habitual and lifestyle implications of television 
viewing from the role played by the content itself.   
The introduction of new media technologies suggests that media use is impacting lifestyle 
habits and political life in new ways.  DVRs, iPods and satellite radio are only some examples of 
such technologies.  As market researchers seek to understand the marketplace potential of such 
products and services, it is critical that academics seek to better understand the implications that 
these technologies have.  The extent that these technologies impact political life is unclear.  As a 
result, public policy is not sufficiently informed about a potentially major aspect of political life.  
As new media products and services become more pervasive, it becomes increasingly important 
that market research findings are scrutinized and expanded with critical analysis.   
The crudeness of the media use indicators in the survey used in the present analysis 
demonstrates that it is important that media researchers have access to more detailed media use 
indicators.  Ideally, scholars would have access to data describing television viewing and radio 
use through people meters such as those used by the organizations that measure television 
viewing for broadcasters and the advertising industry.   Such data would be linked to 
demographics and information about political views and behaviours as well information about 
use of non-broadcast media. Metered data is better than questionnaire methodology at capturing 
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the “channel surfing” that viewers do with their remote control devices.  The lack of surveys that 
measure media use and political participation and identification using a Canadian sample singles 
the lack of understanding of the role of media use in the Canadian context.   
It seems reasonable to expect the findings from the present analysis to apply to Canada.  
Canada and the United States share many of the same media offerings.  All of the major U.S. 
networks and many U.S. cable channels are available in Canada.  All of the media sources 
examined in the present analysis are available in Canada.  Those in American states that 
neighbour Canadian provinces have access to some Canadian media.  People in both countries 
use many of the same print and online sources.  In both cases, the vast majority of high profile 
media companies are privately owned and funded by advertisers.  However, because American 
media, which generally assumes a U.S. audience, is much more prevalent than Canadian media 
in both countries, Canadian news stories are mostly restricted to Canadian newscasts and have 
little presence in other forums including most entertainment oriented programming.  For 
example, Jon Stewart’s program, while popular in Canada, focuses on issues pertaining to the 
United States.  In the present analysis, respondents were asked about media that emphasizes their 
country’s stories.  In contrast, Canadians have to be more deliberate when seeking information 
on Canadian current events and are often in positions where their evaluations of local issues are 
influenced by topics covered in foreign media.   
Further, there are differences in the values between those in Canada and the United 
States.  For example, Grabb and Curtis (2005: 251) found that those in the United Sates had 
“higher levels of religiosity and sexual and moral conservatism” while Canadians were found to 
be more politically active and “tolerant” of racial and ethnic diversity. In addition to suggesting 
that a Canadian sample would differ in its distribution along the political ideology and 
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participation scales used in the present analysis, these findings signal that American media is 
aimed at a more conservative audience.  As a result, Canadians are using media that has been 
developed to match the tastes of an audience with somewhat different values.   
Despite parallels between the media environments in Canada and the United States, it is 
unclear how these issues would impact the strength and direction of the relationships between 
media use and the dependent variables examined in this analysis with a Canadian sample.   These 
concerns highlight the need for tools that would make it possible to examine the link between 
media use and political behaviour and identification in Canada. 
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TABLE A1.1: BACKGROUND VARIABLES AS A PERCENTAGE OF AUDIENCE: 
^Form-specific variable 
 
 Radio Non-Profit 
 Regularly or sometimes learn from: Religious^ Talk^ C-SPAN NPR PBS 
N 323 738 915 1104 1041 
Gender           
Male 41.5% 54.1 50.5 51.7 52.3 
Female 58.5% 45.9 49.5 48.3 47.7 
Age           
18 to 29 17.0% 21.8 20.9 21.9 16.3 
30 to 39 17.0% 20.7 20.0 20.9 18.8 
40 to 49 22.5% 21.0 21.4 22.3 21.9 
50 to 59 19.4% 14.0 15.4 15.6 18.0 
60 to 69 6.2% 9.6 8.6 8.0 10.2 
70 to 79 7.7% 11.0 9.0 7.4 9.7 
80 plus 10.2% 1.9 4.6 3.9 5.0 
"Race"/Ethnicity           
White (Not Hispanic) 66.0% 78.9 73.8 80.7 77.1 
Black (Not Hispanic) 24.6% 12.8 16.8 11.1 14.5 
Hispanic 9.6% 12.4 10.1 9.3 9.7 
Religion           
Protestant 83.0% 52.8 52.6 50.0 51.4 
Roman Catholic 13.9% 29.1 28.1 25.8 28.3 
Born Again 69.8% 34.4 35.0 34.0 31.6 
Education           
Grade 8 or less 2.8% 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 
Some High School 12.1% 8.2 8.2 6.6 8.1 
High School 38.1% 31.8 34.0 33.4 31.5 
Business, Technical, Voc. 3.7% 3.3 2.2 2.0 3.2 
Some College 22.0% 26.1 24.8 22.4 22.5 
College Graduate 15.8% 19.2 19.3 19.3 20.0 
Post-grad or Professional 5.6% 9.9 10.5 15.2 13.5 
Annual Family Income           
Less than $10,000 11.7% 7.3 4.1 6.2 5.8 
$10,000 to under $20,000 17.6% 12.9 10.4 10.8 11.8 
$20,000 to under $30,000 16.9% 11.4 13.1 12.7 14.7 
$30,000 to under $40,000 14.8% 14.0 20.0 16.1 14.3 
$40,000 to under $50,000 13.4% 10.1 11.6 9.6 10.9 
$50,000 to under $75,000 11.7% 17.1 12.8 16.1 13.3 
$75,000 to under $100,000 5.2% 13.6 12.1 14.2 14.9 
$100,000 to under $150,000 5.2% 8.6 9.3 7.6 8.2 
$150,000 or more 3.4% 5.0 6.7 6.7 6.2 
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^Form-specific variable; *Get “most” of TV news from 
 Table A1.1 cont’d Television 
 Regularly or sometimes learn from: Magazine^ Cable Political Sun AM FNC* Local News^ 
N 1104 1400 1227 622 548 
Gender           
Male 46.2 51.5 49.6 51.8 46.7 
Female 53.8 48.5 50.4 48.2 53.3 
Age           
18 to 29 18.1 20.8 19.6 18.4 17.7 
30 to 39 19.0 19.3 16.4 20.0 20.3 
40 to 49 21.5 23.5 21.0 17.4 23.1 
50 to 59 16.4 14.6 16.6 18.7 17.1 
60 to 69 11.8 10.4 11.6 10.6 7.7 
70 to 79 10.2 7.6 10.0 12.1 8.9 
80 plus 3.0 3.9 4.7 2.9 5.2 
"Race"/Ethnicity           
White (Not Hispanic) 79.5 75.1 77.6 82.8 78.4 
Black (Not Hispanic) 12.6 15.1 14.7 10.6 13.4 
Hispanic 9.7 12.2 9.7 76.0 10.4 
Religion           
Protestant 53.1 51.9 53.0 55.0 55.4 
Roman Catholic 30.2 31.2 32.0 27.8 28.7 
Born Again 32.1 34.3 35.5 40.4 32.8 
Education           
Grade 8 or less 2.6 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.2 
Some High School 7.7 7.4 8.7 8.7 10.4 
High School 34.7 32.8 36.3 37.6 34.5 
Business, Technical, Voc. 3.4 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.3 
Some College 25.4 25.2 23.2 26.6 24.0 
College Graduate 17.6 20.9 17.0 15.1 18.0 
Post-grad or Professional 8.6 10.0 10.6 7.2 8.6 
Annual Family Income           
Less than $10,000 7.2 5.7 6.6 5.5 6.4 
$10,000 to under $20,000 10.2 11.8 13.5 12.1 13.3 
$20,000 to under $30,000 13.5 13.0 13.2 12.8 16.4 
$30,000 to under $40,000 15.2 17.4 16.5 16.6 16.0 
$40,000 to under $50,000 11.9 10.1 10.2 15.2 13.9 
$50,000 to under $75,000 15.5 14.8 15.0 15.9 14.6 
$75,000 to under $100,000 14.7 13.6 12.0 11.3 9.4 
$100,000 to under $150,000 8.2 8.2 8.4 6.6 5.6 
$150,000 or more 3.6 5.5 4.6 4.0 4.4 
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Table A1.1 cont’d 
 Regularly or sometimes learn from: Entertainment TV  
 Comedy Late Night Morning^ Total Sample  
N 840 874 727 3188 
Gender         
Male 53.8 49.4 40.2 48.5 
Female 46.2 50.6 59.8 51.5 
Age         
18 to 29 39.3 33.8 20.1 20.9 
30 to 39 20.9 20.1 19.1 18.6 
40 to 49 21.6 19.8 22.6 21.9 
50 to 59 8.8 8.7 17.2 16.1 
60 to 69 3.7 5.9 7.4 8.9 
70 to 79 3.7 7.7 8.3 9.4 
80 plus 2.0 4.0 5.4 4.0 
"Race"/Ethnicity         
White (Not Hispanic) 70.6 74.3 73.9 80.1 
Black (Not Hispanic) 16.1 13.8 15.0 11.7 
Hispanic 15.5 15.3 10.5 10.0 
Religion         
Protestant 46.4 49.0 56.7 54.1 
Roman Catholic 29.4 31.2 30.0 27.2 
Born Again 28.8 31.5 38.4 33.4 
Education         
Grade 8 or less 1.7 3.4 2.6 3.0 
Some High School 9.3 9.5 11.7 9.8 
High School 31.8 37.8 38.3 33.9 
Business, Technical, Voc. 3.7 3.6 2.2 2.9 
Some College 27.7 21.8 22.3 23.7 
College Graduate 16.9 14.6 13.6 17.5 
Post-grad or Professional 8.9 9.3 9.2 9.1 
Annual Family Income         
Less than $10,000 9.9 12.7 9.9 7.6 
$10,000 to under $20,000 10.6 13.0 11.8 12.5 
$20,000 to under $30,000 13.0 12.7 17.2 14.8 
$30,000 to under $40,000 20.2 19.0 18.0 15.5 
$40,000 to under $50,000 10.0 7.8 12.3 12.0 
$50,000 to under $75,000 13.4 12.7 13.4 14.5 
$75,000 to under $100,000 9.6 10.2 7.3 11.7 
$100,000 to under $150,000 7.4 7.4 4.5 6.7 
$150,000 or more 6.0 4.4 5.6 4.8 
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Appendix 1: Audience Composition Comparison 
 
 This appendix is included to offer readers a sense of how the audiences of the various 
media differ.  Apart from the expectation that non-profit media use will be positively associated 
with socio-economic status, this discussion does not directly relate to the hypotheses in the 
present analysis.  It has been included to provide readers with a context of how media use relates 
to the control variables.  The audiences of the content categories are defined as those respondents 
who “sometimes” or “regularly” learn about the election from the source.  The Fox News 
Channel audience includes those who get “most” of their television news about the election from 
FNC.  Percentages are based only on valid cases for “race”, education and income.  The bases 
used to calculate the percentages of the other variables include missing cases.  There were no 
missing cases for age or gender.   
Most audiences closely mirror the composition of the total sample.  There were some 
differences: 
• Sex: The talk radio and comedy show audiences were slightly more male while the 
morning television audience were slightly more female in comparison with the total 
sample.  
• Age: Those aged between 18 and 29 had the most distinct media use.  This age group is 
more highly represented in the audience for late-night television and comedy programs.  
The group is under-represented in the audiences for public television and network 
newscasts.  Those older than 50 years of age are under-represented in the comedy 
audience.   
• “Race”/Ethnicity: The audiences for religious radio, C-SPAN, political talk shows on 
cable television, late night, comedy and morning television had a smaller proportion of 
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Whites than the total sample.  Of these groups, Blacks were over represented in the 
religious radio, C-SPAN, CNN, comedy and morning talk show television audiences.  
Hispanics are more likely than the total sample to consume late night and comedy 
television.  No audience had disproportionately more Whites than the total sample. 
• Religion: There were differences in the religious composition of the audiences of the 
various broadcasters.  The religious radio audience is predominately Protestant and 
under-represents Roman Catholics.  The comedy television audience represents less 
Protestants than the total sample.  Those who identify as born again are over-represented 
in the audiences for religious radio, morning television and The Fox News Channel.   
• Socio-economic status: The non-profit media users had slightly higher incomes and 
educational attainment than the total sample.  Further, weak positive correlations between 
the education and income and the learning scales for NPR, C-SPAN and PBS were found.  
These findings support Hypothesis 3.  Religious radio listeners, late-night television and 
morning talk show viewers are more likely to have not furthered their education after 
high school. Comedy show viewers are more likely to have some college training.  Over-
representation of this group is likely related to the young audience that watches these 
programs.  There is a large over-representation of those with annual family incomes that 
are less than $20, 000 in the religious radio audience.  
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